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CHAPTER 1
Introduction




“By the way, how did you get Sidney Dekker’s report?”
Professor John Stoop, expert in the field of accident investigation, sounded alarmed. 
It was December 2011 when I was conducting research for my master’s thesis. I was in 
Stoop’s office at the Aerospace Engineering faculty of the Technical University Delft, 
the Netherlands, where I was just about to ask him about a strange thing that I had 
found regarding an air crash investigation. Almost three years earlier, in February 2009, 
a Turkish Airlines Boeing had stalled1 and crashed just before landing in Amsterdam. 
After a year of investigating the Dutch Safety Board had concluded that several parties, 
including the pilots who had tragically perished, had contributed to a fatal loss of control. 
Specifically, the pilots and an air traffic controller had violated certain standard operating 
procedures, which could have helped them catch the technical cause of the accident. 
However, an advisory report written on behalf of the investigation had concluded from 
painstaking analysis of the black box recordings that the pilots were not to blame. This 
report was written by the Dutch safety scholar Sidney Dekker.
“You do know it is a confidential report, don’t you?” professor Stoop continued his 
interrogation.
“Yes,” I replied, although I had not realised it was such an issue. I had stumbled upon 
Dekker’s advisory report when I started interviewing aviation experts to comment on 
the Board’s conclusions and lessons that could be drawn. After an interview, one of the 
experts had emailed Dekker’s report to me.
“It has never been released.”
“Well, I believe you can find it on the Internet.”
“You may be able to get it, but know that there is a legal side to this. If you were to 
write your thesis about these contrasting reports, don’t be surprised to get a worried 
response from the Dutch Safety Board. Like, how did you get this confidential report 
that was never published? So be aware of this.”
“Right, that’s good to know.”
“Yes. But be careful, this is very sensitive.”
About eight years later, it turned out that professor Stoop had not been exaggerating. 
The NY Times published an article accusing the Dutch Safety Board of burying Dekker’s 
report (Hamby, 2020, 21 January). Like me, they had stumbled upon Dekker’s report. 
It argues that the Turkish pilots had conducted themselves professionally and were 
not to blame. This pointed the finger to the Boeing 737 ‘Next Generation’ (NG)’s 
unreliable technology. The appendices of the final report show that in response, a team 
of Americans, including Boeing and federal safety officials, attacked the board’s rendering 
of Boeing’s safety processes as ‘technically incorrect’, concluding that prior to this crash, 
1 Stall occurs when an aircraft exceeds its well-defined flight envelope, such as when flying too slowly 
at too great an (nose-up) angle with respect to the airflow, and means a sudden loss of lift and con-
trol. Recovery from stall is not always possible, notably when flying low, and stalling is therefore 
strictly avoided.
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no risks were demonstrated (Dutch Safety Board, 2010, p. 150-151). Subsequently, 
‘the Dutch Safety Board either excluded or played down criticisms of the manufacturer’ 
(Hamby, 2020, 21 January).
However, in the wake of two recent crashes of the 737NG’s successor, the 737MAX, 
journalistic coverage on Boeing raised serious questions about the safety culture of the 
organisation (Laris, 2019, October 19). Like the 737NG, the MAX was programmed in 
ways that pilots were not informed about or trained to handle. Autonomously operating 
safety systems could suddenly act up and cause flight crews to lose control. In case of 
the 737MAX, to compensate for aerodynamic consequences of larger, more efficient 
engines, there was a Manoevring Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), which 
was completely hidden from pilots, even though it could deeply intervene in control. 
Members of the Boeing company apparently knew that the design might be flawed but 
convinced the USA’s Federal Aviation Administration to certify the system in a way that 
prevented expensive pilot retraining on the MAX type (Kitroef, 2020, January 9). These 
dealings cast a questionable light on an array of earlier actions by the Boeing company, 
which the NY Times traced back to the 2009 Turkish Airlines crash.
This dissertation encompasses a set of studies that address persistent yet problematic 
assumptions about the way complex and hazardous technologies are operated by the 
members of aviation safety cultures. In aviation, safety culture plays an important role 
in fostering work practices with underlying norms and belief systems that contribute 
to safety. Safety culture can be defined as “the assembly of underlying assumptions, 
beliefs, values and attitudes shared by members of an organisation, which interact 
with an organisation’s structures and systems and the broader contextual setting to 
result in those external, readily-visible, practices that influence safety” (Edwards, 
Davey & Armstrong, 2013, p 77). Aviation safety cultures have gathered a great 
deal of knowledge from accident investigations and are often taken as examples of 
professionalism, discipline, and commitment to safety. As a result, aviation safety culture 
is often described as humble in terms of its acceptance of human errors and technical 
failures, underscored by the many redundancies, meticulous planning, and adherence 
to standard operating procedures (Hudson, 2003). But as the case of the Turkish 
Airlines crash suggests, recovering the black boxes, reading them out, and analysing 
the contents are not a guarantee for learning. Some lessons may be hard to learn, when 
faced with the fragmented, politically charged snapshot that the black box read-out 
provides. The Turkish Airlines case highlights that, precisely because of the extensive 
standardisation and conformity presumed necessary to stay in control of the extremely, 
but not completely reliable aviation technology, it is hard to grasp how deviations from 
standards belong to such a culture. Deviations from standards however are implied in 
the more varied, fragile, and messy processes in which operational experts like pilots, 
flight attendants, air traffic controllers, maintenance technicians, and ground personnel 
actually work. The central research question of my dissertation therefore is:
1
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Chapter 1
What role do deviations from standards play in committed safety cultures?
In this introduction I first describe my research approach to safety culture, the context of 
the Dutch aviation industry, and a characterisation of the safety ideology that members 
of the culture use to make sense of working and organising with hazardous and complex 
technologies. Next, I examine the contrasting air crash investigation narratives on the loss 
of control over Turkish Airlines flight TK1951. My approach acknowledges that air crash 
investigations are not objective depictions of reality, but after-the-fact sensemaking 
(Gephart, 1993), based on fragmented data (Dekker, 2004) by experts who seek to 
craft authoritative narratives (Brown, 2004). I first show how the Dutch Safety Board’s 
final report construes deviations from standards as inherently dangerous. Then I show 
how Dekker’s advisory report, which draws on alternative ideas, deconstructs some of 
the assumptions underpinning the board’s narrative. I go on to extrapolate this line of 
thinking to guide my subsequent research on the role of deviations from standards in 
committed safety cultures. The sub-questions formulated from this discussion of the 
accident are foreshadowed below in Table 1 and elaborated in the final sections of the 
introduction chapter.
Table 1. Overview of research questions
Central research question: What role do deviations from standards play in committed safety cultures?
Chapter 2: How do contrasting risk perceptions manifest themselves in the societal 
context of airline risk management processes, and how do these social 
manifestations impact regular work in the cockpit?
Chapter 3: How does deviance become normalised in reflective safety-critical work 
practices, and what are the consequences for risk management?
Chapter 4: How does the commitment to safety of maintenance technicians emerge 
and develop under social and organisational influences?
Chapter 5: How can ‘safety 2’ analyses of organisational deviance incorporate 
bottom-up processes?
1.2 RESEARCH APPROACH AND CONTEXT
1.2.1 Studying aviation safety culture in the Dutch research context
I approach safety culture as an anthropological concept, in contrast to the more common 
functionalist approach (Edwards et al., 2013; Guldenmund, 2000, 2010). According 
to the functionalist approach, organisations can engineer safety cultures by using the 
right techniques and systems (Reason, 1997). However, this approach has been widely 
criticised for ‘its inability to demonstrate causal relationships between such features 
and safety performance; a lack of conceptual clarity as to what, exactly, constitutes a 
safety culture; and a neglect of inequalities in power and authority and competing sets of 
legitimate interests in organizations’ (Hardy, Maguire, Power & Tsoukas, 2020, p. 1041). 
In anthropology, there are no functionalist claims regarding culture: cultures describe 
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contexts in terms of the way people, native to these contexts, understand them (Geertz, 
1973). In safety cultural contexts, particular arrays of practices and technologies exist 
that are widely understood in terms of their ability to make possible the safe operation of 
demonstrably hazardous industrial processes (Edwards et al., 2013; Gherardi, Nicolini & 
Odella, 1998; Guldenmund, 2000; Turner & Gray, 2009). To some extent, a culture like 
a particular organisation’s safety culture, is also a political and discursive phenomenon. 
Members of an organisation themselves articulate their own espoused safety values 
(Schein, 1990), which may or may not correspond with what these people actually do, 
and which often becomes entangled in relations of power and (office) politics (Antonsen, 
2009). Safety culture may therefore sometimes refer less to an inherent quality by which 
a certain group or organisation behaves and more to an ideological struggle to (re)define 
what the appropriate cultural behaviours are (cf. Kunda, 1992).
Indeed, as my studies show, there is considerable nuance and debate within ‘the 
culture’ of aviation safety about what constitute safe practices and technologies. I use 
quotation marks because putting boundaries around a culture is inherently a somewhat 
arbitrary exercise in view of the dynamics by which cultural identities are reproduced; that 
is, precisely by defining and redefining culture along practices and people who belong and 
those who do not (Martin, 2001). Furthermore, in specific organisations and professional 
communities, such as the communities in the Netherlands where I conducted my studies, 
safety culture emerges in context-specific ways. These ‘subcultures’ often articulate 
different aspects of practices and technologies, such as anonymous reporting systems, 
reporting practices, paper or digital checklists, and procedural discipline (Edwards et al., 
2013; Hudson, 2001; Reason, 1998).
Grounded in phenomena I encountered in the Dutch research context, I focussed 
on what the Turkish Airlines crash revealed as the most salient debate across various 
local Dutch articulations of the globalised aviation safety culture. That debate centres 
around what it means when highly trained and experienced aviation professionals deviate 
from ‘safe standards’ when operating hazardous technologies that are extremely, but 
not completely reliable.
There is ample indication that the essence of aviation professionalism may be 
described much like other technical work practices, such as Julian Orr’s (1996) influential 
study of the work done by copying machine service technicians. Technicians’ work could 
be characterised as a continuous, methodically prepared and executed improvisation, 
which highlighted the surprisingly fragility of technical understanding and control over 
the process of servicing (Orr, 1996). Analogously, studies in High Reliability Organisations 
like air traffic control and aircraft carrier operations found that expertise is demonstrated 
most clearly when teams improvise, deviate from plans, and exercise discretion in 
response to often only ambiguous signs of trouble (Bigley & Roberts, 2001; LaPorte & 
Consolini, 1991; Roberts, 1990; Weick & Roberts, 1993).
However, it is hard to capture the essence of professionalism in aviation safety 
cultures, because safety is often articulated in terms of regulation and standards. 
It is difficult to reconcile the view of high-tech safety-critical work as a continuous 
1
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improvisation, with the view that such work is highly standardised and regulated. As 
such, caricatures of aviation safety culture persist in both practice and theory that in a 
way act as a theoretical black box (Gross, 2009; Winner, 1993). A theoretical black box 
conceals the process by which inputs (e.g. unreliable moments in otherwise extremely 
fail-safe and redundant systems) are transformed to outputs (e.g. very high safety 
levels and conformity with standards). This process of transformation, which one might 
call the throughput, is subject to different and indeed sometimes conflicting readings. 
Thus, the nuance that can be found within aviation safety cultures on the processes and 
practices by which safety is achieved, is often lost in the translation of safe practices and 
technologies to ‘other’ cultures, such as health care. In health care, translations of aviation 
safety culture have been made to encourage lower ranking personnel to ‘speak up’ when 
physicians make mistakes and employ checklists to catch medical errors (Salazar et al., 
2014). However, caricatures of aviation safety culture as conformist and standardised 
have also driven safety protocolisation while pushing improvisations, which might have 
expressed safety commitment in different ways, underground (Batista, Clegg, Pina e 
Cunha, Giustiniano & Rego, 2016).
In aviation, too, the caricature has an interesting way of refracting back onto the 
culture it was meant to represent, as well as importing caricatures of other industrial 
safety cultures, such as Reason’s (1990) human error taxonomy and ‘Swiss Cheese 
Model’ (SCM) of accident prevention developed in the oil and gas industry (Reason, 
Shotton, Wagenaar, Hudson & Groeneweg, 1989). The SCM uses the analogy of safety 
procedures and other technical and organisational management tools as layers of Swiss 
cheese, stacked on top of each other, to catch hazards such as human errors and technical 
failures. An example of an organisational barrier is the disciplined reading of a landing 
checklist, by which flight crews can catch earlier, dangerous errors like incorrect aircraft 
configuration. Technical safety barriers stacked on top of the organisational barrier 
include for example an audible warning, automatically activated when the landing gear 
has not been deployed below a certain altitude. Each safety barrier thus encapsulated in 
safety-critical practices is potentially helpful to catch dangerous events from cascading 
out of control, but they are also imperfect, as visualised by the holes in the Swiss Cheese. 
Under certain conditions holes emerge, such as when crews are interrupted and the 
checklist procedure becomes less focused, or when a technical warning system is not 
activated as it should. Whilst this way of thinking and designing has probably contributed 
to safety, it sometimes elicits a normative management ideology (cf. Barley & Kunda, 
1992), which promotes a conformist caricature of aviation safety culture at the expense 
of articulating more fragile safety processes like improvisation or the use of heuristics 
(Suarez & Montes, 2019; Tuccio, 2011). After all, the more conformity with various 
procedures, the smaller the holes in the safety barriers through which dangerous events 
can escape control.
The black-boxing of aviation safety culture is well illustrated by how the public 
debate over the Turkish Airlines crash got reduced to the question whether it was 
human error, or unreliable technology that caused the crash. Pieter van Vollenhoven, a 
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noteworthy public figure in the Netherlands who was the Safety Board chair at the time 
of the Turkish Airlines crash, was recently asked to respond to the allegation that he had 
bowed to pressure from Boeing. Boeing’s way of dealing with the 737NG software bugs 
after all appeared to be more problematic in the light of recent 737MAX crashes. Van 
Vollenhoven however resolutely denied: he argued that Boeing had also been assigned 
responsibility for the crash. He pointed out that the final report therefore mentions a 
combination of human and technical factors (Nieuwenhuis, 2020, January 21). While 
Boeing’s technology was unreliable, the pilots had violated crucial safety procedures, 
which meant they were not monitoring the unreliable automatic system when it made a 
critical error. Van Vollenhoven commented:
We can get so enthused about machines. It is also said about ships and cars that they can 
be controlled automatically. It’s good that the operators keep getting trained to land the 
plane manually. At KLM they also fly manually much more often than at Turkish Airlines. 
But with machines come errors. You should not trust those automatic systems too much 
(Nieuwenhuis, 2020, January 21).2
This debate, which for about a decade remained buried within professional aviation 
communities, triggered my interest. Van Vollenhoven’s comment implies that pilots and 
their organisations should foster a measure of distrust in automatic system and that 
this commitment to safety should be expressed in (better) conformity with standard 
operating procedures. However, there is research that suggests that in practice working 
with automation generates reliance on automation. Pilots are embedded in the cockpit 
instruments and controls they operate (Hutchins, 1995b) and collaborate with automatic 
systems integrated in cockpits (Adriaensen, Patriarca, Smoker & Bergström, 2019), while 
standard operating procedures inform, rather than fully determine, how these systems 
get operated (Jahn, 2019).
The latter, admittedly much more complex view of reality however rarely survives 
public debate and more ‘theoretical’ (or rather technocratic) safety engineering discourse 
by which important technological choices are made. For example, in the case of the 
737MAX, the choice to keep stacking new software systems in an already complex 
technical design of the original 1960s Boeing 737 airframe in ways that were apparently 
only believed to be commercially viable if pilots were rudimentarily informed about 
how the software operates. In hindsight, this was a choice that expressed problematic 
commitment to safety as it undermined pilots’ control in important ways. Perhaps 
by learning to open up to the more fragile realities underlying safety problems, such 
technical choices can be made with more foresight.
2 Original quote in Dutch, my translation.
1
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1.2.2 Relevance beyond aviation and safety
A careful reading of the black boxes of aviation safety cultures may be a relevant exercise 
for researchers and professionals beyond the traditional safety-oriented industries. The 
importance of professional judgment is widely acknowledged since industrial processes 
are automated by increasingly intelligent software (Dreyfus & Hubert, 1992; Faraj, 
Pachidi & Sayegh, 2018). To stay adaptive in complex high-tech fields, working in the spirit 
of the rules (DeSanctis & Poole, 1994) may well be leading in popularity over following 
rules to the letter, given our tainted confidence in bureaucratic structures like hierarchies, 
silos, and standard operating procedures (Grey & Garsten, 2001). This popularity makes 
sense in a world of Silicon tech companies, where systems are constantly updated and 
programming errors are considered part of the game (Lee & Xia, 2010; Leonardi, 2011). 
But when it comes to safety (or health, or security), these enlightened views seem to 
rarely survive the dominant reasoning. The dominant assumption, notwithstanding well-
established notions of redundancy, error management, and professional discretion, is that 
safety is largely assured by compliance with standards, while deviations, and especially 
the structural occurrence of deviations from the published standards, imply a potential 
loss of control. We love a pilot who knows how to improvise, but we prefer that they just 
follow procedures as long as we are on board.
The aviation setting seems to be an excellent test case of ideas about trusting 
professional expertise, artificial intelligence, and flexible, adaptive work routines. These 
ideas are also reflected in aviation safety ideology, or espoused safety values, which 
are expressed in technological and organisational design. While the ideology is thus 
grounded in material reality, many of its underpinnings are contested. I therefore provide 
some further background on espoused safety values typically found in aviation contexts 
around the world.
1.2.3 Espoused safety values in aviation
The aviation industry prides itself on professional expertise, embedded in a unique 
safety culture (Pidgeon, 1997), where operational professionals supposedly consider 
safety to be their first priority, even in the face of intense commercial pressures and 
volatile markets. A few decades ago, a cultural shift occurred in the industry with the 
integration of digital instruments and autopilots, with whom a new generation of pilots 
learned to share control (Gras, Moricot, Poirot-Delpech & Scardigli, 1994; VanderBurgh, 
1997). While pilots remain responsible for judging situations, selecting the suitable level 
of automation, and intervening when necessary, control is increasingly mediated by 
digital ‘fly by wire’ systems that translates pilots’ control inputs and manages on-board 
processes like pumping fuel between different tanks. Airbus is working on a system 
that may in the future allow the autopilot to taxi and take off as well (Adams, 2020, 16 
January). Software is also used for safety by ‘augmenting’ flight characteristics, such 
as the Boeing 737MAX’s Manoeuvring Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) 
and Airbus’s ‘alpha protection’, which are in different ways meant to prevent stalling and 
losing control over the aircraft.
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Meanwhile, following traumatic crashes such as the 1977 collision between a KLM and 
a PanAm Boeing 747 in Tenerife (Weick, 1990), the industry tried to flatten hierarchies 
in the cockpit to prevent superiors from silencing valid safety concerns of subordinates 
(Helmreich, Merritt & Wilhelm, 1999), although the stripes on crews’ uniforms show that 
the airline business retains a traditional hierarchical system. Within the cockpit, roles and 
responsibilities are minutely described and allow pilots to switch from being in control 
of the aircraft as ‘pilot flying’ to ‘pilot non-flying’. The captain, always in the left seat, has 
the highest authority and as such the final responsibility for safety and both informally 
as well as sometimes formally acts as a trainer and examiner of co-pilots in the right seat. 
Rotating team schedules furthermore prevent groups to develop diverging practices or 
unwarranted informal authority, while anonymous safety occurrence reporting feeds 
local, national, and global ‘safety intelligence’ systems that are used to identify and 
mitigate risks (Pidgeon, 1997).
Through human factors pilot training courses known as Crew Resource Management, 
the industry fostered constructive, more humble professional attitudes that made pilots 
accept the fact that they inevitably make mistakes and developed practices that enable 
learning from and managing errors when they happen in the cockpit (Helmreich, 2000). 
These cultural traits are said to enable pilots to regularly exercise discretion to deal with 
grey areas encountered within the corpus of programming, planning, procedures, and 
protocols used to control, coordinate, structure, standardise, and safeguard air transport. 
Indeed, the lessons learned in the cockpit also became a guide for the other professionals 
and operational personnel in the industry, for example in aircraft maintenance and 
ground services, as well as other sectors, such as health care. However, because aviation 
is an industry where incidents trigger public scrutiny, aviation also presents a research 
site that reveals tensions and conflicting views on professional discretion. For example, 
as evidenced by accident investigations, debate regularly erupts on the extent to which 
it is legitimate for aviation professionals to deviate from standard operating procedures, 
if these were designed to ensure safe operations.
1.3 LOSS OF CONTROL
The Dutch Safety Board’s (2010) narrative on why Turkish Airlines flight TK1951 lost 
control provides a good illustration of how espoused safety values, which hold authority, 
fuel an authoritative safety discourse. That is, the safety board’s narrative is convincing 
because it applies or implicates authoritative concepts to make sense of a very complex 
problem out of fragmented and partially contested data (cf. Brown, 2004). I illustrate how 
the narrative achieves this by highlighting how it implicates the authoritative concepts 
of normal accidents, high reliability organising, and safety barriers.
1
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1.3.1 A normal accident
The first more technical explanation for the accident resonates with a classical 
sociological literature of normal accidents (Perrow, 2011). Charles Perrow argues that 
accidents should be considered normal in certain types of socio-technical systems, if these 
systems are inherently dangerous. Socio-technical systems are comprised of human 
operators as well as various (semi-)autonomously operating technical systems. In case 
of interactively complex, tightly coupled systems, such as aircraft and nuclear power 
plants (Perrow, 2011), complex interactions between people and technical systems will 
inevitably sometimes trigger a cascade of unexpected events that escapes the control 
of human operators. If one accepts that sociotechnical systems can be described along 
these dimensions, the more defining design characteristic might be complex interactivity, 
rather than tight coupling (Hollnagel, 2009). Redundancies, such as redundant altimeters 
on an aircraft, are designed to create loose coupling: if one system fails there are others 
which can take over. However, these very redundancies can interact complexly with 
other elements, especially when software is involved (Leveson, 2011), and thus still trap 
operators in situations with limited time and options.
In terms of normal accidents, the technical hazard revealed in the B737NG featured 
a complex software interaction, which emerged unpredictably. Corrosion in the fuselage 
probably caused a disturbed sensor signal of the left-hand radio altimeter, which then 
jumped to a nonsensical reading of -8 feet. Investigation testing the software revealed 
that the system then sometimes interpreted this reading as aircraft touchdown. This 
made the auto-throttle system switch to the ‘flare - retard’ mode and cut engine power 
for the final landing flare, even when the autopilot, which drew its data from other 
sensors, continued flying the approach. This complex software interaction had been 
reported before by some pilots flying the 737NG airplane in different parts in the 
world (Dutch Safety Board, 2010). It was being investigated by Boeing’s fleet resolution 
process, which analysed data, prioritised problems, and generated solutions to be shared 
with B737 operators around the world. Since pilots rarely reported the problem, and the 
resolution was to simply switch the automatic thrust control off, the issue had not been 
prioritised much. Therefore, no warning or technical design change had been issued. This 
kind of unreliability was as such considered acceptable within the industry and covered 
by existing non-normal procedures. In fact, if one dives into the technical formalities, 
it was even hard for the Board to classify the faulty radar altimeter as malfunctioning 
at all. To be precise, the Thales company who manufactured the computer pointed 
out that ‘tests performed during the investigation have established that both Radio 
Altimeter computers from the accident aircraft were operational and comply with their 
specifications’ (Dutch Safety Board, 2010, p. 100).
Because as a socio-technical system, air transport is so tightly coupled, it seems 
almost inevitable in hindsight that a crew would ultimately get ‘trapped’ in a particular 
combination of circumstances where the complex interaction would prove fatal. The 
tightly coupled conditions of flight TK1951 are provided by a number of factors. First, 
Schiphol’s air traffic controller had directed the Turkish Airlines crew on a shorter, 
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steeper line-up for the final approach path than how it was published in the official 
procedures. This meant that the airplane at first had to descend steeper to pick up the 
final, shallow glidepath of the Instrument Landing System (ILS) towards the runway. 
Second, the autothrottle had to cut engine power to idle in order to descend quickly and 
make the shortcut, but as I mentioned, it did so for another reason: due to the erroneous 
radio altimeter signal, the system ‘thought’ that the airplane had already landed. Once the 
independently acting autopilot pulled up from the steep descent, the autothrottle did not 
restore engine power as the flight crew expected. Third, because the crew were still busy 
getting ready for landing, and it is very hard to notice something that is not happening 
(restoring engine power), they also failed to notice that they were rapidly losing airspeed. 
Fourth, because it happened at such a low altitude, they were too late to recover the 
aircraft when it stalled. The Dutch Safety Board (2010, p. 8) therefore concludes:
The various different factors, and even a combination of some of them, will occur somewhere 
in the world on a daily basis in flight operations. What is unique about this accident is the 
combination of all the factors in a single flight.
1.3.2 Failed High Reliability Organising
Second, mirroring the established literature of high reliability organisations (Weick et 
al., 2008), the narrative provides evidence of human error by demonstrating how the 
accident resulted from failed organising on the part of the flight crew. The high reliability 
organisation (HRO) literature resulted from a set of ethnographic studies of a Berkeley 
social research group. In the 1980s, they began observing safety-critical high tech 
organisations such as air traffic control operations (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991), aircraft 
carrier deck operations (Weick & Roberts, 1993), and nuclear power plant operations 
(Schulman, 1993). In the light of a then dominant pessimistic literature about the 
mindlessness, sluggishness, and fallibility of traditional organisations, these studies found 
surprising mindfulness (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007), adaptivity (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991), 
and infallibility (Robert, 1990) given their extremely challenging conditions. Weick and 
Sutcliffe (2007) summarise that members of HROs are apparently ‘chronically worried’ 
as they stay vigilant even if nothing appears wrong, and track small failures because even 
small failures can cascade into fatal accidents.
When applying this literature to accidents, however, investigation narratives can 
demonstrate the failure of involved teams and organisations to live up to the ideal-type 
HRO that has consequently been construed in the literature (LaPorte, 1994; Rijpma, 
1997; 2003). In the case of the Turkish Airlines flight, as Van Vollenhoven recently 
again emphasised, the Turkish pilots failed to be mindful of the erratic behaviour of the 
autopilot. They failed to be mindful of the evolving situation and track small failures. Some 
failures may seem relatively insignificant: the radio altimeter was only one of several 
redundant altimeters, for example. But they can turn out to be a weak early signal of a 
process that is busy cascading into a big failure.
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The events leading up to the Turkish Airlines crash can indeed be read as failures of high 
reliability organising. The radio altimeter jumped to the -8 value shortly after take-off, 
but there is no evidence that the crew was aware. There is evidence that on approaching 
Schiphol, the Turkish Airlines crew noticed a warning ‘radio altimeter’ as well as ‘landing 
gear’. However, there is no evidence that they understood the connection between the 
two or tracked any potential impact on the evolving situation. It seems that, unlike some 
of the other crews who had earlier encountered the problem, the Turkish Airlines crew 
had not signalled that the autothrottle had switched to ‘retard flare’ mode (Dutch Safety 
Board, 2010, p. 204-205). However they seem to have missed several opportunities to 
discover the problem. When for example, as a consequence of the retard flare mode, 
the crew is unable to arm the speed brake for landing, Boeing notes that ‘[t]he crew did 
not discuss the warning light nor the associated nonnormal procedure contained in the 
QRH3’ (Dutch Safety Board, 2010, p. 145).
Perhaps distracting the crew from these weak signals precipitating the accident was 
the fact that it could be seen as a relatively busy flight. The captain was simultaneously 
teaching the co-pilot how to fly to the complex airport of Schiphol, although there was a 
third safety pilot in the jump seat to compensate with an extra pair of eyes. In any case, 
the crew in this case had not switched the automatic thrust control (auto-throttle) off. 
Then, as the crew approached Schiphol airport, the air traffic controller on duty deviated 
from standard operating procedure. The controller positioned the aircraft on a shorter 
approach path than the published procedure, without explicitly indicating this to the 
flight crew. This meant that the flight crew, which probably had not realised they were 
on a shorter trajectory, suddenly needed to speed up their work process as they were 
getting ready for landing. The safety pilot, who was supposed to safeguard the process, 
instead helped the process speed up by alerting the cabin crew to get seated for landing. 
Nobody was watching the instruments when the speed dropped.
The crew’s final moments can also be read as a lack of high reliability organising. The 
higher ranked captain interrupts the co-pilot at a point where, maybe, the plane could 
still have been saved. When the aircraft begins to stall, the crew is alerted by a stick 
shaker, which physically shakes the yoke that pilots use to control pitch and roll. This is 
an unmistakable cue to immediately apply full power and if possible push the nose down 
to recover. The co-pilot immediately responds by advancing the throttle, but the captain 
interrupts him before he completes this action, saying “I have”. The auto-throttle then 
again moves the throttle levers back to the idle position, which again cuts all engine 
power. At this point the aircraft cannot be saved anymore. The pilots now switch the 
autopilot and autothrottle off, and the captain advances the throttle to full power. He 
battles his way down a couple of hundred feet where the aircraft crashes into a wet 
field. The aircraft breaks up upon impact and slams the nose gear into the cockpit, fatally 
wounding the pilots. Since no fire breaks out, many passengers survive the accident. 
3 QRH: Quick Reference Handbook, which contains all non-normal and emergency procedures.
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Nevertheless, the Dutch Safety Board’s narrative shows how various imperfections to 
high reliability organising contributed to loss of control.
1.3.3 Compromised safety barriers
The third explanation for the crash that the Dutch Safety Board’s loss of control 
narrative provides also concerns human factors, building on widely accepted idea 
that standard operating procedures function as safety barriers against human errors 
(Reason, 1990; 1997; Reason et al., 1989). The narrative suggests that even with the 
above reconstructions demonstrating normal accident factors and failing HRO factors, 
the crash could still have been prevented if the pilots had conformed with standard 
operating procedures. Applying Reason et al.’s (1989) Swiss Cheese Model, the Board 
concludes:
The standard operating procedures in aviation are the safety barriers designed to ensure that 
flight safety is not compromised. […] As shown by the chain of events during flight TK1951, 
the importance of these standard operating procedures must not be underestimated if the 
flight is to be undertaken safely.
(Dutch Safety Board, 2010, p. 8)
Both Schiphol’s air traffic controller as well as the Turkish Airlines’ flight crew violated 
critical procedures. First, the chain of events described above would not have occurred 
as it did if the air traffic controller would have conformed to normal procedure. Because 
the controller fell back on a shortcut that had become routine practice for the controller, 
but not for the entire flight crew, the crew got ‘trapped’ by the tricky interaction between 
the faulty radio altimeter signal and the automation software.
Second, as they passed 1000 feet altitude, the Turkish Airlines procedure said they 
should have made been ready with the landing checks or made the decision to abort the 
landing. If they would have been ready with the landing checks, they would have been 
free to monitor the instruments, they would have noticed the speed dropping, and they 
would have been prepared to take control. A second decision point to go around, which 
could have saved them, was at 500 feet, which also passed without getting called. Had 
they aborted, the Dutch Safety Board concluded, the subsequent chain of events would 
not have unfolded and there might not have been a fatal crash that day.
The report therefore concludes that if air traffic control and the flight crew had 
followed all standard operating procedures, this accident would not have happened. 
Therefore, the narrative continues, even though these factors happen routinely 
across the world, the importance of standard operating procedures should not be 
underestimated. This implies that certain operational professionals involved, possibly 
indicative of problems within their organisational cultures, had underestimated the 
importance of standard operating procedures. Indeed, the Board’s recommendations 
reflect this implication: “In light of the deficiencies uncovered in this investigation, Turkish 
Airlines should adjust its safety programme” and the air traffic control organisation 
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“LVNL4 should harmonise its procedures for the lining up of aircraft on approach […]. 
LVNL should also ensure that air traffic controllers adhere to the VDV5” (Dutch Safety 
Board, 2010, p. 86).
1.4 RE-READING THE BLACK BOX
The Dutch Safety Board’s reconstruction may appear to demonstrate sound logic and a 
healthy common sense. Responsible operators of safety-critical technologies need to be 
vigilant for any technical anomalies and they need to stick with the procedures. However, 
Dekker’s (2009) report suggests that one can take issue with the way it reconstructs the 
accident as a normal accident, to explain the more technical factors, in combination with 
instances of failed high reliability organising and compromised safety barriers to explain 
the human factors. The main issue is that it makes it look like human operators and their 
organisations have control over socio-technical systems, which they really may not have.
1.4.1 Illusion of control
If the Turkish Airlines crash was a normal accident, then this cannot only serve as an 
explanation of the technical factors causing the crash. The theory after all describes 
socio -technical systems, which are comprised of technological systems – such as the 
normally operating auto-throttle, autopilot, radio altimeter, and the buggy sensor 
equipment – as well as the humans operating these systems. In fact, ‘operator’ might be 
a confusing word to begin with. Cognitive anthropologist Edwin Hutchins made this point 
in his influential study of flight deck operations, when he analysed in detail how an entire 
cockpit, rather than the pilots alone, remembers its speeds (Hutchins, 1995b). In the 
flight operation there are various speeds that indicate limits, such as the speed at which 
an aircraft stalls, that depend on situational factors like weight, atmospheric pressure 
and temperature, and flap settings6. Various procedures and the continuous process of 
scanning instruments trigger pilots to set these speeds, which serves as a memory on 
which they subsequently rely. Literature that follows this type of analysis time and again 
points out why errors and complex accidents cannot be reduced to something a human 
operator does or fails to do (Henriqson, van Winsen, Saurin & Dekker, 2011a; Salmon, 
Walker & Stanton, 2015; 2016). The human operator, after all, is immersed in the very 
control process that the normal accident theory describes: he or she cannot rise above 
it. Nevertheless, the Dutch Safety Board’s loss-of-control narrative does precisely this. 
It narrates a normal accident, which it then reduces to technical factors of a dangerous 
4 LVNL: Luchtverkeersleiding Nederland, the Air Traffic Control organisation of the Netherlands.
5 VDV refers to a Dutch acronym for the Rules and instructions for flight controllers.
6 Flaps are inboard, trailing edge parts of the wing that can fold downwards to increase lift and drag, 
thus enabling aircraft to approach more steeply and touch down at lower speeds. With flaps selected 
in the up-position, the aircraft stalls at a higher speed than when flaps are deployed.
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situation that could have been contained if the organising had been highly reliable and 
the operators would have used the safety barriers appropriately.
In his human factors analysis, which extensively cites the above, as well as other 
research, Dekker (2009) contradicts the view that the evidence suggests failing high 
reliability organising and compromised safety barriers on the part of the Turkish Airlines 
crew. He provides the analysis of the ‘trap’ and then sticks to the reconstruction of the 
accident as a normal accident from the point of view of the crew. Important in this regard 
is that he rejects the idea that the flight crew’s procedures could have acted as safety 
barriers:
The data from continued approaches suggest that crews do not primarily interpret 
situations in terms of stabilized approach criteria, but in terms of their ability to continue 
the approach. Soft and hard gates (e.g. 1000 feet, 500 feet), when set in context of the 
end of a flight at a busy, major airport on a scheduled flight become norms against which 
to plan and negotiate the actual approach vis-à-vis the air traffic and weather situation, 
not iron-fisted stop rules for that approach. (Dekker, 2009, p. 108-109)
In support of this conclusion, Dekker cites research that suggests that pilots gradually 
commit to landing, because they look at a broader picture. He makes a plausible argument 
that due to the trap, the Turkish Airlines flight crew could not have seen the complex 
interaction coming, based what they could reasonably have known from training and 
instruction manuals. Dekker thus concludes:
A large amount of scientific research and, perhaps even more importantly, studies sponsored 
and conducted by regulatory aviation safety agencies and independent aviation safety 
boards from across the world (FAA, 1996; BASI, 1998; CAA, 2004) have pointed for years 
to the insufficiency of automation training standards, the difficulty of relying on human 
monitors with normally very reliable automated systems, and the possibly devastating 
effects of subtle automation failures. TK1951 may have been a surprise for the aircrew 
involved; it can hardly come as a surprise to the industry. (Dekker, 2009, p. 120)
1.4.2 A dangerous contradiction
Dekker’s analysis of the Turkish Airlines flight crew’s actions not only deconstructs 
common assumptions about aviation safety cultures; in case of the air traffic controller, 
Dekker’s analysis seems to help the Dutch Safety Board’s narrative to reify these 
assumptions. While Dekker’s report elaborately reconstructs the flight crew’s work 
process, such a reconstruction is missing on the part of the air traffic controller. The 
controller deviated from normal procedure by directing the aircraft on a short line-up 
for runway 18R, thus contributing to the ‘trap’ that caught the flight crew off guard. 
Such shortcuts make sense in a busy, complex airport such as Schiphol that is constantly 
under pressure to increase its capacity while running into various limits that prevent this. 
Dekker’s narrative however suggests that the air traffic controller should have either 
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followed procedure or coordinated the shortcut with the flight crew. In his own words, his 
analysis “[s]hows the consequences of ATC [Air Traffic Control] not previously announcing 
or coordinating a short and high turn-in for final approach, so that the flight crew has no 
chance to properly prepare” (Dekker, 2009, p. 6). However, LVNL, the Dutch Air Traffic 
Control organisation, responded that their air traffic controllers were authorised to 
interpret the procedure flexibly and that no comments had been received earlier on 
this particular short line up practice (Dutch Safety Board, 2010, p. 56-57). Because 
of this, LVNL argues that there is no cause for changing the procedures or enforcing 
greater compliance with their ATC rules and instructions, referred to as the VDV:
Air Traffic Control the Netherlands has indicated that executing a turn-in manoeuvre 
between 5 and 8 NM7 for runway 18R at Schiphol airport as it occurred with regard to 
flight TK1951 occurs in more than 50% of all approaches for this runway. In addition, pilots 
sometimes ask for a short line up. LVNL is, therefore, of the opinion that aligning aircraft 
within the 8 NM is a normal situation. Air Traffic Control the Netherlands is also of the 
opinion for this same reason that aircraft crew do not have to be asked whether they can 
or wish to accept such a line up. Air Traffic Control the Netherlands states that air traffic 
controllers may broadly interpret the procedures for lining up aircraft as mentioned in the 
VDV. Air Traffic Control the Netherlands has also indicated that no feedback has been 
received the past few years that this mode of operation has led to a higher risk. Air Traffic 
Control the Netherlands, therefore, does not see any reason to intervene with regard to the 
current mode of operation and procedures. (Dutch Safety Board, 2010, p. 56-57).
The board did not take this response well. They recommend procedural discipline 
and harmonising the rules and procedures because safety must be guaranteed by 
unambiguous instructions and procedures (Dutch Safety Board, 2010, p. 57):
Air traffic control is responsible for among other things promoting the most extensive safety 
possible with regard to air traffic in the Amsterdam Flight Information Region. Air traffic 
controllers need to get unambiguous instructions. Interpreting the regulations in the above-
mentioned manner is, therefore, a contradiction. When it emerges that the regulations are 
not workable, they must be reviewed.
Furthermore, after concluding that the deviating practice regularly used by LVNL controllers 
disagrees with the way aircraft are designed, which are taken into account in the guidelines 
of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the safety board recommends:
The Board deems it important that the procedures in the Rules and instructions air traffic 
control are brought in line with the ICAO guideline that an aircraft shall be enabled to be 
established in level flight on the final approach track prior to intercepting the glide path. 
7 Nautical Miles (1 NM=1.852 km)
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The VDV should also reflect how controllers actually work and LVNL will have to make sure 
that air traffic controllers work as prescribed in the VDV.
1.4.3 Deviance or professional discretion?
The safety board’s view on LVNL’s role might reflect common sense and a justified worry 
about flight safety. Perhaps LVNL was on a slippery slope and taking its responsibility for 
safety less seriously than it should. It would not be surprising, given the rapid growth of 
the airline industry and the pressure to accommodate more and more flight movements.
The board’s rendering of LVNL’s role in the crash actually resonates with an influential 
risk study on organisational deviance, which sociologist Dianne Vaughan (1997) defined 
as “routine nonconformity” with organisational safety standards. Vaughan studied the 
events within NASA leading up to a catastrophic Space Shuttle crash in 1986. NASA 
attempted to shift from the Apollo era space exploration towards a ‘cheaper, faster, 
better’ culture to provide routine access to earth orbit. So doing, certain technical 
anomalies, which at first prohibited launching the Shuttle, sometimes got accepted 
through a formal ‘waiver’ process, which gradually became routine, and finally became 
the norm. Doing so, the large and complex NASA organisation developed ambiguous 
launch criteria and was unable to see the increasing risk that it thus had accepted with 
regard to Space Shuttle operations.
However, while this makes sense in retrospect, it is harder to identify dangerous 
deviance before it causes an accident. Despite the extensive analysis, a similar process 
led to another lost shuttle in 2003 (Vaughan, 2005). Indeed, the assumption that 
ambiguities in rules and procedures inherently imply a lack of safety commitment may 
be problematic. In the case of the Turkish Airlines crash, while the board concludes that 
LVNL’s procedures are unworkable, that is not what LVNL seems to be saying. LVNL 
seems to simply recognise the professional discretion that its controllers normally have 
and should have to accomplish the task of air traffic control. Indeed, the practice-based 
view of highly skilled technical work (Orr, 1996) and of HRO operations (Bigley & Roberts, 
2001) as a methodical, continuous improvisation, makes it hard to see how there could 
not be regular deviations from rules and procedures.
From this point of view, the Dutch Safety Board does not seem to provide conclusive 
evidence of all the necessary organisational factors that are claimed to contributed to the 
crash. Rather, the investigation relies on problematic assumptions about what routine 
deviations with rules and procedures say about the organisation that normalises these 
deviations. This apparent gap in our current understanding of safety cultures leads me 
to three main themes, which guide my subsequent studies.
1.5 RESEARCH THEMES AND CHAPTERS
My critical reading of the Turkish Airlines crash led me to the overarching conclusion 
that to gain further insights, I needed to look at practices in their normal operational and 
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organisational context rather than in the context of an accident. To guide this research 
agenda, I derive three themes, which are: risk context (chapter 2), organisational deviance 
(chapter 3), and modelling emergent safety culture processes (chapters 4 and 5). I shortly 
outline each theme and indicate in which chapter the theme is further investigated.
Each chapter was developed through exposure to various scientific and expert 
communities. Further information and background regarding this development is 
provided in Table 2 below. Chapters 2-5 have earlier been published elsewhere as a 
book chapter (chapter 2), journal paper (chapter 4), and conference proceedings paper 
(chapter 5); chapter 3 is currently under review for an organisation scientific journal.
1.5.1 Risk context
By contrasting Dekker’s (2009) report with the final report of the Dutch Safety Board 
I argue that the black box read-out is subject to some interpretive flexibility (Star & 
Griesemer, 1989). While the safety board reconstructs the Turkish Airlines crew’s 
actions as failed high reliability organising, which also compromises organisational safety 
barriers, Dekker’s reconstruction suggests a normal accident due to dangerous software 
technology. The board and Dekker seem to agree on the danger of normalising routine 
deviations in the case of air traffic control. However, I argue that this conclusion is built 
on inconclusive evidence because it relies on problematic assumptions about underlying 
organisational processes of normalisation.
Such interpretive flexibility with regard to the risk posed by deviations from the norm 
can also be found in the context of aviation safety cultures. This is illustrated by the 
investigation process. Shortly after the crash, a story emerged that on the crash site, while 
the disaster relief was being deployed, a member of the Dutch Safety Board scooped up 
the black boxes before the public prosecutor could get his hands on them (Springelkamp, 
2009, 24 April). The black boxes contain valuable recordings of aircraft instrument and 
control input data as well as a higher fidelity recording of the final half hour of talking in 
the cockpit. In the Dutch news, aviation safety expert professor Ben Ale, again from Delft 
Technical University, pointed out that there is “a certain tension” between the safety 
board and the public prosecutor, who simultaneously launched a criminal investigation 
(Slager, 2009, 27 February). The public prosecutor’s job is to establish culpability. In 
contrast, the safety board is responsible for establishing causes in order to improve 
safety, preferably avoiding blame games that tend to harm constructive relations within 
society, thus striving for a ‘ just culture’ (Dekker & Breakey, 2016; Reason, 1998). The 
very different logics and responsibilities of the legal versus safety investigation spheres 
often conflict, which led to the development of the Dutch Safety Board as a separate, 
impartial institution. Notably, Pieter van Vollenhoven is recognised for his public work 
in shaping the safety board while Sidney Dekker is an outspoken academic promotor of 
just culture in aviation, health care, and other sectors.
While in the ideal case, safety cultures might be insulated from these contradictions, 
I wondered whether, and if so how, the ‘tensions’ in reality manifest themselves in a 
context where contrasting risk perceptions exist, and what the impact might be on work 
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in the cockpit. In chapter 2 I investigate this question based on fieldwork I subsequently 
conducted in the circles of Dutch aviation authorities and experts, who actively give 
shape to the just culture policy, as well as fieldwork ‘inside’ the safety cultures of several 
organisations. I elaborate a bit more on engineering approaches to risk management 
and the contrasting perceptions of risk that result from applying normal accidents and 
high reliability organisations as normative ideal types. Then I develop a framework to 
interpret observations of everyday tensions in the work of airline pilots in terms of 
these contradictions of the Dutch risk context. This might help retrieve the nuances 
and complexities of these contextualised practices, rather than, so to speak, putting 
them back in the box, as I argue public risk debates tend to do.
1.5.2 Organisational deviance as a case of professional expertise
My critical reading of the Turkish Airlines investigation led me to question the implied 
idea that deep-seated ambiguity regarding safe standards signify a dangerous lack of 
safety commitment. Could it be that routinely recurring deviations from standards, which 
the safety board identified at LVNL, are a necessary and helpful aspect of professionals, 
if their work is in reality better characterised as a methodically prepared and executed 
improvisation? Indeed, Dekker’s comment on pilots’ tendency to deviate from the 
stabilised approach criteria suggests that deviations from standards are not so much 
the norm, but certainly normal. Is it even possible to operate a complex system without 
routinely recurring deviations from standards?
I further investigate these questions in chapter 3 through an in-depth study of 
deviations observed in airline pilots’ expert work practices, guided by the question: 
how does deviance become normalised in reflective safety-critical work practices, and 
what are the consequences for risk management? I would have also found it interesting 
to conduct this study within the air traffic control organisation. However, when I 
approached them I mentioned the Turkish Airlines report, which according to a source 
in my informal network immediately closed the doors for me. I later conducted a few 
interviews within ATC but overall decided to change research focus. Given the sensitivity 
of the subject, and the limitations this presented to obtaining access, I chose to further 
study deviations from standards in airline pilots’ work practices. Through my informal 
network, I had better access to the airline pilot community and being a private pilot 
myself I also had a better grasp of the basic technical challenges. Based on the resulting 
study in chapter 3, written together with my PhD supervisors Jeroen Wolbers, Frank 
de Bakker, and Peter Groenewegen, I elaborate the debate on organisational deviance 
and argue that the positive consequences of this process are understudied. Drawing on 
various fieldwork data I then present a process model that helps explain how and why 
deviant practices, despite their apparent fragility, may be crucial for organisations when 
they seek to defer to operational expertise.
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1.5.3 Modelling safety culture
It is interesting enough to open the black box of aviation safety cultures through social 
science fieldwork observation and interviews. However, the topic also invites engagement. 
The Turkish Airlines crash investigations show that the normative concepts that describe 
and prescribe safety commitment sometimes lead to contradicting conclusions. This 
indicates a need to translate the more descriptive social science research on complex 
social and organisational processes to the engineering communities who actually 
design these processes (Leveson, Dulac, Marais & Carroll, 2009). Otherwise, the more 
counterintuitive knowledge gained on operational expertise, such as provided by the 
previous theme on deviance, risks getting ignored. Engineers after all tend to either 
eliminate humans from the system or use simple (‘elegant’) models that eliminate what 
we know about ‘deviant’ processes. Also, it might be said, social scientists tend to criticise 
engineers’ models without offering alternatives.
In chapter 4 I provide such a translation by taking up an interdisciplinary research 
challenge with computer scientists in the field of artificial intelligence. Although our 
research approaches were very different, I was delighted to find a common ground with 
Alexei Sharpanskykh, who specialises in modelling social and organisational processes. 
We attracted funding to hire two research assistants with their own expertise, Colin Mols 
from the aviation management domain and Jan Bím from AI/computer science, to form a 
research project around aviation safety culture. Our project initially used ethnographic 
data earlier collected by a colleague, Sytze Kingma, and his master student Ahmed Atak. 
They collaborated on an insightful article that revealed how the safety culture within the 
aircraft maintenance organisation where Atak worked varied significantly in different 
episodes of the organisation’s development (Atak & Kingma, 2010). Because we were 
able to interview them both, as well as members of the company that Atak had since left, 
we saw an opportunity to translate some of the interesting findings to a formal multi-
agent modelling methodology. Settling on the maintenance case study, we formulate 
the research question: how does the commitment to safety of maintenance technicians 
emerge and develop under social and organisational influences? Our approach then 
enables us to develop mathematical representations of some mechanisms by which safety 
commitment emerges from a (mathematically speaking) complex system of agents, and 
provide interesting nuance in the light of more normative debates on safety culture. The 
normative safety culture literature after all relies on linear models like the SCM, which 
support a more general, problematic assumption that there is a linear relation between 
management safety commitment and commitment to safety observed on the work floor.
Based on the article and additional interviews and sources we model the power 
and influence relations between more junior and more senior aircraft maintenance 
technicians—a generic term used by Atak and Kingma for an actually more diverse group 
of specialisations—under influence of a separate maintenance and safety management 
department. Computer simulations with this model then allows us to pattern-match the 
results with the original description, which provides validation of the model. However, 
we also point out that because organisational safety cultures are context-specific, the 
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model should not be seen as generally applicable or predictive, but rather as a useful 
exercise with potential for further development.
Chapter 5 demonstrates this potential when we apply the methodology to the case 
of a safety culture change programme at a ground services organisation, focusing mostly 
on the operations at Schiphol airport platform. In this project Alexei Sharpanskykh and 
I collaborated with Robert Jan de Boer, at the time lector of the Aviation Engineering 
school of the Amsterdam University of Applied Sciences. Ground services represented 
an undervalued aspect of the company’s safety culture as occasional workplace 
accidents as well as flight safety occurrences demonstrated. Applying Line Oriented 
Safety Audits (LOSA), a method developed for safety culture in the cockpit (Helmreich, 
Klinect & Wilhelm, 2017, May), ground safety management had found routine deviations 
from platform safety procedures. They interpreted this as a worrying lack of safety 
commitment, but had trouble convincing the work floor to comply with the procedures. 
An interdisciplinary research team, which now encompassed supervisors and students 
from three universities, of which I was the social science supervisor, was invited to study 
and work on the problem.
The main question was: how can ‘safety 2’ analyses of organisational deviance 
incorporate bottom-up processes? This question addresses a key safety debate on 
conventional ‘safety 1’ analyses versus the ‘new view’, or ‘safety 2’ analyses. Safety 1 
approaches, such as the SCM, which have a top-down perspective on safety rules and 
standards, often identify human error as the main hazard and turn to compliance as a 
crucial tool for safety management (Hale & Borys, 2013). In contrast, safety 2 approaches 
suggest a bottom-up perspective of rules as they acknowledge that safety standards 
need to be applied in complex sociotechnical contexts (Dekker, 2006). While deviance is 
also seen as an organisational hazard, safety 2 scholars suggest identifying and managing 
these hazards through sociotechnical system analyses (Hollnagel, 2012; Leveson, 2011). 
As chapter 5 reports, we first tried and then ended up criticising an existing engineering 
safety analysis approach called STAMP (Systems Theoretic Accident Model and Process) 
(Leveson, 2011), but we also provided an alternative by applying and extending the 
method developed in chapter 4. This allows me to return to the central research question 
in chapter 6 and discuss the role of deviations from standards in committed safety 
cultures and what this insight contributes to theory and practice.
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Tension in the air
ABSTRACT
In this chapter I address the debate whether irregularities in safety-critical organisations are 
accidents waiting to happen, or that they are a normal part of risk management. I present a 
series of vignettes from diverse qualitative field studies in commercial aviation. The vignettes 
reveal how contrasting risk perceptions of safety-critical processes emerge between actors 
operating in the societal context of airline companies, contributing to a negotiated order that 
seeks to satisfy the contrasting risk perceptions. I argue that manifestations of the negotiated 
order impact regular work in the cockpit through subtle social tensions, as exemplified by the 
humour, emotions and stress that I describe in the vignettes. I discuss the implications of my 
findings for the influential risk debate between High Reliability Organisations and Normal 
Accidents, which tend to arrive at opposing interpretations of irregularities in inherently 
hazardous processes. In contrast, I argue that studying social tensions emerging in regular work 
settings can provide a range of more nuanced risk management interpretations of irregularities.




On July 25, 2015, Air Traffic Control (ATC) radio communication went viral on YouTube 
(ATC audio, n.d.) featuring a Dutch airline jet that encountered a wind shear—an abrupt 
change of wind direction. One of the pilots was heard exclaiming “Scary!” and “Speed, 
speed, speed!” The air traffic controller warned the pilots that they were accidentally 
broadcasting their private talking over the radio frequency, but for some reason the 
captain was heard on the radio again, coaching the co-pilot: “You’ve flown really well, I just 
wanted to say that.” The aircraft made a go-around and then landed low on fuel, having 
already diverted from another airport due to bad weather. While this information might 
typically only have ended up in an anonymous reporting database, the cockpit scare now 
spread via YouTube to national news media and even debates in parliament (AD, 2015, 
30 July). Despite the upheaval, the Dutch Safety Board subsequently responded that 
there would be no investigation, because the event was too regular to learn anything 
new (AD, 2015, 2 September).
The wind shear scare demonstrates common, contrasting risk perceptions. The 
public perceived the scary looking event as an accident waiting to happen. The common 
expectation is for the authorities to take control and investigate the matter: could the 
incident be due to technical or human error; is anyone to blame (Dekker, 2004)? In 
contrast, the event may appear regular from the point of view of highly experienced 
safety-critical organisations, whose core operational processes are inherently hazardous. 
Through risk management, these organisations can reduce, but not eliminate the 
likelihood of damage and loss (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991), so the close call might be 
classified as an acceptable risk (Vaughan, 1997).
The inherent social tension between safe and scary risk perceptions can have 
consequences when perceptions of different actors are opposed, such as directly 
after a reported incident. Organisational relations may be damaged when managers 
blame individual operators for incidents, perhaps in order to avoid legal consequences 
(Dekker, 2007), while safety-critical organisations rely on good internal relations to 
continually improve safety (Cox, Jones & Collinson, 2006). These discussions, however, 
remain rather abstract while we have limited understanding of the way safety-critical 
organisations regularly interact with their societal contexts. Seminal empirical studies 
focus on incidents (Vaughan, 1997; Weick, 1990) or their aftermaths (Brown, 2000; 
Gephart, 1993; 1997; Maguire & Hardy, 2013), rather than any impacts that these 
societal interactions might have on the regular work process.
In this chapter I therefore present empirical evidence of social tensions occurring in 
day-to-day operations in the Dutch commercial aviation industry. In aviation, contrasting 
risk perceptions might surface more sharply than in other safety-critical industries, such 
as oil and gas (Hudson, Parker & van der Graaf, 2002, January), because passengers 
are often physically confronted with disturbances like windy weather. Thus, contrasting 
perceptions of aviation risk frequently emerge as these scares enter the public arena 
through news and social media. Yet the impact of these media hypes on the regular work 
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done within the privacy of the cockpit usually remains opaque to outsiders. I therefore 
ask: How do contrasting risk perceptions manifest themselves in the societal context of airline 
risk management processes, and how do these social manifestations impact regular work in 
the cockpit?
I continue this chapter by reviewing the relevant risk management literature, followed 
by the choice of settings and methods I used to collect, analyse, and present qualitative 
data from the Dutch aviation industry. I then present my findings in a series of vignettes 
and discuss the implications for the debate on risk perceptions.
2.2 RISK MANAGEMENT IN A SOCIAL CONTEXT
Risk management can refer to any organised attempt to exercise control over 
uncertainties (Power, 2008), but I limit my discussion here to safety risks. I first describe 
how risk management literature depicts the way managers and government officials can 
design routines for operating safety-critical technologies, and coordination processes 
between operators. However, the operation may look messier in practice than on paper, 
which fuels debate between opposing perceptions of whether such messiness is risky.
2.2.1 Risk management by design
Risk management can refer to an administrative office occupation, as well as a real-time 
operational activity performed by operators like pilots. In the literature, the administrative 
occupation dominates (Maguire & Hardy, 2013). The administrative risk management 
process first identifies risks retrospectively by investigating reported incidents and 
accidents, or prospectively by projecting those risks on future operations. Second, risk 
managers design and implement mitigating measures. Third, risk management systems 
monitor and provide feedback on the effectiveness of these measures.
Risk management methods are anchored in accident models from which control 
systems for safe work practices are inferred (Hollnagel, 2012; Leveson, 2011; Reason, 
1997). These control systems look technical, but a major concern is with human actors. 
Hazards originate in technical processes like flying jet aircraft, but engineering progress 
has made the hardware, like jet engines, highly reliable. Thus, the most unpredictable 
factor in risk management is the human factor (Reason, 1990) or rather its complex 
interaction with software and hardware (Leveson, 2011).
Two broad approaches to human factors risk management can be identified. The 
first reasons that human errors are sadly inevitable and sometimes cause accidents, 
and therefore develop organisational safeguards to contain the effects of errors and 
thus prevent accidents (Reason, 1990; 1997). A checklist, for example, can function as a 
safeguard by catching a mistake made earlier, and help the operator correct their mistake. 
In aircraft, the landing checklist item reminding pilots to lower their landing gear before 
landing is a good example. Organisations can audit such safeguards by using functional 
methods such as Line Oriented Safety Audits (LOSA). LOSA is a popular tool by which 
2
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observers act as “fly on the wall” in the cockpit, check flight crews’ compliance with 
procedures, and note errors and violations during several flights (Klinect & Wilhelm, May 
2017). However the underlying assumption, that errors and violations indicate hazards 
to be fixed, seems problematic when organisations have already attained very high safety 
levels (Amalberti, 2001). Certain procedure violations for example may be expressions 
of professional expertise.
The second approach (Woods, Johannesen, Cook & Sarter, 1994) reasons that 
hazards can be managed by redesigning the socio-technical system from which errors 
emerge (Rasmussen, 1997). A socio-technical system represents safety-critical 
processes consisting of interacting human and technical elements, such as an aircraft 
consisting of technical elements, and a flight crew and computers controlling the aircraft. 
An established origin of human error lies in ergonomic design choices of the hardware. A 
famous example from WW II was the design solution to B-17 bombers that kept getting 
damaged when the landing gear was raised while the aircraft was on the ground (Stanton 
et al., 2010). Pilots kept making this mistake because the landing gear toggle switch looked 
exactly like another switch that they had to operate after landing. By differentiating the 
landing gear actuation design, pilots no longer made the same mistake.
The design of complex organisational systems can also create hazardous situations. 
The formalised coordination processes between pilots and air traffic controllers, for 
example, is partially automated, enabling detailed planning of aircraft movements; but 
occasionally complex, unforeseen interactions emerge, causing dangerous situations. 
Various regulatory agencies ultimately influence the design processes by which the 
risks of systems like global air transport are managed; Rasmussen (1997) therefore 
extended risk management thinking to the societal level. New risk management methods 
(Hollnagel, 2012; Leveson, 2011) now challenge managers and administrators to think 
about complex interdependencies and redesign organisational systems so that hazards 
do not emerge or can be jointly monitored and managed.
However, like the original design, the redesigned organisation also functions 
differently in practice. Human operators are usually confronted with many unaccounted 
operational variabilities, even in routine technical operations (Suchman, 1987; Orr, 
1996). Such variation requires operational personnel to respond adaptively (Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2007), although it may be hard to appreciate what actions are required from 
them: technical work tends to look messy in practice (Schulman, 1993). Because risk 
management methods tend to select on the dependent variable (Dekker, 2004), and 
infer bad outcomes from messy looking work, messy looking work is often treated as an 
accident waiting to happen.
2.2.2 Normal Accidents Theory
Sociologist Charles Perrow (2011) coined the term Normal Accidents to explain why 
messy looking work processes are accidents are waiting to happen. Two characteristics 
of socio-technical systems compromise control over hazardous processes. The first 
characteristic is interactive complexity, which refers to the innate tendency of system 
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elements to interact in unforeseen ways. The second characteristic is a tight coupling 
between these elements, denoting strong interdependencies between operational 
processes and little time, or few alternative courses of action, for operators to respond to 
unforeseen events. Thus, the messy system will inevitably produce unexpected situations 
where operators do not have enough time or courses of action to respond. Subsequently, 
because the system is tightly coupled, one small failure may immediately cause other 
failures, and the failure, rippling through the system, might end in catastrophe.
Despite several criticisms (Leveson, Marais & Carroll, 2009; Weick, 2004), Normal 
Accidents Theory (NAT) remains popular to describe accidents waiting to happen. 
Although its risk predictions are not entirely accurate (Leveson et al., 2009), there is 
broad agreement on the following central point. However advanced professionals’ 
abilities are to deal with messy processes, some safety issues cannot be resolved unless 
the socio-technical system is redesigned. When the political momentum to accomplish 
costly and disruptive redesigns is lacking, the prospect or actual occurrence of a 
catastrophic accident can amass such momentum (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997).
The Normal Accident frame is further strengthened by the influential risk theories 
of Dianne Vaughan’s (1997) normalisation of deviance and Scott Snook’s (2000) practical 
drift. These established, influential theories point to messiness as indicating a slow 
process of degradation. The degradation process is hard to see while one is immersed 
in it because the messiness has become normalised, by way of cultural blindness or 
groupthink (Vaughan, 1997). The dangers only manifest themselves when the inevitable 
accident happens. Retrospective analyses then reveal how the purpose behind risk 
management systems gradually shifted, allowing deviations from standards to become 
the norm and blinding organisations to dangerous incompatibilities between diverse 
organisational units.
2.2.3 High Reliability Organisations
In contrast, the High Reliability Organisation (HRO) concept suggests that safety-
critical organisations can continually progress without accidents (LaPorte & Consolini, 
1991; Roberts, 1990). HROs impressed social science scholars because HROs operate 
inherently dangerous technologies low-risk (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991). Social 
psychological processes contributing to this phenomenon are summarised as ‘chronic 
worries’ about risks (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007), and continuous learning, tweaking, 
and improvement (Roberts, 1990; Schulman, 1993; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). These 
characteristics were observed in a range of technical work contexts, such as air traffic 
control (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991), nuclear power plants (Schulman, 1993), and aircraft 
carrier deck operations (Weick & Roberts, 1993).
The HRO perspective is further elaborated by systems theories emerging from 
engineering disciplines (Leveson et al., 2009), labelled Resilience Engineering (Hollnagel, 
Woods & Leveson, 2006). Resilience Engineering suggests that the way in which 
operational variabilities are handled explains why most operational processes are 
performed safely (Leveson, 2011; Hollnagel, 2012; Woods et al., 1994). From a Resilience 
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Engineering standpoint, it is impossible to design frictionless planning systems, complete 
system operating instructions, or unambiguously purposed management systems. These 
views resonate with influential science and technologies studies such as the work of Lucy 
Suchman (1987) on situated action, and Susan Leigh Star’s work on boundary objects 
(Star & Griesemer, 1989).
To handle unexpected, but systematically occurring variabilities, HRO operators 
develop professional, experiential expertise that entitles them to make safety-critical 
decisions in the daily operation (Roberts, 1990; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). Their 
knowledge and experience can make a difference between life and death, but they are not 
infallible (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). Instead, HRO members humbly accept their human 
limitations and make an effort to learn from failure. To accomplish this, the organisation 
has to protect them from the age-old tendency of the society, in which they operate, 
to punish someone for a failure (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997). Societies confronted with 
catastrophe tend to seek a scapegoat to release all the public emotion and political stress.
Weick (1987) therefore argues that the precondition for a constructive organisational 
culture in HROs is that they are relatively secluded from their societal context. This 
portrays HROs as creating their own ‘bubble’ in society, within which professionals can 
perform their work by their own, expert professional ethics, undisturbed by the anxieties 
from the surrounding society. The resulting culture of high reliability (Weick, 1987), 
or safety culture (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007), is protected by translating erratic public 
pressures for safety into rational, incremental process improvements characterised by 
high levels of formalisation (LaPorte, 1996).
However, the inside of the bubble looks messy, because HRO risk management 
is not strictly centralised (Schulman, 1993). In order to facilitate continuous learning, 
Schulman (1993) argued that HROs foster “conceptual slack”, or “a divergence in 
analytical perspectives among members of an organisation over theories, models, or 
causal assumptions pertaining to its technology or production processes” (Schulman, 
1993, p. 364). Schulman’s study of a nuclear power plant revealed how “much of the 
formalisation at the plant is meant to document and reinforce an elaborate balance, even 
fractionation, of administrative power” (Schulman, 1993, p. 358). HROs thus manage 
risks through a negotiated order where zealous proceduralisation of technical work 
processes and office politics come together.
Schulman’s (1993) work on HROs is relevant in the context of today’s globally 
intensifying accountability practices (Power, 1997), within which conceptual slack is 
often perceived as a risk and a liability (Dekker, 2011b). This trend indicates that HROs’ 
negotiated orders involve interaction with actors in their societal contexts, which 
suggests that HROs are not always isolated bubbles within society. I therefore continue 
to show how, in the case of commercial aviation, the negotiated order of high reliability 
manifests itself at the societal level and how that order impacts regular, safety-critical 
work processes in the cockpit.
Voorbereid document - David.indd   40 01-02-2021   15:14
41
Tension in the air
2.3 METHODS
Based on seven years of research (2011-2017) in the Dutch aviation industry, I developed 
five vignettes that demonstrate regular social tensions in airline risk management. 
The vignettes, adopting three levels of Rasmussen’s (1997) multi-level view of risk 
management, answer the central question in two main ways. First, vignettes 1 and 2 
illustrate how contrasting risk perceptions manifest themselves in a negotiated order in 
airline’s societal contexts. Vignette 1 describes a debate emerging between professional 
and public risk perceptions at the societal level. Vignette 2 shows how actors negotiate 
within this common tension at the administrative level. Second, vignettes 3 through 5 
describe impacts of this negotiated order on work done in the cockpit, at the level of the 
safety-critical work process. I look at the impacts represented by pilots’ social responses 
to risk management systems such as flight data monitoring; their involvement in the 
negotiated order that standard operating procedures represent; and the social influence 
they exert in negotiating between different planning systems.
The first two vignettes derive from data collected by investigating and participating 
in two interconnected aviation networks (see Table 3). First, I participated in an industry 
network consisting of a cross-section of aviation professionals. Second, I interviewed 
members of a governance network consisting of the aviation authorities, government, 
and industry management. Third, I conducted two rounds of in-depth interviews with 
airline pilots, who represented a subset of the industry network. In total I participated 
in 9 seminars and conducted 47 interviews; I recorded and transcribed interviews or 
made notes in case recording was not allowed or impractical.
The last three vignettes are based on two consecutive flight observations with a 
flight crew flying back and forth between two European cities. I made these observations 
from the back seat of the cockpit, called a jump-seat. I observed the pilots at work in 
the middle of a regular workday; they had more flights scheduled that day that I did 
not observe. During the flight, I was able to engage in conversations with them about 
topics that came up because something happened. Meanwhile, I made notes with pen 
and paper and occasionally took a photo or a short video. After the flights, I wrote down 
and analysed the events I had observed and checked my interpretations in two rounds 
with one of the observed pilots. In developing the vignettes, I compared them to the 
data from interviews and documents that I had collected and continued to collect for 
another year (see Table 3).
In the cockpit, I was able to make detailed, in-depth observations due to the extensive 
preparatory study of the technical and social aspects of pilot work. Earlier, I was trained 
as a private pilot to fly general aviation aircraft such as the popular Cessna 152. I also 
followed introductory aerospace engineering courses. This background allowed me to 
make an analytical jump to the level of large, complex, multi-engine, multi-crew airline 
jet operations. I performed a first flight observation in which I refined the observation 
technique. For this flight, I prepared myself by flying for one hour in a fixed flight simulator 
of that aircraft type. I analysed aircraft operating manuals and studied multi-crew 
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coordination techniques before entering into the second flight observation, reported 
here.
In the final analysis phase, I compared different data content thus gathered. For 
example, to develop the fourth vignette, I compared procedure variations reported by 
various interviewees. It emerged from these stories that procedure variations involved 
confusion, fuelling industry-wide debates about contrasting risk perceptions. Thus I was 
able to relate tensions I found in the societal context with subtle social expressions of 
humour, emotions, and stress in the regular cockpit work setting.
Table 3. Data collection and analysis 
Time frame Type of data Data source Content
2011-2017 Participation
in 9 seminars, 
ethnographic 
interviews




 ■ Ground services






relevant to aviation 
professionals
2011-2012 12 interviews,
1 hour long on 
average
Aviation professional industry 
network:
 ■ Airline captains, co-pilots
 ■ Pilot trainer, examiners, managers
 ■ Retired pilots
 ■ Human factors training 
entrepreneurs
 ■ Flight simulator technology 
entrepreneurs
 ■ Aviation contract researchers
 ■ Aviation psychologists




for regular work in 
the cockpit
2013-2015 20 interviews,
1 hour long on 
average
Aviation governance network:
 ■ Safety managers
 ■ Airline officials
 ■ Air traffic control officials
 ■ Aviation judiciary
 ■ Aviation police
 ■ Aviation inspectors
 ■ Pilot union member
 ■ Government officials






companies and their 
societal context
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Table 3.  Continued
Time frame Type of data Data source Content
2011-2017 15 in-depth
1-4 hour long 
interviews, of which 
7 were recurrent 





 ■ Trainers, examiners, managers




emerging as social 
tensions in the 
regular work of 
airline pilots
2015 - 2016 Jump seat 
observations of 2x 2 
consecutive flights 
to/from European 
cities, about 1 hour 
per flight and about 
1 hour turnaround 
time for each set of 
flights.




 ■ Flight attendants
 ■ Ground services
 ■ Air traffic controllers








emerging as social 
tensions in the 
regular work of 
airline pilots
2011 - 2017 Various 
documentation
 ■ Aircraft Operating Manuals
 ■ Navigational charts
 ■ Policy documents
 ■ Accident investigation reports
 ■ News media reports
Textual 
representations 
of contrasting risk 
perceptions
2.4 TENSIONS IN AIRLINE RISK MANAGEMENT
2.4.1 Vignette 1: Journalist ignores difference between ‘emergency’ versus ‘pre-
cautionary’ landing
The first vignette describes how, in a heated debate, a journalist rejected the arguments 
of aviation professionals to distinguish between an ‘emergency’ and a ‘precautionary’ 
landing. This occurred in a seminar organised by a Dutch aviation professionals network, 
exemplifying a cross-section of industry professionals. A few prominent journalists were 
invited to share their views on how they reported on aviation. The safety manager of a 
major aviation organisation shared the stage to enable a debate between the media and 
the industry. The audience was occupied by members of the industry network and by 
students in journalism.
Tensions rose in the room when a journalist from the popular newspaper Telegraaf 
took the stage. He talked about an occasion when a KLM aircraft, flying across the 
Atlantic Ocean, had made a precautionary landing in the UK due to unexpectedly strong 
headwinds. The flight crew thus managed to stay well within their safe fuel margins and 
there was never any danger to the passengers and crew. A Telegraaf journalist traveling 
on board, however, immediately contacted the editorial staff to report an “emergency 
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landing” due to low fuel. As soon as this news came out, a storm erupted in the news 
media to which KLM had to respond.
The discussion in the room now unfolded about the question if it was right for the 
Telegraaf to use the phrase “emergency landing” if this was factually incorrect. The 
journalist held on to his standpoint and said that he would not hesitate to use the phrase 
emergency landing again. He argued that he could not expect from his readership to tell 
the difference between an emergency and a precautionary landing.
Tensions escalated in shouting anger amongst the aviation professionals in the 
audience as the journalist went on to argue that his job was to report something 
newsworthy. Aviation professionals in the audience charged the journalist for fabricating 
news, which could have negative consequences for aviation professionals, organisations, 
and ultimately flight safety. However, the journalist continued that his professional ethic 
was to report something newsworthy in a language that his readership would understand.
“I actually liked the Telegraaf journalist,” an aviation researcher told me afterward. “At 
least he was honest.” The researcher, an active member of the industry network that 
had organised the seminar, was more appalled by the story of another journalist. This 
journalist had spent years investigating to try and prove a pilot guilty of an accident. The 
researcher found this kind of investigative journalism similar to the Telegraaf’s example 
in that it fabricated aviation news, but in a more destructive way. From the industry 
perspective, fabricating news about guilty pilots amounted to witch hunts, or calls for 
justice when there is no justice to be served.
This vignette demonstrates how contrasting risk perceptions manifest themselves in 
emotional debate about the way unusual events are portrayed and serve vested interests. 
One could sense the tension in the atmosphere that the emotional disagreement 
caused, which could perhaps be better understood when placed into the broader 
societal context. These were no idle semantic games, as a horrifying case from nearby 
Germany demonstrated. After investigators acquitted an air traffic controller who was 
on duty when two aircraft crashed mid-air over Überlingen, Germany, the controller was 
murdered by a relative of crash victims. The relative had felt that justice had not been 
served, and had taken matters into his own hands. Thus, members of the authorities and 
the industry could sense urgency to negotiate a position in risk debates that satisfies 
contrasting perspectives, as is demonstrated by the next vignette.
2.4.2. Vignette 2: Air traffic controllers’ alleged sensitivity to the prospect of 
prosecution
The second vignette illustrates how it emerged that, according to the Dutch aviation 
judiciary, air traffic controllers were more sensitive to the prospect of prosecution than 
pilots. This shows how actors in the aviation industry and the authorities are aware 
of contrasting risk perceptions and sometimes actively manage the resulting political 
sensitivities.
The observation took place in the office of a safety manager of a Dutch ATC 
organisation, just as I sat down to have an interview with the manager. The phone rang; 
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it was the aviation judiciary. A Dutch aircraft had accidentally overrun a taxiway and hit 
the grass while taxying in freezing weather. Nobody was hurt, but in aviation, such a 
small event potentially becomes the site of an extensive investigation because it could 
have been worse. The airport where it happened was controlled by the safety manager’s 
ATC organisation, so they also became part of the investigation. The judiciary was at this 
stage judging if the incident could have been caused by someone’s intention or gross 
negligence, which would require him to start a formal investigation.
Now on the phone with the judiciary, the manager expressed dismay with the fact that 
the aviation police were visiting his organisation. The judiciary replied that the police were 
only conducting a preliminary investigation, but the manager felt that the line between 
preliminary evidence gathering and full-on prosecution was blurry. “Any evidence that 
they might gather now can be used to prosecute our employees later,” he explained to 
me, after hanging up. From the manager’s point of view, the judiciary did not live up to 
the kind of hesitancy to prosecute that they had mutually agreed on before.
What had happened? The reason for the incident was unclear at this stage, but it was 
tempting to speculate that the pilots were maybe taxying too fast; this was a pattern I 
had heard about from pilots. If the pilots were speeding, however, it was unclear to me 
how the ATC organisation could be blamed. Could they be blamed for putting pressure 
on pilots to taxi faster than the speed limit? It seemed unlikely to me, but it was all 
speculation at this point—I had no access to data of the incident.
A few weeks later, I talked to the judiciary and asked him to clarify what had happened. 
He told me that to his mind, there was no direct cause for worry for the ATC organisation. 
Instead, his perception was that air traffic controllers were overly sensitive to the 
prospect of prosecution; more so than airline pilots. He said that members of the ATC 
organisation would still reference a 1990s case where a Dutch air traffic controller had 
been prosecuted. The judiciary found it hard to understand why the case resonated 
so strongly that, in 2015, it still caused hostile sentiments amongst Dutch air traffic 
controllers towards the judiciary. The judiciary pursued a policy of hesitancy to prosecute 
(see Dekker, 2007, EESC, n.d., and ICAO, 2016, 25 August, for elaborations on this policy 
of ‘Just Culture’), enabled by maintaining rapport with various crucial industry officials like 
the ATC safety manager. By keeping in touch on a regular basis, the judiciary cultivated 
a knowledge basis to judge if a reported incident could be left to an organisation’s own 
investigative process.
The vignette exemplifies how emotional disagreements emerge in daily risk 
management activities dealing with the political sensitivities of risk, and that considerable 
energy is spent to maintain a dynamic, negotiated order. The tensions erupting in the 
phone call between the safety manager and the judiciary illustrate the tensions arising 
in this work. The judiciary and the safety manager did not give any impression that the 
incident, and the disagreement it had caused between them, seriously threatened their 
relationship. These tensions seemed to be part of the game.
The negotiated order may also impact the regular safety-critical work processes 
in airlines. In the following vignettes, I focus on the airline cockpit work process and 
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a selection of events and conversations unfolding there on a regular working day. The 
first impact is a social response of pilots to their company’s risk management systems.
2.4.3. Vignette 3: Flying 30 knots over the speed limit
The third vignette shows how a flight crew senses, anticipates and responds to managerial 
risk perceptions on their actions as they reflect on a deviation within what they perceived 
as a grey area of the rules. The observation took place in the cockpit of an aircraft that 
had just taken off and was climbing to cruise altitude, presently passing around 3000 
feet altitude. I noticed that the speed indicator read 270 knots, instead of the 250 knots 
I expected. The co-pilot, as if anticipating my question, explained that: “Nine out of ten 
times we will fly maximum 250 knots [463 km/h] below Flight Level 100 [an altitude of 
10,000 feet or 3 km]. But if the captain agrees, we can consider to go a bit faster.”
Speeding below 10,000 feet was deemed to be one of the ‘grey areas’ where, 
according to some pilots whom I interviewed, the rules are not as fixed as they look on 
paper. This grey area differs from speeding on the taxiways of airports, which I allowed 
myself to speculate about in the previous vignette. Speed limits exist in certain parts 
of the airspace. Pilots I interviewed said that speeding often happens in the airspace 
between the ground and 10,000 feet, where a 250 knots speed limit applies. In this 
airspace, aircraft usually are either climbing away or descending on approach to airports. 
The reason for the speed limit is to keep these dynamic traffic flows manageable and 
prevent mid-air collisions between aircraft. However, pilots argued, sometimes exceeding 
the limit by 20 or 30 knots (37-55 km/h), would not endanger flight safety and could help. 
Speeding could sometimes straighten out the flow of traffic or simply help a flight catch 
up from an earlier delay, so that it could be on time for an arrival slot.
Back to the cockpit. Shortly after the co-pilot clarified the current speed—by now, 
reading 280 knots—an unusual warning popped up on one of the computer screens. 
“Speed limit exceeded.” We were now passing through 6500 feet and both pilots said 
they had never seen this computer warning before. The co-pilot quickly cancelled the 
warning, joking that he did not want to be summoned to the office. The captain added 
that the office would probably get this message, in view of their extensive flight data 
monitoring. “You don’t want to know what they are checking. The reversers you were 
pulling on landing, your flaps settings, everything.”
It sounded like the pilots felt uneasy about being monitored, so I asked if there was 
any truth in the co-pilots joke. The captain replied that they did not have to fear being 
summoned because that only happened if one “experienced something”, some kind of 
incident. The current situation would not qualify: “Flying 30 knots faster won’t matter 
if you hit someone.” Perhaps to make sure that I would not misunderstand his joke, the 
co-pilot concluded the conversation by stating that he had “complete confidence in the 
reporting culture of the company. It’s really all about learning.”
This vignette illustrates how pilots may anticipate and respond to the negotiated 
order embodied by their risk management system. The impact described here is subtle 
and of no direct consequence for the flight I observed, but it illustrates how pilots 
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may anticipate and respond socially to technical risk management systems. The social 
response here consisted of ironic and laconic talking about the system, possibly revealing 
some ambiguity in the company management’s perceived intentions behind the system.
2.4.4. Vignette 4: “Quick reset” instead of following the SOPs
The fourth vignette describes how a novice pilot responds to a captain’s order to deviate 
from the aircraft’s standard operating procedures. Besides variations on air traffic rules 
like speed limits, described in the previous vignette, I also found that routine variations 
on technical systems operating procedures sometimes surface in the regular work I 
observed. The topic of performing variations on system operating procedures arose 
when one of the covers of the emergency rope, above the captain’s head, suddenly fell 
open mid-flight. The emergency rope is intended for escaping out of the cockpit after 
a crash. The before start-up checklist required checking the rope on every flight, as I 
had seen the captain perform on the ground. Evidently, the captain suggested while 
closing the cover again, opening and closing the cover regularly had weakened the closing 
mechanism.
A conversation then arose about how in aircraft little things tend to break; and how 
the formal procedure for dealing with small system failures may differ from the informal 
norm. The co-pilot then shared his experience of becoming socialised in the culture of 
pilots flying the current aircraft type. In his initial training, he learned to strictly revert to 
the books whenever a failure occurred. Then, as he began participating in the operation, 
he was a little shocked to find that for many failures, the only accepted response was 
a simple, “quick reset”. That is, many failures would be remedied by simply turning the 
failed system off and on again. The co-pilot learned that the informal norm for a quick 
reset was more authoritative in practice than the formal procedure to which he was 
accustomed.
The background of the quick reset practice was that earlier generations of pilots were 
routinely faced with small system failures. They had learned that the formal procedure for 
many failures—taking out the Quick Reference Handbook and following the checklist—
was unnecessarily cumbersome. Pilots found that in many cases a quick reset did the 
trick, and they began spreading this practice informally. The practice thus spread as 
seniors conveyed operational experience to juniors. Eventually, the quick reset practice 
found its way to “the office”, which decreed through an email communication that resets 
were allowed under certain conditions. The co-pilot added that he had missed the email, 
which was sent after he had already gotten used to the informal practice. Later on, he 
had heard about the formal change from a colleague.
This vignette thus illustrates how pilots socially participate in the negotiated order 
represented by Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). Pilots participate in creative 
socialisation processes by which informal operational norms are created and maintained. 
A new member’s experience of slight shock and confusion demonstrates the process 
when he gets exposed to the social norm that the informal routine prevails over the 
formal procedure. The differences between formal and informal practices may cause 
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confusion at first, for how does one know which parts of the books are authoritative, and 
which are not? When the informal norm is adopted in an amendment of the SOP, it turns 
out that pilots are not merely recipients of the negotiated order but also, as a collective, 
participate in the process of negotiation.
2.4.5. Vignette 5: A flight crew’s frustration about a controller communication
This final vignette shows how, while taxying to the runway, one of the observed flight 
crews got frustrated by a delay, which from the crew’s perspective should have been 
communicated earlier by the ground controller. The flight was planned in detail, as always, 
but also encountered this contingency to which the pilots had to respond in a coordinated 
manner. Whereas coordination may sound like a neat, technical process, it can look tense, 
even angry, in practice. The following illustrates the coordination between air traffic 
controllers and the flight crew, taking the point of view of the latter. Even on a short 
flight in Europe, flight crews may pass through several, slightly differently organised ATC 
planning systems, with different customs and accents in English. The pilots on this flight 
had already spent some time talking about the annoyances that the different airport 
planning systems caused, before the following events happened.
When it was time to depart for the return flight, everything looked well. The weather 
was perfect and the passengers had boarded without incident. The ground crew had 
put some fuel in the wrong tank but it would be possible to correct this in-flight. While 
taxying out from the gate, the flight crew was confident that they would arrive on time 
at the destination, until they spotted an ominous row of waiting aircraft. The captain 
requested an expected take-off time and the air traffic controller replied: “We will call 
you back.” The captain cursed, sensing trouble. “How do they not know yet?”
A few minutes later, the ground controller returned on the frequency and politely 
informed the flight crew that “delay is one-niner minutes.” The captain replied with a 
neutral “roger” but the mood in the cockpit instantly flipped to anger. The captain had 
just promised the passengers that they would be on time; now, they might have suddenly 
incurred about twenty minutes delay. “Ridiculous,” the co-pilot exclaimed. “Why not 
let us wait at the gate so we don’t have to stand here burning fuel?” In addition to the 
expected delay, the fuel management situation had suddenly changed. The co-pilot 
quickly calculated that their fuel reserve could now get below their expected Take Off 
Fuel (TOF). The number was written on a piece of paper clipped to the inside of the 
cockpit. Would they even have enough fuel to depart, by the time they would be allowed 
to take off?
The pilots continued to decompose the TOF-number to arrive at the minimally 
required amount of fuel to arrive safely at the destination. With a delay of about 20 
minutes, they concluded, there would still be enough fuel to arrive at the destination well 
above minimum fuel required by law. There might however not be enough fuel left to 
divert without issue to another airport, in case of bad weather or a runway obstruction at 
the destination, for example. Even if they would have to divert, there would still be plenty 
of nearby airports in range, but the flight crew might have to declare an emergency. 
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Declaring an emergency is legally required below 30 minutes of fuel remaining. Once 
an emergency is declared, a formal investigative process will start and the event will be 
thrust into the public arena.
Diverting was an unlikely scenario, because the weather was good and the destination 
was unlikely to get unexpectedly closed at arrival. Talking it through, the captain reasoned 
that if something unforeseeable happened, they could “commit” to the destination. 
Confronted with this phrase, an air traffic controller could become more willing to 
find a way and let an aircraft land on a closed airport. “Committed” would essentially 
communicate the impeding need to declare an emergency, thus preventing the situation 
where one has to come out and actually do it. Having calculated and reasoned it through, 
the pilots felt reassured. They continued to wait in line for take-off and the rest of the 
flight proved to be routine. Flying a bit over the speed limit, the pilots later even managed 
to catch up some of the delay and got their passengers to the destination on time.
The vignette demonstrates how anger and frustration can mark pilots’ preparation 
to negotiate contingent planning with ATC. Anger and frustration emerged first from 
the pilots’ lack of influence on the ATC planning system in which they operated, which 
pushed them towards the limits of their fuel planning. They responded by re-asserting 
their fuel planning and re-evaluating the safety and accountability risks associated with 
the landing phase of the flight, preparing a way to implicitly negotiate with ATC on arrival. 
Since the flight continued without incident, they did not need to exert this influence and 
their efforts never escaped the confines of the cockpit.
2.5 DISCUSSION
The five vignettes I presented in this chapter show what dynamic risk management looks 
like as a socio-technical phenomenon, embedded in a social context where contrasting 
risk perceptions exist. Contrasting risk perceptions manifest themselves in a negotiated 
order in airline’s societal contexts. I described a debate emerging between professional 
and public risk perceptions at the societal level, and subsequently showed how risk 
management actors negotiate contingent positions within this common tension at the 
administrative level. These observations demonstrate interactions between professional 
members of aviation High Reliability Organisations (HROs) and their societal context. 
The actors invest in negotiation because failing to do justice to either of the contrasting 
risk perceptions can have damaging consequences to aviation organisations.
I subsequently demonstrated how the impacts of the negotiated order of aviation 
HROs are visible at the level of the safety-critical work process. I looked at three 
manifestations of the negotiated order in HROs: the application of risk management 
systems in regular flight operations; social norms guiding variations on SOPs; and formal 
jargon used to negotiate contingent planning. The impacts of these manifestations of 
the negotiated order were visible, first, in how pilots responded socially to ambiguity 
in technical risk management systems by laconic and ironic talking. Second, I showed 
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pilots’ feelings of shock and confusion when getting involved in the negotiated order 
through socialisation and learning how to perform variations on SOPs. Third, I highlighted 
pilots’ anger and frustration when they were facing frictions in the negotiated order 
represented by different planning systems, and engaged in contingent planning to re-
assert their position towards ATC by committing to the destination.
2.5.1 Social tensions in commercial aviation HROs
Developing empirically rich description of social tensions could further aviation safety 
debates about the meaning and consequences of observed irregularities. Often 
irregularities are reduced to forms of either human error or technical failure (e.g. Reason, 
1990). In contrast, my observations reveal social tensions between actors engaging in risk 
management at different levels—society, administration, and hazardous work process—in 
the form of disagreement, ambiguity, and strains in the relationships between them. 
These social tensions become visible in emotions, humour, and stress, and provide a 
window into the regular irregularities, or the negotiated orders, that characterise aviation 
HROs on a daily basis. What the consequences of these social tensions are is a complex 
matter and subject to debate.
Going back to the wind shear scare described in the introduction, it seems obvious 
that the emotion of fear is an indication of danger and therefore demands action from 
actors who share some responsibility for the HRO risk management process. However, 
in light of the evidence presented in this chapter, the reader might appreciate the 
complexity of interpreting the risks associated with emotions like fear, and of arriving at 
a proportionate response. I demonstrated shared responsibilities between authorities, 
administrators, and operational personnel, and showed how they interact to subtly 
negotiate and re-negotiate an order that works. Much of their investments in this process 
may never be seen by higher authorities or outsiders to the professional community 
or even the single work space. For example, the efforts of the observed flight crew, 
to prepare for the highly unlikely prospect of negotiating with ATC, would never have 
escaped the cockpit if I had not been there to write about it here.
The approach to investigate and describe social tensions in depth may add an actor-
perspective that is often lacking in functionalist aviation safety analyses. Functional 
safety analysis methods, such as LOSA (Klinect & Wilhelm, 2017) are useful because 
they do allow aviation HROs to gain insight in their own operational practices. LOSA 
could have found deviations as described in vignettes 3 (a speed deviation) and 4 (an 
aircraft operating procedure deviation). LOSA would probably label the former two 
as a type of error – a human-caused hazard – and then suggested a course of action, 
such as promoting compliance with speed restrictions and harmonising SOP with 
informal practices. While these are not necessarily bad ideas, the aviation industry 
is already immensely regulated and it is probably impossible to eradicate grey areas 
from sociotechnical systems (Amalberti, 2001; Suchman, 1987). I therefore agree with 
resilience engineering scholars (Hollnagel et al., 2006) that for cases like the above, error 
labels are probably overly negative and fail to do justice to the operational reality in which 
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deviations are performed. My approach might therefore usefully complement existing 
functionalist approaches. In contrast to a LOSA observer, I was not a “fly on the wall” to 
check for non-conform behaviours but engaged actively in conversations with the pilots, 
before, during, and after the flight, to learn how professional expertise comes into play 
in everyday practice (vignettes 3-5). Instead of focusing only on line operations, I also 
contextualised these practices in the society that shapes and impacts social interactions 
(vignette 1), which led to the interesting suggestion that political sensitivities might 
surface differently within different groups of aviation professionals (vignette 2).
2.5.2 Contextualising HRO practices in and beyond aviation
Developing a practice approach that seeks to contextualise (e.g. Nicolini, 2012) may be 
useful to understand how risks are managed by HROs both within and beyond aviation. 
By zooming in (Nicolini, 2009) on irregularities seen in everyday work settings in aviation, 
this chapter already provided some up-close glimpses of people regulating, managing, 
and working with hazardous technologies in aviation HROs. This approach contributes 
to research in HRO domains, which due to their “preoccupation with failure” (Weick 
& Sutcliffe, 2007) often focus on human error but lose a sense of context and lived 
experience that the vignettes reveal.
Loss of context is an important limitation to the use of safety tools like flight data 
recorders, or ‘black boxes’, from which often human errors emerge as culprits of 
aviation accidents (e.g. Dutch Safety Board, 2010). Airline captain Sullenberger makes 
an important point in this respect, as quoted in the movie Sully: “[If] you are looking for 
human error, make it human.” Dekker (2004) furthermore argues that we should not be 
looking for error, but a more neutral vocabulary about operational variabilities. Adding 
to Sullenberger and Dekker, I argue that since human action is social, we should add 
social texture to the debate about HROs. However, in contrast to the ‘neutral’ technical 
language promoted by resilience engineers, I suggest a more descriptive language 
of social tensions to translate relevant insights in everyday practice across HRO risk 
regimes.
A social perspective, which acknowledges the various ambiguities and emotions that 
people experience in everyday practice (e.g. Nicolini, 2012), suggests that irregularities in 
HROs are more than hazards to overcome. In contrast, from a functionalist perspective, 
irregularities are predominantly seen as unwanted hazards. We then tend to only see 
conflicting risk perceptions between aviation professionals and journalists (vignette 
1) as dangerously undermining HROs; we could characterise negotiations between 
industry and authorities (vignette 2) as potential failures of oversight; and we might 
judge operational deviations (vignette 3 and 4) and emotionally charged coordination 
(vignette 5) as messy and weak examples of human involvement in high-tech systems. 
In contrast, from a social perspective, even if these examples do indeed reflect certain 
hazards inherent to HROs, they also reveal important, perhaps necessary work done 
in and around HROs. The social perspective then shows us how aviation professionals 
and journalists may learn about each other’s different points of view (vignette 1); how 
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politically sensitive negotiations are conducted between actors who represent different 
regimes of HRO risk management (vignette 2); and how highly skilled, reflective practices 
(Schön, 1983) are performed by aviation professionals (vignettes 3-5). Indeed, similar 
strains and stresses are observed in HROs outside aviation, such as how professionals 
demarcate and mobilise their expertise in nuclear power plants (Schulman, 1993; Roe 
& Schulman, 2008) and crisis response (Wolbers, Boersma & Groenewegen, 2018). 
This suggests that reliability-seeking sectors, such as hospitals, should also foster their 
own negotiated orders, instead of merely copying aviation’s focus on proceduralisation, 
standardisation, and discipline (Kortleven, Putman & Waaijer, 2017).
I do not mean to argue that the presence of a flourishing negotiated order makes 
HROs immune to normal accidents; on the contrary. HROs still operate inherently 
vulnerable, hazardous systems that continue to evolve and sometimes produce 
hazards in new and unexpected ways. Rather, my argument is that negotiated orders 
are not inherently dangerous or deviant (Vaughan, 1997), and that we lack conceptual 
tools to distinguish hazardous social processes from safe ones. I further develop this 
line of thinking in the next chapter (3). Furthermore it may be fruitful to investigate 
and systematically compare social tensions in different types of HROs and bridge the 
opposing HRO and NAT viewpoints, which tend to get stuck in caricatures (Leveson et 
al., 2009; Shrivastava, Sonpar & Pazzaglia, 2009; Rijpma, 1997; 2003). The caricatures 
are as follows: if a safety-critical organisation is successful, we perceive an HRO; if the 
organisation is involved in an accident, we see evidence of a normal accident (Rijpma, 
2003). Getting stuck in these opposing frames of mind does not lead to new insights 
about risk management. Instead, studying a range of vulnerable HRO conditions might 
open up the debate between NAT and HRO scholarship. An example of such work is 
found in Atak & Kingma’s (2010) longitudinal, auto-ethnographic study of an aircraft 
maintenance organisation’s negotiated order. When the organisation experienced rapid 
growth, the competitive strain was reflected in heightened social tensions between 
technicians, client pilots, and managers of the company. In this phase, Atak and Kingma 
(2010) argue, the aircraft maintenance company was more vulnerable to failure, because 
managers pushed technicians to compromise safety margins. With such an analysis it 
becomes possible to debate under what conditions HROs become more vulnerable, 
without needing to jump immediately to the inevitable accident waiting to happen.
Furthering the risk debate in this manner is a cross-disciplinary challenge, because 
different scientific disciplines specialise in different levels of the risk management 
process (Rasmussen, 1997, p. 185). An example can be found in the attempt of Passenier, 
Mols, Bím and Sharpanskykh (2016; chapter 4 in this dissertation) to translate Atak and 
Kingma’s (2010) qualitative explanation of social tensions into a formal agent-based 
model. Applying the approach in a ground service organisation (Passenier, Sharpanskykh 
& de Boer, 2015; chapter 5 in this dissertation), this cross-disciplinary research led to 
new insights in the negotiated order at the work process level (Sharpanskykh & Haest, 
2017).
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2.6 CONCLUSION
I presented a study of the airline risk management including how actors in the societal 
context invest in a negotiated order to satisfy contrasting risk perceptions, and how 
these negotiations impact the regular work process of airline pilots. Despite available 
methods, it remains hard to judge if regular but messy or odd-looking events should 
be seen as risky, and what organisations should do about these risks. Further, cross-
disciplinary research on the social conditions under which tensions emerge and modify 
the negotiated orders in regular technical work could move this debate forward.
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Deviance in airline cockpits
ABSTRACT
Organisational deviance, defined as routine non-conformity, can be dangerous in high 
reliability organisations when organisational deviance becomes normalised. Classic studies 
of major accidents, such as the Space Shuttle disasters, reveal that organisations gradually 
categorise hazardous deviance as ‘accepted risk’ until the hazards suddenly materialise. In this 
study, we show that in the case of commercial airline pilots’ work practices, deviance is more 
pervasive than is previously acknowledged and actually stimulates reflective risk management 
processes. We studied pilots’ work practices over a seven-year field study period, employing 
a combination of methods, including in-depth interviewing and detailed observations of 
pilots at work in the cockpit. Our study reveals how normalisation of deviance contributes 
to organisational risk management, when it enables professional intuition through reflective 
practice. This complements our understanding about normalisation of deviance as a potential 
hazard, because we show why deviance should be recognised as common and valuable in 
safety-critical organisations.




It is a routine afternoon departure, but the flight crew feels the time pressure as they prepare 
the plane for flight. “It’s like top-class sport,” says the co-pilot. Rising competition with 
budget airlines puts pressure on the ground process, as is presently visible in the cockpit. 
While the captain performs the pre-flight procedure by heart, he manages to cram in a 
few words to the observer seated on the jump seat behind the two pilots. “I can already tell 
you…”– his right-hand whizzes across four different levers and switches – “…that I’m not 
following normal procedure here.” The Aircraft Operating Manual confirms this statement, 
showing a slightly different sequence of checking and switching the position of 85 controls 
and indicators, a procedure that the captain performs in only a few minutes. On being asked 
why he deviates from the normal procedure, the captain later explains that this is how he 
had once learned to do it when he was still a co-pilot. In contrast to the formal procedure, 
his sequence follows a continuous line across the instrument panels in the cockpit, which, 
he argues, makes it easier to keep track of all items and therefore less likely he will forget 
something, even if he performs the process rapidly.
(Cockpit observation, September 2015)
Is it normal to deviate from formal procedures in an industry known for its safety and 
reliability? Indeed, deviance, generically defined as “routine non-conformity” (Vaughan, 
1999, p. 274), is often characterised as a potential hazard in accident investigations. 
Studies focusing on major crises and accidents, such as aerospace accidents (Oliver, 
Calvard & Potočnik, 2017; Snook, 2000; Vaughan, 1997; Weick, 1990), strongly influence 
risk management research. This view holds that once deviance is normalised, an accident 
cannot be far away, so deviance should be prevented at all times (Reason, 1990). This 
leads to an intensification of control (Power, 2008), involving methods like reporting, 
auditing, enforcing compliance, and adjusting the rules, based on systematic analyses of 
hazards (Power, 1997; Reason, 1997).
Studies of safety critical industries show that deviance is more pervasive than 
we often think, as demonstrated by phenomena like practical drift (Snook, 2000), 
performance limits violations, and procedure violations (Busby & Iszatt-White, 2016; 
English & Branaghan, 2012; Reason, 1990). This pervasiveness suggests that deviance 
might not automatically lead to accidents in safety-critical organisations. Indeed, research 
shows that approaching unintended deviance in a tolerant and constructive manner 
benefits organisational learning and performance (Sitkin, 1996) because after-the-fact 
reflecting on deviance helps shape future responses to real-time danger (Ron, Lipshitz 
& Popper, 2006). Thus we note a scattering of ideas about deviance in the literature, 
since it is unclear under what conditions the normalisation of deviance is dangerous, or 
how deviance could simultaneously be a normal part of reflective practice in ways that 
might even contribute to safety.
The aim of this paper is to provide a coherent perspective on deviance, suggesting 
that the normalisation of deviance can contribute to risk management. If risk management 
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is becoming a dominant template for organisational management (Hardy & Maguire, 
2016; Power, 2004), fuelled by growing dependency on high-tech systems with potential 
for catastrophic failure (Perrow, 2011), then it is important to distinguish better the 
processes by which deviance can lead to negative and positive consequences. We 
investigated the normalisation of deviance by posing the following research question: 
How does deviance become normalised in reflective safety-critical work practices, and what 
are the consequences for risk management?
We first review the role of deviance in risk management in extant literature and then 
present an extensive study of deviance in commercial airline cockpit work practices. Our 
results indicate that deviance is pervasive in flight operational practices. Reflexive actions 
may trigger reflective deviations when pilots experience small anomalies. These reflective 
deviations are extracted from the operation by problematising deviance, after which 
some deviating practices are normalised in established work practices. By identifying this 
emergent process of risk management, we make two contributions. First, we contribute 
by explaining how deviance renders professionals’ expert intuitions actionable. Second, 
we formulate a research agenda for organisations to stimulate reflective practices by 
which deviance may be normalised. In the following section, we will discuss the debate 
on deviance in risk management, which provides the basis for our study into cockpit 
work practices.
3.2 THE ROLE OF DEVIANCE IN RISK MANAGEMENT
Recent decades have seen a proliferation of risk management (Power, 2008). Whereas 
at first certain technologies, such as aircraft or nuclear power plants, were primarily 
considered as risky objects (Perrow, 2011), attention has gradually shifted to deviant 
organisations (Gephart, Van Maanen & Oberlechner, 2009). Risk management nowadays 
is thus being applied to the organisation of virtually all inherently dangerous human 
activities, ranging from flying planes (Pélegrin, 2013), to driving cars (Elvik, Vaa, Erke 
& Sorensen, 2009), providing medical care (Cagliano, Grimaldi & Rafele, 2011), or 
even mountaineering (Keyes, 2006). Risk management however is also applied to more 
and more mundane, less hazardous activities (Power, 2008) such as going to school 
(Binkhorst & Kingma, 2012) or playing children (Christensen & Mikkelsen, 2008). Risk 
management thus has become increasingly pervasive and controls many aspects of our 
daily lives.
3.2.1 The normalisation of organisational deviance
Studies on deviance play an important role in the proliferation of risk management, 
following Vaughan’s (1997) seminal research on the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster 
as well as subsequent influential accident analyses (Dunbar & Garud, 2009; Snook, 2000; 
Starbuck & Farjoun, 2005; Vaughan, 2005). Organisational deviance in risk management 
is often treated as a potential danger, but this ignores other possible approaches. On 
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the one hand, ground-breaking studies into accidents explain that normalisation of 
deviance fosters less reflective practices, which can unnoticeably drift into complex 
failures (Snook, 2000; Vaughan, 1997). On the other hand, the same studies show that 
organisations develop highly reflective practices, of which other researchers (Weick, 
Sutcliffe & Obstfeld, 2008) claim that they mobilise technical expertise through deviance.
We first examine the argument that deviance fosters dangerous, unreflective 
practices. The key technical cause for high-tech accidents is ‘complex interactivity’ 
(Perrow, 2011) that makes technologies ‘unruly’ (Wynne, 1988). Complex interactivity 
means that, either because of unknowns in the core technical process or through complex 
interactions with unpredictable environments, deviations from normal procedures are 
regularly necessary. Because such deviations cannot be eradicated, organisations must 
learn, cope, and adjust their practices and sometimes their formal procedures, guided by 
strict organisational control systems (Leveson, Dulac, Marais & Carroll, 2009). However, 
in large, complex organisations, ‘structural secrecy’ (Vaughan, 1997), the inadvertent 
isolation of knowledge in dispersed pockets of organisations, may obstruct coordination 
of these adjustments. Sometimes, therefore, adjusted practices can drift out of control, 
which can have disastrous consequences. Snook (2000) describes that when a US Air 
Force squadron in Iraq adjusted its squawk code procedures for radar recognition, 
another Army Blackhawk helicopter unit had not been privy to these changes, which 
led to a friendly fire accident because two US Blackhawk helicopters were misidentified 
as enemy Hind helicopters.
While Snook’s analysis reveals the danger of deviance within the military as a 
consequence of practices that locally drift away from the standard procedures, 
deviance can also be found in a complex interplay between intuitive and reflective risk 
assessments. Accident analyses of other complex organisations such as NASA have 
revealed in detail how more risks gradually become accepted when decision-makers, 
faced with little more than someone’s strong intuition of danger, reject this intuition 
in favour of what is considered ‘hard’ evidence (Vaughan, 1997). However, what is 
considered hard evidence is subject to normalisation. In her study of the Space Shuttle 
Challenger accident, Vaughan (1997) demonstrated how deviance became normalised 
by NASA and the contractor that produced the failed rocket booster joints for the Space 
Shuttle. By ‘normalised,’ Vaughan means “that behavior the work group first identified as 
technical deviation was subsequently reinterpreted as within the norm for acceptable joint 
performance, then finally officially labelled an acceptable risk. They redefined evidence that 
deviated from an acceptable standard so that it became the standard” (Vaughan, 1997, p. 
65). The accidents that occur as a consequence of such normalisation of deviance cause 
deep crises that make organisations problematise deviance, wanting them to reassert 
control (Maguire & Hardy, 2013; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997).
In a similar vein, in the infamous incident at Tenerife airport where two Boeing 747s 
crashed into each other, a Dutch captain muted the feelings of his co-pilot and flight 
engineer that something was amiss (Weick, 1990). The Tenerife accident, however, rather 
than serving as a crisis with only a temporary effect on risk management, as was seen in 
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the case of NASA (Boin & Schulman, 2008; CAIB, 2003; Vaughan, 2005), contributed to 
a lasting integration of more risk-averse attitudes in commercial aviation’s professional 
safety culture which now pays more attention to intuitions of danger. Crew Resource 
Management (CRM) training was developed over decades, teaching co-pilots to ‘speak 
up’ against captains, accept errors as part of their normal work, and develop skills to 
manage and learn from these errors while remaining constantly aware of the danger 
(Helmreich, Merritt & Wilhelm, 1999). Today, these views are common sense amongst 
pilots and developing the skills to approach deviance constructively constitutes an 
important part of the socialisation process into the professional pilot communities of 
commercial airlines.
3.2.2 Reflective practices in High Reliability Organisations
The same studies that point out how normalisation of deviance caused accidents, also 
note the extensive reflective practices by which organisations approach deviance. A 
popular explanation of the Challenger accident was that it had been illegally launched 
due to malevolent procedure violations within NASA. When Vaughan tried to confirm 
this popular notion, she found that violations of procedures hardly exist as such. In 
contrast, the organisation has extensive rule systems for creating workarounds in 
order to continuously learn to work with the technology. Schulman (1993) refers to a 
‘negotiated order’ by which such complex bureaucracies maintain a certain order whilst 
continuously debating changes to established practices. NASA employed bureaucratic 
control like ‘waivers’, defined as “a formalized procedure that, upon approval of the technical 
rationale behind the request, allows an exception to some internal rule” (Vaughan, 1997, p. 
57), by which the normal operation could continue through adjusted practices.
In other words, under very specific conditions, deviance is normal, accepted, and 
even valued in high-tech organisations. Even unintended errors, such as when forgetting 
an item in a lengthy procedure or entering wrong values in a computer, are valued to 
the extent that they can provide information about design weaknesses in systems and 
procedures (Reason, 1997). Deviations from procedures can trigger reflection on work 
practices that is instrumental for both learning (Thomas, 2003) and adapting to varying 
operational contexts (Haavik, Kongsvik, Bye, Røyrvik & Almklov, 2017). However, these 
positive roles of deviance are often pushed to the background when researchers are 
looking for ways to explain how an accident occurred. The psychological mechanism of 
‘hindsight bias’ makes it hard to read anything else but a catastrophic plot in operational 
deviations, even if the basis for the inferred causal explanations is weak (Dekker, Cilliers 
& Hofmeyr, 2011). Hindsight bias affects accident investigations (Dekker, 2004) as well 
as the identification of future risks (Dekker, 2004), implying that the danger of deviance 
may often be overestimated.
Indeed, Vaughan (1999) states that while organisational deviance may be considered 
in the light of positive and negative consequences (cf. Merton, 1949), her work focuses 
on negative consequences. It therefore comes as no surprise, examining the literature 
on High Reliability Organisations (HROs), that we find that deviance can also contribute 
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to safety (Fraher, Branicki & Grint, 2017; LaPorte & Consolini, 1991; Roberts, Stout & 
Halpern, 1994; Schulman, 1993; Weick & Roberts, 1993). HROs conduct operations 
safer than one might expect based on the severe hazards inherent to their processes. 
In commercial aviation, for example, safety currently hovers around 0.08 accidents 
per million flights, with 2017 striking a record of zero fatal accidents (Young, 2018). 
An important aspect of such successful HRO risk management concerns non-conform 
behaviour to handle risks that emerge real-time in the operation (Weick & Roberts, 
1993). Work practices in HROs therefore rely on often quick, critical judgments made 
by local technical and experiential experts, which sometimes may go against the formal 
lines of the more traditional bureaucratic system, such as formal authority and decision 
trees. These practices are reflective (Fraher et al., 2017; Schön, 1983) because they rely 
on a supportive safety culture where professionals develop a sharp technical intuition 
(von Meier, 1999), which, due to diverse expertise bases, regularly leads to debate and 
epitomises useful ‘conceptual slack’ in the organisation (Rochlin & von Meier, 1994; 
Schulman, 1993).
The resulting debate suggests that HRO professionals manage risks through 
reflective deviance, which seems to imply that unreflective deviance is dangerous. The 
basic assumption is that routinised action, on account of its automaticity, saves resources 
like time and energy, and risk management implies intervening in these processes by 
making them more reflective. Putting risk management into practice is therefore often 
seen as a trade-off between working thoroughly, by complying with organisational 
procedures, and working efficiently, by deviating and taking more intuitive shortcuts 
(Hollnagel, 2009). However, the assumption that costly, slow reflection implies a trade-
off with efficient, fast reflexes, has been extensively challenged (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 
2005). Indeed, it turns out that fast ‘reflexive’ processes operate in parallel with slow 
‘reflective’ ones (Lieberman, 2007) and both processes “literally compete for control” 
as people act (Hodgkinson & Sadler-Smith, 2018, p. 487). That is, we now understand 
that intuitive forms of normalised deviance, such as quick, habituated shortcuts and 
workarounds that people locally develop to speed up their process, goes together with 
reflection and deliberate control.
In sum, we thus signal a scattering of ideas about the role of deviance. On the one 
hand, scholars argue that normalisation of deviance can make organisations unreflective 
about the dangers of deviance, with catastrophic consequences as a result (Snook, 
2000; Vaughan, 1997). On the other hand, scholars investigating these same complex 
organisations tasked with safety-critical operations, find that while deviance is in some 
ways normal (Schulman, 1993), these organisations’ work practices are unusually 
reflective and wary of danger (Fraher et al., 2017; Weick et al., 2008). These different 
theoretical positions motivate our research, because while contrasting views have been 
duly noted (Leveson et al., 2009; Rijpma, 2003), we argue that there is need for a more 
coherent perspective. To restore coherence between these two risk approaches we 
investigate what a normalisation process looks like by which the intuitions of danger are 
not trivialised, as seen in the NASA and Tenerife disasters, but acted upon.
Voorbereid document - David.indd   60 01-02-2021   15:14
61
Deviance in airline cockpits
3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN
When we started to examine deviance in commercial airline cockpits and the question of 
whether and how deviance might be normalised, we aimed to uncover a complex set of 
activities that was not well-defined ex-ante. We therefore followed the logic of zooming 
in and out of the phenomenon of interest (Nicolini, 2009) and employed an engaged 
practice-approach (Barley & Kunda, 2001; Nicolini, 2012; Van de Ven & Johnson, 
2006). We characterise our approach as engaged because we studied and gave voice 
to practitioners, and in particular under-represented voices, such as advocates for new 
safety approaches, that contradicted dominant discourses, such as the risk discourse 
that emphasises compliance. Our approach qualifies as a practice-approach because we 
studied deviant aspects of cockpit work practices as well as pilots’ reflections on these 
practices, enabled by the reflective nature of these practices.
Based on our theoretical framework, we distinguish three elements in reflective 
processes: reflexive action, reflection-in-action, and reflection-on-action (Hodgkinson 
& Sadler-Smith, 2018; Schön, 1983; Yanow & Tsoukas, 2009). Through interviews, we 
first tapped into pilots’ ongoing reflection-on-action, such as when talking with colleagues 
about challenging work situations over lunch or coffee (Orr, 1996). These reflections 
guided us to grasp reflection-in-action, i.e. split-seconds of thinking and deliberating 
that happen while an action in the cockpit is unfolding, predominantly relying on pilots’ 
fast reflexive action. The example in the introduction, where a pilot comments on his 
routine deviation while he performs it, illustrates how both the observer and the pilots 
identified situations of reflection-in-action. To retain our independent analysis, we 
regularly compared and triangulated different sources, and discussed the emerging 
interpretations within the research team.
3.3.1 Research setting
The three elements of reflexive action, reflection-in-action, and reflection-on-action 
occurred in different domains in our research setting. First, there are individual flight 
crews’ reflexive actions, taking place mainly in cockpits characterised by meticulous, 
continuously updated technical designs, maintenance, and operational support. Flight 
crews operating them, in case of the short-haul flights we studied, usually consisting 
of two pilots who often do not know each other but can smoothly work together 
because of their intensive training and extensive standardisation. With technological 
advances, processes that in the past relied on crews’ deliberate reasoning and calculating, 
under pressure of the ongoing operation, are now distributed between human actors 
and technical systems. In today’s automated cockpits, most visible actions by human 
operators, therefore, are reflexive actions, such as making a quick judgment by eye. 
Knowing how technical systems work, procedures are designed, and flight crews are 
trained, therefore is essential to understand the meaning of what, to an untrained 
observer, might seem like mindless actions.
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Reflection-in-action is seen when pilots in the operating environment discuss how to 
adjust to contingencies. In order to be able to intervene, pilots do not just monitor if 
dials are pointing “in the green” and react when the system tells them to do something, 
but rather prospect, by scanning if the readings make sense in terms of the underlying 
– often quite complex – system logics and the expected flow of unfolding events. The 
slightest deviations that emerge in the process trigger a sense that something is off and 
requires attention, i.e. reflection-in-action. Pilots activate themselves by using tools like 
checklists and scan flows across the instruments to keep checking if the readings make 
sense. Sometimes cues that something is off are easy to spot and the required responses 
well-rehearsed; at other times cues are not that obvious, which can be confusing or even 
threatening. Therefore, pilots experience a strong norm of providing constant feedback 
to keep everyone as well-informed as possible.
After the flight, as well as during low-workload periods in the cockpit, deviations 
from the normal process also trigger reflection-on-action. Pilots take the planned 
process such as provided by the trained and written procedures very seriously. They 
often discuss their experiences in convoluted legalistic and technical jargon amongst 
each other informally, in training sessions, and by entering even mundane deviations 
and anomalies from planned processes in centralised safety reporting systems. There, 
these data are analysed and used to distil safety lessons that are communicated back to 
pilots or other parts of the operation, or serve as input for complex procedure redesign 
processes. Updates are offered continuously, but the updating process may involve many 
parties, including regulators and aircraft manufacturers. Safety information can also lead 
to modifications in the continuous flight simulator training cycle that pilots are subject 
to during their entire career.
The flight simulator hence is another setting where we find all three elements. All 
flight training on a new type of aircraft starts in realistic (moving) flight simulators 
and trains reflexes to the point that trained pilots can immediately start flying the real 
aircraft operationally. From novice pilot to experienced captain, pilots’ expertise typically 
develops in stages, where at first they are still highly aware of all procedures, but not 
necessarily know how to apply them in complex situations yet, while senior pilots may 
have forgotten about certain procedural details but know exactly how to handle complex 
situations. Half-yearly recurrent flight simulation training keeps these reflexes sharp, 
guides pilots to reflect-in-action, and triggers them to also reflect on their actions.
While these work processes and safety systems are very similar across the globe, 
there may be differences between countries. Our study took place in the Netherlands, 
a member state of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO, 2018), falling 
under the jurisdiction of the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA, 2018) and EU and 
Dutch aviation law and regulations. By focusing on one national context we could involve 
many key positions in relevant social networks; this gave us ample insight in typical social 
phenomena observed globally in aviation.
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3.3.2 Data collection
The first author gathered different types of qualitative data by approaching research 
participants and building relations with aviation professionals in the Netherlands between 
2011 and 2017, as part of ongoing research in aviation (see Appendix 3A). With about 170 
hours of General Aviation (GA), non-professional, flight experience, and having completed 
one year of aerospace engineering course work, this author was uniquely prepared for 
this study. Because pilot training starts in GA aircraft, the first author could draw on a 
shared background in terms of basic flying principles and a common understanding of 
the existential value of standard procedures. The data reflect pilots’ current experiences 
as based in the four different airline companies where they worked, as well as previous 
experiences in several other companies inside and outside the Netherlands. In total, 
sixteen interviews were conducted in the first, exploratory phase. Participation in a 
professional aviation network, as well as interviews with key governance actors, helped 
form a deeper understanding of the type and origin of discussions surrounding deviance 
and risk. The first author participated in nine professional seminars, presenting and 
conducting workshops on two occasions. From 2015 onwards, the first author developed 
a dialogue through seven consecutive interviews with an airline captain with an academic 
safety background, which allowed us to start zooming in on deviating work practices. 
Throughout the process, all authors discussed the data being collected to challenge 
informant choices as well as initial interpretations of what informants were saying.
Based on personal invitations by this captain in 2015, and a co-pilot in 2016, the first 
author conducted observations in cockpits of two different aircraft types and companies. 
For the first observation, the first author studied the aircraft procedures and took an 
hour of flight simulator training to get a sense of flying a large two-engine jet, as well 
as of the complex cockpit crew coordination materials and procedures involved. After 
the observation, notes were transcribed and the captain was interviewed to check 
the accuracy of the observations, elaborate upon them and connect them to earlier 
conversations. For the second observation, one year later, the knowledge gained from 
the first observation transferred well enough so that no further training was needed. The 
debriefing interview sufficed to understand the deviations in this case, what motivated 
them, and how they connected to larger debates in the professional community of pilots, 
flight instructors, and CRM trainers on the normalisation of deviance. The observations 
helped refine the reflexive dimension of our analysis, as it gave access to events that 
pilots might not necessarily want to be known. The debriefing interviews underscored 
the value of these observations, such as when the co-pilot was shown a series of photos 
made of him slightly mixing up a short sequence of fuel tank switching actions. He joked: 
“I kind of hoped you hadn’t seen that,” commenting that he was impressed by the level 
of detail of the field notes.
Finally, the first and second author together conducted observations in five seven-
hour flight simulator sessions, followed by a debriefing interview to examine our 
observations and five further interviews to challenge and inform our interpretations. 
Even though the flight simulator setting might inspire conforming behaviour, we noted 
3
Voorbereid document - David.indd   63 01-02-2021   15:14
64
Chapter 3
some interesting deviations and discussions about these deviations. One part of each 
flight simulator session was particularly useful because it was not concerned with training 
but with ‘just’ observing how pilots normally fly. In the span of about 80 minutes, a regular 
flight process was simulated from preparation to parking. The instructor’s role was to 
operate the simulator and play all the other actors that pilots normally encounter on a 
regular flight, such as cabin crew, air traffic controllers, ground service personnel, and 
maintenance and operational back offices offering assistance in case something was 
wrong. Instructors would also comment during the simulation flight on actions to help 
us understand what happened and take note of something that we could pick up on in 
the coffee break afterwards.
Simulator flights are much less complex than real flights, for example because the 
instructor can only play one actor at a time; yet the observed simulated flight was packed 
with small failures that required pilots to act in non-normal ways, which triggered non-
standard actions. The training practices we observed, such as how instructors engaged 
with different crews’ performance of non-standard actions, further corroborated our 
interpretations of how reflective practices take place. We transcribed our notes and 
checked our interpretations in interviews with the instructors as well as the company’s 
safety and training mangers.
3.3.3 Data Analysis
The data provide a rich set of empirical examples of how deviance occurs when risks are 
managed in cockpit work. To this end, we began unpacking our deviance examples by 
coding elements of reflective processes as we found them in the empirical examples. We 
developed the coding scheme through an iterative process (Gioia, Corley & Hamilton, 
2013). We first labelled the empirical examples shown in Appendix 3B with first-order 
concepts that formulated aspects of reflexive action, reflection-in-action, or reflection-
on-action. We grouped the examples to different risk-prone processes, such as take-off, 
landing, failure management, and fuel management. In this grouping, deviance is still 
implicit: some examples are one-off deviations, which according to our definition is not 
necessarily deviance; other examples concern routine deviations, and thus constitute 
deviance. Some examples show explicit reflection-in-action, such as the example of 
adapting the standard procedures for selecting flaps to non-normal snow conditions 
(#I.1 in Appendix 3B). Other examples show reflection on an earlier performed action 
that failed to accomplish a goal, signalling a lack of reflection-in-action, such as when one 
flight crew in a simulator session forgot the after-care process of a cabin injury accident 
(#S.11 in Appendix 3B).
From this process of examining different empirical examples and counter-examples, 
we developed second-order themes that were theoretically informed and that described 
the normalisation of deviance. As we began to gather a larger volume of data, the different 
examples and counter-examples of deviance, we realised, could all be interpreted in 
terms of potential negative as well as positive consequences. Indeed, the informants 
interviewed in intermediate stages of the analysis process provided commentary on the 
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possible mechanisms and the positive and/or negative consequences. They generally 
suggested that these are not mutually exclusive processes; the positive normalisation 
processes usually are not differentiated from the negative ones. This analytical process 
resulted in a coding scheme consisting of six second-order themes: reflexive action, 
experiencing small anomalies, reflective deviations, problematising deviance, normalising 
deviance, and established work practices.
We went through several iterations before arriving at the two aggregate 
dimensions of deviance and normalisation, which connected the different second order 
themes. In addition, we realised that the deviance and normalisation processes operated 
at different levels of analysis. We identified that deviance occurred at the operational 
level, whereas the normalisation process occurred at the organisational level. Throughout 
this process, all four co-authors independently reviewed the evolving coding scheme to 
assure a balanced interpretation, develop our understanding of the operating mechanisms 
and tease out different explanations of deviance and normalisation. We realised that 
a perspective on positive deviance consequences was important, complementary to 
the already strong discourse on negative consequences. This led us to develop a data 
structure of deviance normalisation (see Figure 1), which we will explain in the findings.
Figure 1. Data structure
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3.4 FINDINGS: NORMALISATION OF DEVIANCE IN COCKPIT 
WORK PRACTICES
Our analysis of cockpit work practices revealed that the normalisation of deviance is a 
bottom-up process consisting of deviance and normalisation as two distinct parts, which 
link the operational and the organisational level. Through this process pilots are able to 
strike workable balances between safety and efficiency and manage complex safety risks.
3.4.1 Deviance
In this section, we first unpack the emergence of deviance in the regular flight operation as 
pilots recognise and act on various cues. This process consists of reflexive action followed 
by experiencing small anomalies, which may trigger reflective deviations as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Deviance process
Reflexive action. Reflexive action is predicated on a continuous stream of cues. Many 
cues are recognised from previous experience and training and trigger pilots’ well-
rehearsed reflexes. Because not all cues can be covered by training, and pilots have 
varying experiences and backgrounds, there is some variation in what cues pilots 
recognise as well as what the cues signify to them. Therefore, when presented with the 
same cues, pilots may intuit different degrees and types of risk, as we observed in the 
flight simulator exercise. Only one of the five crews faced with the identical conditions 
decided to bring additional fuel for their flight. The weather conditions were so close to 
the legal limits that this crew thought that they risked having to wait before the take-off 
runway for the weather to clear up and consequently run low on fuel for the flight.
Cues like certain weather conditions therefore may signify a risk, or an opportunity, 
and pilots develop their sensitivity to these cues by sharpening their reflexes, sometimes 
in non-standard ways. A co-pilot argued that within limits, he regularly experimented with 
different techniques because it expanded his sense of what he could do with the aircraft. 
We for example observed him select flaps instead of airbrakes, when Air Traffic Control 
(ATC) requested him to expedite his descent. He argued this was a way to increase 
drag and thus descend faster, without making the aircraft buffet as much as the speed 
brakes did, thus benefiting passenger comfort. Such small experiments might trigger the 
emergence of (slightly) deviating practices.
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Table 4. Reflexive action
1st order Empirical reference 2nd order
Intuiting risks
 ■ of dirty runway + tailwind, which triggers a “red flag” (#I.17);
 ■ when hearing that the weather conditions are close to minima 
(#S.2; #S.4)
 ■ when sensing familiar engine vibration (#S.8)
 ■ of deviating from stable approach criteria (#S.12)






 ■ by self-training a mental trigger to do an extra check on air 
pressure (#I.9)
 ■ is induced while vacating the runway: feeling the anti-skid 
operating confirms a “red line” for accepting “dirty runway” 
conditions (#I.17)
 ■ by dimming lights as a sure reminder to close the window after 
checklist says so, but before taking off (#O.6)
 ■ when using hand grip to remember clearance received (#I.7)
 ■ by levelling off just above clouds and bleed off airspeed before 
descending into clouds and possible turbulence (#O.15)
 ■ by manually flying around clouds to avoid turbulence (#O.14)
 ■ by trying flaps instead of airbrakes to expedite descent smoothly 
(#O.12)
 ■ by trying a fuel management sequence and correcting mistake 
(#O.3)
 ■ by dipping one wing to make the plane “sit” more comfortably 
(#O.17)
Experiencing small anomalies. Faced with certain cues, pilots may judge these to be 
(slightly) anomalous. Experiencing anomalies often means facing complexities intrinsic 
to the flight process, such as we observed when a flight crew inadvertently triggered a 
navigation system warning. They conducted their pre-flight process very fast in order 
to depart on time, but this meant that the system was not yet ready when the crew 
entered a subsequent process. The crew did not know about this complex interaction 
and therefore did not understand why the light had come on and gone off again. They 
called the ground mechanic on duty who helped diagnose the anomaly, after which the 
crew felt confident that the system was, in fact, operating normally.
Pilots can also experience anomalies due to some external event that impacts the 
operational process, such as we observed when flight crews in the simulator experienced 
vibration due to simulated ice accumulating on the engine’s turbofan blades. This example 
shows that the source of the impact may not be immediately apparent. One captain, 
who had previously experienced the vibration in real life, immediately recognised 
the sensation caused by the simulator, and directed his team process straight to the 
associated Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) procedure. In contrast, other crews were 
more surprised by the vibration. In view of the weather conditions reported, they thought 
that ice formation was unlikely and it subsequently took one of these crews more time 
to diagnose and resolve the problem.
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Table 5. Experiencing small anomalies
1st order Empirical reference 2nd order
Facing 
complexities
 ■ interrupting the engine start checklist in complex airport (#I.9)
 ■ triggering a system warning when performing start-up very fast 
(#O.11)
 ■ triggering critical fuel when taking time to handle problems (#S.4)






 ■ of personal problems that may reduce pilot’s sharpness (#I.10)
 ■ of short/rugged airfields on landing (#I.11)
 ■ of tailwind and dirty runway on landing (#I.17)
 ■ of low visibility and unserviceable runway lights on fuel safety 
margin (#S.2)
 ■ of volcanic ash on engines (#S.1)
 ■ of ice on engine turbofan blades (#S.8)
Table 6. Reflective deviations




 ■ when given nonstandard command to handle both radio and 
failure (#I.6)
 ■ when operations centre hesitates to accept extra fuel (#S.3, 
#I.2, #I.4)
 ■ by joking about co-pilot’s fast taxiing (#O.16)
 ■ by raising question, triggered by error in captain’s briefing 
(S.7)
 ■ by inviting feedback, saying “if you’re not happy, we don’t 
go” (#S.1)







 ■ by taking a moment to discuss the timing of a non-normal 
procedure (#I.1)
 ■ by briefly reasoning through contingencies when fuel goes 
critical (#S.4)
 ■ by recalculating the expected fuel available on take-off after 
getting delayed while taxiing, weighing the risks, and deciding 
to “commit” to land on the destination airport because it is 
unlikely to close down (#O.2)
 ■ by silently weighing risks before transgressing speed limit 
(#O.13)
 ■ by shortly explaining a nonstandard solution to a resisting 
co-pilot (#I.6)
 ■ by discussing whether to continue the flight as planned, 
divert, or return because of some problems incurred during 
flight (#S.10)
Reflective deviations. Small anomalies trigger pilots to reflectively deviate by speaking 
up and receiving feedback, and planning and motivating the deviation. Flight crews 
may show contrasting responses to small anomalies, which surface when pilots speak 
up. Speaking up when one sees a higher ranked crew member do something strange 
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or incorrect is found extremely important, if very difficult –even in the supposedly 
egalitarian culture in the Netherlands– because it is not self-evident that higher ranks 
will be receptive to feedback. Procedures help co-pilots to speak up, such as by simply 
calling an anomalous reading (“speed!”) rather than saying the captain is doing something 
wrong (“you are going too slow!”). Captains may however consciously invite feedback by 
adjusting leadership styles to the perceived expertise-level and attitude of the co-pilot. 
The more novice co-pilot might benefit from a more directive captain to structure the 
overwhelmingly complex, fast-pacing operation, but since novice pilots might also be less 
assertive, captains may explicitly give co-pilots space to voice contrasting viewpoints.
Reflective deviations are furthermore planned and motivated. Sometimes there 
is plenty of time to discuss the plan and motivation of the deviation. Often, however, 
there is little time for explicit deliberation and split-second reflections may at first 
appear rudimentary or even absent. In the simulator we observed how a captain, despite 
rearranging and extending his final approach to make more time to configure the aircraft 
for landing, did not manage to reduce enough speed before reaching 1000 feet, at which 
point the SOP stipulates that a ‘stable approach’ should be established. The co-pilot asked 
if they should go around, but the captain replied “no” and continued steering the plane 
down in silent concentration. Because of low fuel and several failures incurred earlier, the 
captain explained afterwards that he instantly felt that going around presented a bigger risk 
than deviating from the stable approach procedure. Indeed, the instructor congratulated 
him on making a good and fast decision that demonstrated operational expertise.
3.4.2 Normalisation
In this section we unpack the process of normalisation that occurs when pilots extract 
their reflective deviations from the operation. In this process, pilots first engage in 
problematising deviance, and may normalise deviance by informally spreading deviant 
practices or codifying them into established work practices, as shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Normalisation process
Problematising deviance. Pilots extract deviance from the operation by problematising 
deviance when they are sharing experiences or by discussing procedure adaptations. 
Sharing experiences of noteworthy deviations may problematise a particular situation 
where it was not obvious how to apply the SOP, or debate pilots’ responses to such 
situations. The captain in one of our flight observations, for example, told a ‘war story’ 
about a co-pilot resisting an urgent request because it was non-conform the SOP. In mere 
3
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seconds, the captain had to explain the deviation before the co-pilot understood and 
would go along. The point of this story was to demonstrate that being a good pilot means 
sometimes deviating from procedures to deal with a complex situation. By sharing such 
experiences, pilots may question each other’s abilities to handle complex situations in line 
with SOPs and take a position in larger questions of what it means to be a professional pilot.
By discussing procedure adaptations, pilots may subsequently problematise the 
SOP itself. Pilots for example debated about the extent to which speed limits could be 
violated to gain flexibility without endangering flight safety. We observed this process 
in informal discussions arising in breaks of the simulator sessions, where pilots debated 
whether fast taxying was worth the risk. Pilots may also disagree with the aircraft 
operating manual about what the safest procedure is and develop their own deviating 
practice, as was the case for automatic landings on an aircraft that has two independent 
autopilot systems. Normally, pilots flew with only one of the autopilots engaged and the 
other functioning as backup. However, for automatic landings the manual prescribed 
selecting two autopilots, because only with two systems engaged could the aircraft 
perform an automatic go-around. In order to prepare for this eventuality, the two 
systems combined would always start trimming up the nose around 400 feet altitude. 
If in this situation, for whatever reason, the pilot should have to decide to overrule the 
autopilot and take manual control, he or she would have an ‘out of trim’ aircraft that was 
less controllable at a very critical low altitude and speed. One of our informants found 
out that to prevent this risky eventuality, many of his colleagues chose to select only 
one autopilot, which would mean that an automatic go around was not possible, but 
they would in any case never have to face an out-of-trim aircraft. Consequently, they 
would have to be ready to disengage the autopilot and perform the go-around manually 
if needed. Discussing such a procedure adaptation thus involves critically examining 
reasons for deviating and techniques by which to accomplish the goal of the SOP and 
the underlying company policy, such as landing safely under varying weather conditions 
or flying passengers timely to their connecting flights.
Normalising deviance. We found that in some cases informal deviating practices were 
normalised because, after ample problematisation, they were found to offer better 
solutions to practical problems than the existing SOP. A deviating practice can then 
spread informally in the operation such as by captains’ instructions to novice co-pilots. 
One co-pilot for instance said that he was instructed to deviate from the SOP in the case 
of various small system failures. When he was about to find the relevant Quick Reference 
Handbook procedure after a failure occurred in flight, he was briskly told to just reset the 
system. After his initial shock, the co-pilot learned that this was standard practice in his 
type division for several of the small system failures that the aircraft routinely suffered.
When the deviating practice that has emerged from practical experience in the 
operation is found to offer a better solution than the written procedure, the organisation 
may undertake a formal process by which the practice is codified into a modified SOP. 
Because modifying SOPs involves many different regulatory bodies and organisations, 
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airlines may be hesitant to start the process. In the case of the ‘quick reset’ deviating 
practice, the organisation eventually codified this by formulating certain conditions 
under which this practice was allowed. The type division’s chief pilot communicated the 
modification by email to all pilots, which our informant co-pilot had actually missed, but 
was told about by a colleague in the operation.
Table 7. Problematising deviance
1st order Empirical reference 2nd order
Sharing 
experiences
 ■ by telling war story about co-pilot resistance (#I.6)
 ■ by voicing distrust in aircraft checklist design (#S.9)
 ■ triggered when the emergency rope cover falls open in flight 
(#O.10)







 ■ of leading nonstandard autopilot practice (#I.18)
 ■ when new SOP no longer specifies quantitatively when to 
select runway turnoff lights (#I.20)
 ■ of risks involved in making reverse thrust a non-normal 
procedure instead of the normal procedure (#I.21)
 ■ needed to comply with the rules of a complex airport (#I.9)
 ■ by debating whether the time gained by fast taxying is worth 
the risk (#I.6)
 ■ by debating stable approach deviations (#S.13)
Table 8. Normalising deviance




 ■ when co-pilot is told to do a “quick reset” instead of following 
procedure (#I.13)
 ■ by commenting that briefing “flex temp” as per SOP signifies 
a lack of independent thinking (#O.5)







 ■ when management endorsed the “quick reset” under certain 
conditions (#I.13)
 ■ when late passenger seating becomes the standard 
procedure (#I.15
Established work practices. Finally, the normalisation of deviance modifies established 
practices. Established practices could be modified when normalised deviance codified 
in formal SOP modifications are adopted by training programmes or simply passed on 
by instructions such as the earlier mentioned email from the chief pilot. Normalisation 
of deviance however probably modifies established practices more often in informal 
ways, because many deviating practices involve only slight deviations that are informally 
accepted, or they have become a norm only within a certain part of the organisation. 
Because of the extensive data monitoring that occurs in airlines it seems increasingly 
3
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difficult to hide deviating practices from company management, although plenty of 
deviance remains difficult to survey. Most normalised deviance as such appears to 
fall within “grey areas” that are generally left to pilots’ professional discretion, such 
as personally preferred deviations from the standard scan-flow described in the 
introduction.
Table 9. Established work practices
1st order Empirical reference 2nd order
Training 
formal SOP
 ■ ingrains emergency reflexes like following TCAS commands 
(#S.7)
 ■ ingrains the “normal procedure” as basic reflex while giving “non-
normal” options for varying conditions such as short runways 
(#I.21)
 ■ helps to enter emergency checklist despite overwhelming noise 
and stress (#S.9)






 ■ when leading failure handling practice is to perform a quick reset 
instead of following QRH (#I.13);
 ■ when working around automation-induced risks of an automatic 
landing (#I.19) or switching off automatic thrust to prevent over-
speed (#O.9)
 ■ when non-normal becomes treated as normal procedure, such as 
when pilots stopped briefing flex temp (#O.1; #O.5)
 ■ when routinely chopping the start-up checklist in two parts to 
comply with ATC procedure in a complex airport (#I.9)
 ■ in case of personally preferred scan-flows (#O.7) or use of paper 
when digital tools are being introduced with early design flaws 
(#O.8)
We have thus returned to the premise of the normalisation process, because pilots 
heavily rely on the structured, routine scan-flow of cockpit instruments and controls 
to spot anomalies and deviate as necessary. As cited in the introduction, the captain we 
observed at work in the cockpit argued afterwards in the debriefing interview that for 
him personally, his deliberately deviating scan-flow allowed him to spot anomalies better, 
thus contributing in a small but critical way to the management of organisational risks.
3.5 DISCUSSION
Our study of airline cockpit work practices indicates an emergent process by which 
professionals deliberately act on anomalous cues and reflectively engage in the 
normalisation of deviance to manage organisational risks. Although positive roles of 
deviance in HROs have been noted (Roe & Schulman, 2008; Schulman, 1993; Weick & 
Roberts, 1993), the possibility that normalisation of deviance may contribute in a positive 
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way to risk management has thus far remained relatively unrecognised because of the 
emphasis on accidents in risk studies (e.g. Gephart, 1993; Oliver et al., 2017; Turner & 
Pidgeon, 1997), characterising the normalisation of deviance as a complex organisational 
path towards failure (Snook, 2000; Vaughan, 1997). We argue that the risk literature has 
thus incurred hindsight bias (Dekker, 2004), seeing deviance mainly as a potential danger, 
while the need for deviating is only recognised in incidental cases (e.g. Weick & Roberts, 
1993). In contrast, because we studied regular work practices rather than failures, we 
removed hindsight bias from our analysis, enabling us to make two main contributions to 
the risk literature that formulate positive consequences of deviance and normalisation. 
First, as shown by the deviance processes in Figure 4, at the operational level, pilots act 
reflexively as they recognise cues in the ongoing and highly standardised flight process. 
Experiencing small anomalies triggers reflective deviations by which professionals give 
voice to diverse expert intuitions. Second, as shown by the normalisation processes in 
Figure 4, at the organisational level, such experiences are regularly extracted from the 
operation by the ongoing problematisation of deviance. Some procedure adaptations are 
eventually normalised when consensus is reached for how to handle certain anomalies 
in established work practices.
Figure 4. A model of the normalisation of deviance emerging from regular work practices
3.5.1 Deviance in operations
Our cockpit study shows how operational deviance responding to small anomalies 
does not necessarily lead to failure but instead to reflection. Researchers usually warn 
against deviance such as shortcuts and workarounds to deal with regularly encountered 
3
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small anomalies, because organisations presumably cannot control the risks induced by 
professionals deviating (Reason, 1990; 1997). Indeed, our model shows how within the 
loop of reflexive action, individuals or groups may develop deviating practices that are not 
shared or tested by the organisation or authorities (cf. Snook, 2000). Yet, we contribute 
by showing that reflexive action is not only imperative for professionals’ ability to know 
when to deviate, but, triggered by the experience of small anomalies, professionals can 
also share diverse expert intuitions by reflectively deviating.
By explicating these deviance processes, we connect research on human factors in 
HROs with risk research on organisational deviance. Scholars argue that speaking up, 
receiving feedback, planning, and motivating deviations in-action are critical professional 
skills to avert accidents (Helmreich et al., 1999; Helmreich, Klinect & Wilhelm, 2017; 
Nevile, 2004; Sur, Schindler, Singh, Angelos & Langerman, 2016; Weick, 1990). Our 
study adds that these skills imply and sustain useful deviance in HRO operations, because 
deviating from SOPs is a structural rather than incidental phenomenon, which interacts 
with the inherent complexity of HROs’ socio-technical systems and their environments 
(Perrow, 2011; Snook, 2000; Vaughan, 1997).
Our study thus begins to answer a crucial question from risk scholars who, after 
decades of asking how human errors trigger accidents, now ask “why the behaviours 
that usually make things go right occasionally make things go wrong” (Hollnagel, 2014, 
p. 77). Scholars studying socio-technical processes are thus shifting from a focus on 
reliability, which seeks to eliminate dangerous variations and errors, to resilience, which 
in turn seeks to capitalise on the richness and diversity of behaviours in such systems 
(Hollnagel, Woods & Leveson, 2006; Roe & Schulman, 2008). Our study adds that HROs 
capitalise on the diversity of expert intuitions with operational experience (Dreyfus & 
Dreyfus, 2005; Hodgkinson, Langan-Fox & Sadler-Smith, 2008; von Meier, 1999), if 
professionals engage in a communicative process through reflective deviations that 
renders their intuitions intelligible to a wider audience.
Since our study implies that organisations who seek to eliminate deviations 
may undermine intuitive expertise, further research is needed to understand how 
organisations may facilitate and stimulate reflective deviance. Research has shown 
that reflective practices may be stimulated by way of standard briefing procedures that 
require professionals to reflect afterwards or interrupt the operational process to reflect 
on potential threats and upcoming situations that might induce them to err (Helmreich 
et al., 2017; Ron et al., 2006). Our study in contrast shows that many anomalies arise 
dynamically and unpredictably from the complexity of high-tech systems and the 
uncontrollability of the environment. Therefore, we suggest that the main question for 
further research is how to rearrange an ongoing, largely reflexive process (Hodgkinson & 
Sadler-Smith, 2018) under pressure of time and danger in order to engage in meaningful 
reflection-in-action (Yanow & Tsoukas, 2009).
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3.5.2 Normalisation in organisations
Our cockpit study suggests that the normalisation of deviance is not necessarily 
a dangerous path of increasing risk-taking, because normalisation can also signify 
a reflective process by which a risk-averse organisational culture is sustained and 
developed. Seminal risk studies showed that when deviance is normalised, organisations 
gradually expand the scope of acceptable risk, until a catastrophic accident occurs 
(Snook, 2000; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997; Vaughan, 1997). In contrast, our study shows 
that on the condition that problematisation of deviance examines the risks and benefits of 
deviating practices, normalisation codifies and spreads deviating practices that embody 
useful lessons drawn from operational experience. Thereby our study complements, 
rather than contradicts, the view that normalisation of deviance is potentially dangerous, 
because there is no guarantee that the right lessons are drawn when a group normalises 
its deviance (Snook, 2000). Indeed, our study serves to set a research agenda by which 
we can better recognise the normalisation of desired and undesired organisational 
deviance in HROs.
Our study first triggers the question at which point problematisation of deviance from 
and by operational professionals should be followed up by an organisational response. 
Established thinking suggests that an organisation managing risks as critical as flight 
safety should quickly extract emerging deviance and swiftly codify or correct deviating 
practices (Helmreich et al., 2017, May). However, our study raises the question whether 
immediate correction or codification does not cut short the useful problematisation of 
deviance by which professionals learn and develop their expertise. If organisations were 
to accept the premise that professionals should develop and test their own thinking and 
intuition by problematising deviance, then a logical organisational standpoint would be 
that in various routine situations, non-conformity is tolerated based on professional 
grounds (EESC, n.d.). This position, taken by scholars who promote “resilience 
engineering” (Hollnagel et al., 2006), drives the question whether and how organisations 
can develop a ‘ just culture’ (Dekker, 2007) that capitalises on professionals’ intuitive 
expertise (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 2005) and discourages scapegoating when incidents 
happen (Perrow, 2011).
Second, suggesting to better discern the normalisation of desired deviance prompts 
the question: desired by whom? The NASA Space Shuttle accident studies revealed 
a gradual shift towards commercialisation, changing the safety culture developed 
in the age of Apollo moon missions because many stakeholders with a diverse range 
of interests collectively tolerated increasing risk-taking (Vaughan, 1997; 2005). Our 
study in commercial aviation similarly addresses a politicised safety-critical business 
where the operational professionals we observed and interviewed actually represent a 
stakeholder group that promotes risk-averseness, even if they acknowledge that they 
regularly bend the rules inspired by a company policy of timely flight service. We need a 
better understanding of how organisations may give room to and provide platforms for 
such professional groups to problematise deviance by making explicit what deviance is 
desired by whom and why.
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Third, our study raises the question how professional risk and safety cultures can 
have sufficient influence to keep organisations on track when commercially driven 
organisations regulate their own risky processes by managing compliance (Vaughan, 
1990). This implies a change of perspective from existing compliance-based risk 
management to managing deviance. The dominant view is that HRO professional cultures 
are risk-averse because they are compliant with organisational standards, while in other 
cultures, such as in the banking industry, professionals show risk-taking behaviour 
through deviance, even after the global financial crisis (Palermo, Power, & Ashby, 2017). 
In contrast, our study suggests that in order to understand how professionals in risk-
averse cultures are able to manage organisational risks, we need to understand better 
how these cultures uphold risk-averseness exactly by perpetuating the normalisation 
of deviance. Further research needs to develop and test these informal mechanisms 
and investigate them empirically in HRO safety cultures as well as other risk-managed 
organisations, such as banks and accounting firms.
Finally, our study shows that we need more context-sensitive research on the 
normalisation of deviance in more cultural and regional contexts than Western Europe. 
Current thinking on safety culture suggests that certain cultural characteristics, such as 
the reportedly steeper hierarchy and stronger emphasis on seniority in Asian countries, 
could inhibit dissent (Liao, 2015). Our study suggests dissent to be crucial for the 
reflective normalisation of deviance. Especially considering the growth of Asian markets, 
as seen in commercial aviation, there could be much to gain in furthering research on 
the positive consequences of deviance and normalisation in these cultural and regional 
contexts.
3.6 CONCLUSION
Our study reveals how normalisation of deviance contributes to organisational risk 
management, when it enables professional intuition through reflective practice. This 
complements our current understanding about normalisation of deviance as a potential 
hazard, because we show why deviance should be recognised as common and valuable 
in safety-critical organisations. With growing organisational dependency on high-tech 
systems with a potential for large-scale, complex failures, HROs as well as other risk 
managed organisations could benefit from facilitating the process where professionals 
develop, detect, and learn from deviance.
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Chapter image: Safety commitment. Created for a commercial safety culture assignment in SE Asia.
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CHAPTER 4
Modelling safety culture as a 
socially emergent phenomenon: a 
case study in aircraft maintenance
ABSTRACT
Safety culture is often understood as encompassing organisational members’ shared attitudes, 
beliefs, perceptions and values associated with safety. Safety culture theory development is 
fraught with inconsistencies and superficiality of measurement methods, because the dynamic 
and political nature of culture is often ignored. Traditionally, safety culture is analysed by survey-
based approaches. In this paper we propose a novel, systemic, interdisciplinary approach for 
investigating safety culture that combines multi-agent system modelling with organisational 
ethnography. By using this approach, mechanisms of emergence of safety culture from daily 
practices, operations and interactions of organisational actors can be modelled and analysed. 
The approach is illustrated by a case study from the aircraft maintenance domain, based on 
existing ethnographic data. Using the proposed approach we were able to reproduce and explain 
emergent characteristic patterns of commitment to safety in the maintenance organisation 
from this study. The model can be used for theory development and as a management tool to 
evaluate non-linear impacts of organisational arrangements on workers’ commitment to safety.




It is broadly recognised that safety culture plays a crucial role in shaping the safety and 
performance of operations in safety critical organisations (Reason, 1997) in such areas as 
air traffic (Mearns, Kirwan, Reader, Jackson, Kennedy & Gordon, 2013), nuclear power 
plant management (Lee & Harrison, 2000), and railway systems (Jeffcott, Pidgeon, 
Weyman & Walls, 2006). Safety culture has been defined in a variety of ways (Choudhry, 
Fang & Mohammed, 2007; Guldenmund, 2010). In this paper, we use the term safety 
culture as those aspects of organisational culture that may have an effect on safety, which 
is in line with Hopkins’ (2006) primary focus on organisational culture and subsequent 
analysis of its impact on safety.
Organisational culture is a complex, context-specific phenomenon not easily harnessed 
in a single definition or theoretical approach (Giorgi, Lockwood & Glynn, 2015). Culture is 
particularly complex because its members may relate to cultural meanings in ambiguous 
ways (Kunda, 1992). Organisational members may engage in political ways with cultural 
elements such as particular basic assumptions, espoused values, technologies, and artifacts 
(Schein, 1990); and narratives, symbols, and rituals (Geertz, 1973). A culture is therefore 
not necessarily an integrated and stable whole, but is dynamic and can be differentiated 
into subcultures or appear to be fragmented (Martin, 2001). This fundamental 
insight has not yet been thoroughly incorporated into the concept of safety culture.
Current safety cultural analytical approaches and frameworks have acknowledged 
limitations. They rely on linear models derived from accident research (Reason, 1990). 
These models, and the assumptions underlying them, are increasingly being criticised 
for being overly simplistic (Hollnagel, Woods & Leveson, 2006). They offer little insight 
in the way competing values interact in real organisations, such as the simultaneous 
challenges to accomplish growth and profitability as well as high safety levels (Antonsen, 
2009). Current approaches to safety culture are therefore a-political, while in reality, 
power plays an important and complex role in the development of organisational safety 
cultures, as Antonsen (2009) has noted.
In this paper we present a novel, advanced research approach to investigate 
organisational safety culture as a complex phenomenon, emphasising its gradual emergence 
in years of mostly normal operations. The approach takes a systemic view on safety 
modelling and analysis (Hollnagel et al., 2006) according to which safety hazards, accidents 
and incidents develop from complex, nonlinear interaction between diverse organisational 
processes. This view fits the social scientific understanding of culture described above.
The paper is organised as follows. In section 4.2, we describe the approach and its 
components of ethnographic research, multi-agent modelling, and simulation analysis. 
Section 4.3 describes the process of case selection as well as presenting details of the 
case study. Section 4.4 describes the model and how it was developed. In section 4.5 we 
present the simulation results of the model as well as virtual experiments. We conclude 
in section 4.6 with a discussion about theoretical implications, applications, limitations, 
and further development of the approach.
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4.2 APPROACH
Modelling safety culture necessarily involves an in-depth study of a particular culture, 
which is usually done by ethnography. Therefore we introduce agent-based modelling 
and organisational ethnography, as well as how to perform agent-based modelling on 
safety cultural phenomena and incorporate ethnographic data.
4.2.1 Organisational ethnography
Because of the complexity of culture, organisational culture is typically investigated 
with ethnography. Ethnography involves making detailed discoveries of local informal 
processes and practices, understand the experiential reality of cultural members from 
within, and thus develop ideas about how patterns of interest emerge (Fayard & Van 
Maanen, 2015). Generally the method of participant observation is preferred. The 
researcher participates in the everyday life of the cultural group of interest to obtain 
an insider’s understanding, while also maintaining an intellectual distance or preventing 
to ‘go native’. In the case of auto-ethnography, a member of a culture may be trained 
as ethnographer and enabled to study the culture by reflecting on its common sense 
meanings with cultural outsiders (Doloriert & Sambrook, 2012). The data that are thus 
gathered are field notes of observations and conversations, transcripts of interviews 
and collections of meaningful documents. The analysis process is quite particular to the 
research context which means there are hardly standard procedures for analysis. The 
results are conveyed through context-rich, or ‘thick’, qualitative descriptions (Geertz, 
1973).
4.2.2 Agent-based modelling
The emergent nature of cultural phenomena is intuitively congruent with the multi agent 
paradigm. According to this paradigm, cultural patterns, seen as systemic properties 
of a multi-agent system, emerge and develop over time from many distributed local 
interactions of agents that represent organisational actors. Agent modelling can 
complement ethnographic theory building because it can serve as a formal test of its 
logic, and lead to new theoretical propositions (Harrison, Lin, Caroll & Carley, 2007).
A specification of a multi-agent system model comprises: 1) A description of agent 
types and structural relations between them; 2) A specification of local properties of each 
agent. Such properties comprise both internal (cognitive) properties and behavioural 
properties, i.e., temporal input-output relations of some complexity; 3) A specification of 
relations between agents, such as communication and power relations; 4) A specification 
of the environment.
This definition is in line with the work of Weiss (1999). More details on the specification 
of multi-agent systems are provided in Bosse, Jonker, van der Meij, Sharpanskykh and 
Treur (2009) and in Sharpanskykh (2008).
4
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4.2.3 Agent-based modelling of safety culture
The combination of agent modelling and ethnographic data, that our approach implies, 
is unusual in the sense that it serves theory development. The safety cultural concept 
of interest, such as commitment to safety, is refined through the ethnographic study. 
A more complex idea about what the concept means and how it unfolds in practice is 
thus developed. Modelling then serves to work towards more generic statements by 
incorporating more social scientific theories. The aim is not to simply model an observed 
structure or process, but to incorporate much more detailed and conceptually refined 
observations that can lead to theoretical development.
The process of modelling and validation of the model through simulation requires 
teamwork between the researchers of the interdisciplinary team. Ethnographic data 
are used to build an agent model from generic socio-cultural mechanisms that aims to 
reproduce the patterns found in the ethnographic study. In our team, two ethnography 
specialists were guiding in the interpretation of the data. Modelling specialists created 
suitable mathematical representations, implemented and instantiated the model, and 
produced visuals for interpretation. The tension here is between the ethnography 
specialists who attempt to contextualise and the modelling specialists who attempt to see 
concepts and dynamics as more generic. The team must ensure that members are talking 
about the same concepts and make an effort in understanding some of the principles and 
details of the other’s discipline.
The modelling process involves jointly creating a conceptual model, after which the 
modelling specialists continue to formalise the model in mathematical equations. To 
test the model’s expressiveness and value to the current literature, we also compared 
it with another model of power relations (Appendix 4A). Our agent-based model was 
then implemented in Java. We did not use dedicated agent modelling tools because their 
conceptual models of agents and specification languages are rather restricted for our 
purposes (e.g., to the BDI architecture). Furthermore, a lower level implementation runs 
faster, which is critical for sensitivity (Appendix 4B) and robustness analysis (Appendix 
4C), when many runs with many interacting agents need to be performed.
Generating and interpreting simulations with the model serves validation as well as 
deepening theoretical insights and throwing up new questions. In section 5 we show how 
we could validate our simulation results by interpreting visualisations of the simulations 
and making sense of them in terms of the original research question. In addition to 
reproducing cultural patterns in the original ethnographic study, we performed several 
virtual experiments. In these experiments we explored the behaviour of the model in 
different settings and under different conditions that seemed plausible in the given setting.
4.3 CASE STUDY
In this section we describe the process of case selection and present the necessary 
empirical details of the case itself. The case narrative is the basis for the agent model.
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4.3.1 Case selection
Although different sequences are possible, we began by selecting an empirical research 
domain where a relevant contribution could be made. We chose the aircraft maintenance 
domain. In this domain daily practices are usually hidden from view in incident 
investigations, and only the emergent errors or failures are found when an incident or 
accident occurs. Thus, investigating aircraft maintenance safety culture has the dual benefit 
of understanding the emergence of safety cultural characteristics over longer periods of 
time, and of uncovering hidden, ‘latent failures’ (Reason, 1990) of air transport systems.
Our literature analysis furthermore suggested that the commitment to safety of 
maintenance technicians and maintenance teams is an essential aspect of safety culture, 
which presumably has a strong effect on safety of maintenance operations. Commitment 
to safety is a sensitive topic because organisational members are confronted with 
dynamic market demands and complex work situations, in which rules and procedures 
do not always make sense and ambiguities arise (Hale & Borys, 2013; Dekker, 2014). 
Under the pressure of meeting schedules and satisfying customers, a good safety culture 
means commitment to safety is ingrained such that it prevents pushing the balance too 
far towards working quickly and less safe (Edwards, Davey & Armstrong, 2013). What 
remains relatively under-investigated however is how context and power actually shape 
such commitment. Thus, the main research question of our case study is: how does the 
commitment to safety of maintenance technicians emerge and develop under social and 
organisational influences? Below we describe the data collection, and describe the case 
in terms of its internal power relations and the more complex pattern unfolding over time.
4.3.2 Data source
As a relevant and recent source of data for our study we used the case study on aircraft 
maintenance safety culture by Atak and Kingma (2010). The first author of this paper 
performed auto-ethnography, allowing a unique insider’s view of safety culture. We 
conducted additional interviews, literature and materials that helped us understand 
local social processes, safety cultural practices, and the context and the history of the 
organisation in question. Furthermore, we modelled the power and influence relations 
between the agents using theories from social science. To gather missing data required 
for the model, and gain a thorough understanding of the secondary data, we conducted 
additional interviews with the authors Atak and Kingma, with a manager still working 
in the organisation in question, and with domain experts from commercial aircraft 
maintenance organisations. In addition to the interviews, we used several reports on 
field studies performed in existing aircraft maintenance organisations in the context of 
large European projects such as HILAS (2007), ADAMS (Van Avermaete & Hakkeling-
Mesland 2001), and TATEM, and smaller PhD projects (Pettersen, 2008; Ward, 2006).
4.3.3 Power relations
The company features professional power relations and dynamics that are common in the 
industry. At the core of operations are teams of Aircraft Maintenance Technicians (AMTs), 
4
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which can generally subdivided into junior technicians and senior flight engineers. Junior 
technicians usually do most of the actual handwork repairs, and senior flight engineers 
usually take on more of a supervisory role such as taking care of planning and drawing 
up work packages. The ratio of junior to senior technicians that closely cooperate in a 
team may be somewhere around six to one.
Supervising the seniors is a senior Maintenance Manager (MM), who is responsible 
for planning in terms of total man hours and work packages for incoming aircraft. The 
MM thus plays a key role in regulating production pressures that AMTs experience, and 
to which they may sometimes mount resistance. While the incentive from MM may be 
to increase speed and efficiency, the Quality Assurance and/or Safety Department (SD) 
of a maintenance organisation provides a counterbalance.
The SD is there to ensure repairs are carried out in a way that does not harm flight 
safety as well as occupational safety of maintenance personnel. The SD is much less visible 
at the work floor than the MM. The SD takes on an advisory role towards management, 
monitors and investigates incidents, and reports to top management. Whether the SD 
has the power to assure safe operations then also depends on the CEO’s prioritising, 
which in turn is a response to the economic and operational challenges that the company 
is facing at a certain point in time.
We refer to Luke’s (1974) three faces of power to distinguish different power 
dynamics resulting from the relations described above. The first face is direct power 
influences between agents, such as when one agent is able to make another agent do 
something that it would not otherwise do. This happens for example when a MM holds 
punitive power over an AMT. The second face is indirect power, such as setting an agenda 
or refraining from making a decision. When older AMTs use their experiential authority 
to talk about how things used to be, they exercise this power, as it draws away attention 
from current demands. The third face of power can be exerted by discourse, rather than 
individuals. This occurs when a discourse stressing production values takes hold due to 
changing context, such as the development described below.
4.3.4 Emergent patterns
The aircraft maintenance organisation developed in three distinct phases from birth to 
maturation in a period of 9 years, beginning in 2001 and running up to 2009. In 2001, 
the organisation experienced a takeover. First, it had to survive the challenging first 
phase with many ad-hoc projects and slim margins. Of the initial work force of 35, the 
company still employed 20 Aircraft Maintenance Technicians (AMTs) that had worked 
at the company before the takeover. The increasing work pressures led to resistance 
amongst this old guard while the company grew to employ 60 AMTs. Second, at the start 
of 2004, the company contracted new customers and grew explosively to a total of 260 
employees by 2008. Members of the old guard gradually left the company and resistance 
diminished. AMTs worked overtime and there were some close calls, highlighting safety 
had a lower priority than productivity at this stage. Third, in mid-2008, a new technical 
director led the company into more mature phase. Safety and production goals were 
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harmonised, the AMTs could develop a sound professional culture and adhering to safety 
standards became normal.
These three phases correspond to three different perspectives on the organisational 
culture (Martin, 2001), which is seen as consisting of a safety strand and a production 
strand. Due to its complexity, any organisational culture can at any time be seen as 
integrated, differentiated or fragmented, depending on the focus of the researcher. In 
the case of the maintenance organisation, and in agreement with Martin (2001), one 
perspective was found to be dominant over the others in each of the consecutive three 
phases (Martin, 2001, as interpreted by Atak & Kingma, 2010, p. 269):
 ■ Survival phase: fragmentation perspective ‘highlights ambiguity and a lack of clarity 
and conflicting or changing meanings in organisations’.
 ■ Development phase: integration perspective ‘refers to the shared understandings 
in organisations’.
 ■ Maturation phase: differentiation perspective ‘focuses on the existence of sub-
cultures’.
During the survival phase, the old guard resisted the pressure of Maintenance 
Management (MM) to increase productivity by reverting to a work-to-rule resistance 
strategy: extensively complying with all procedures, stalling the company’s performance. 
The company’s Safety Department (SD), not very active at this time, was used in this way 
as a shield against MM’s pressure. To new AMTs, however, ‘the way we do things around 
here’ was not clear at this stage. Experienced and senior old guard drew new AMTs to 
collaborate with their resistance, while at other times MM could force decisions. There 
was little common understanding about the application of procedures. Confronted with 
ambiguity and conflicting values, the new AMTs’ experiences reveal a fragmented culture.
In the second phase, the organisational culture integrated around production values, 
at the expense of the safety strand of the culture. The company grew to 260 employees, 
with members of the old guard gradually leaving. The new AMTs continued to use the 
resistance strategy of the old guard against management pressure, though to a lesser 
extent. They were working overtime and sometimes even double shifts. Members 
throughout the company adopted a flexible attitude to safety trying to satisfy rising 
work demand enforced by MM.
In the final maturation phase, the company culture can be seen as differentiated, with 
several subcultures coexisting next to one another. MM still focused on productivity 
yet existed in relative harmony with SD, which was in turn occupied by a new, more pro-
active team that was granted more influence. AMTs gained autonomy to act on their 
judgment and sticking to safety procedures became easy compared to the previous 
phases. Production demands were resolved through planning schemes rather than by 
pressuring AMTs to work faster, allowing AMTs to develop a professional sub-culture 
with safety as a solid priority. For a more detailed description of the study we refer to 
Atak and Kingma (2010).
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In this section we show how we translated the ethnographic findings to a more general 
conceptual model, and derive a formal model with specific parameters. We translate our 
conceptualisation of power relations into a generic set of mechanisms, incorporate the 
given context of the case, and quantify from mostly qualitative data.
In accordance with the case description, we identified four types of agents: new AMT 
(a novice technician), old guard technician, MM and SD. The behaviour of the technician 
agents was the main focus of modelling. MM and SD agents exerted performance and 
safety pressures on that behaviour, which were driven by conflicting goals and different 
interests, values and norms. These pressures and the AMTs’ response to them were 
formalised by performance and safety demands and efforts considered in Section 4.4.1. 
Power and influence relations between the agents are described in Section 4.4.2. The 
spread of attitudes to performance and safety in shifts of AMTs was modelled as a social 
contagion process, considered in Section 4.4.3. In Appendix 4A we demonstrate how 
the proposed model can be related to another well-known agent-based model of power 
based on social dependencies. This was done according to Burton’s (2003) model docking 
approach.
4.4.1 Demands and efforts
To describe at a high level the execution of maintenance operations by AMTs the following 
variables are introduced, in line with the essential organisational goals:
 ■ performance demand (pd) and performance effort (pe);
 ■ safety demand (sd) and safety effort (se)
All these variables vary from 0 to 1.
The performance demand for a task is an aggregate of the task complexity, the 
situational complexity of the environment, in which the task is being executed, and of 
the time pressure. High performance demand is associated with the interval [0.7, 1], 
average – with [0.4, 0.7) and low – with [0, 0.4).
Several empirical sources indicated that AMTs normally have a high workload and 
work pressure during the night and in the morning, and a low to average workload and 
work pressure during the day.
To represent the changes in the performance demand imposed on the AMTs as described 
in the case study, a correlated random walk is used with fixed mean values for all the 
phases. These values are linearly interpolated during the transition phases and their 
values are different for day and night. In the first phase the means are 0.5 and 0.7 for 
day and night respectively, 0.6 and 0.8 for the second phase, and return to 0.5 and 0.7 
for the third phase (Figure 5).
The meaning of performance demand we derived from Atak and Kingma’s narrative 
as well as additional interviews. Zero performance demand means no work needs to be 
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done at all. At 1, AMTs must disregard all quality and safety rules and precautions and 
completely exhaust themselves to meet schedules. An average demand of 0.5 means that 
work can be accomplished at a normal rate and no heavy pressure is experienced. On the 
threshold of average to high, at 0.7, the AMTs begin to experience that they must pick up 
pace, skip steps, and work overtime in order to accomplish the work. We took skipping 
steps at the level of 0.7 as not necessarily harmful for safety and can be done based on 
expert judgment. Similarly, working overtime can be experienced as doing something 
out of professional zeal, rather than being exploited. This depends on the context: in the 
first phase, the latter meanings applied (unsafe violations, exploitation), and in the third 
phase, the former meanings (safe workarounds, professional zeal). Passing 0.7 towards 
the level of 0.8 in the second phase, production pressures will begin to affect health and 
safety negatively after some time. Working overtime becomes working double shifts and 
skipping steps in procedures to meet schedules becomes routine.
The safety demand indicates the required degree of compliance of an AMT with 
the safety standards of the maintenance organisation and other regulatory bodies. The 
highest safety demand (sd=1) means that all the safety standards are required to be 
followed by the word. Multiple interpretations of standards may be possible; then the 
highest safety demand means that AMTs are required to choose the interpretation that 
by their professional judgment optimises safety rather than efficiency or AMTs’ own 
interests (cf. Atak & Kingma, 2010, p. 273). The minimum safety demand (sd=0) indicates 
that only a minimum set of strong safety requirements is required to be satisfied. Similarly 
to performance, high safety demand is associated with the interval [0.7, 1], average – with 
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When the performance effort reaches a critical value called critical performance point 
(cpp), it starts interacting with the safety effort. This assumption is based on several 
evidences provided in Atak and Kingma (2010), indicating that some safety prescriptions 
were not followed by AMTs because of a high time pressure (performance demand). It 
is reflected in the model by the assumption that the higher the performance effort of 
an AMT agent, the less the maximum amount of safety effort it would be able to deliver. 
This relation reflects the well-known dilemma between performance and safety goals in 
safety-critical organisations, and is also in line with observations of operation execution in 
many maintenance organisations. To formalise such a relation between the performance 
effort and the maximum amount of safety effort of an AMT (i.e., the limit on safety effort 
from above), the logistic function maxsft(pe)=1-1/(e-w1×pe + w2) with w1=25, w2=20 shown 
in Figure 7 was chosen. This function determines cpp close to 0.7, corresponding the 
lower bound of the high demand interval. The high steepness of the function reflects 
that with the increase of pe above cpp, the maximum se degrades rapidly, i.e., every 
subsequent increase of pe by ∆pe occurs at a rapidly increasing cost for the maximum 
se. In Appendix 4B, sensitivity analysis results are provided for different values of w1 and 
w2 corresponding to different values of cpp.
Note that an AMT may not necessarily contribute the maximum possible amount 
of safety effort. The AMT’s effort is determined as the result of social influences and 
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The initial values of the efforts were drawn randomly in the beginning of the simulation 
from uniformly distributed ranges defined as follows: for old guard se ϵ [0.7, 1] and 
pe ϵ [0.4, 0.7]; for new AMTs pe ϵ [0.5, 0.8] and se ϵ [0.5, 0.8].
4.4.2 Power and influence relations
In the model, MM is the main source of the performance demand imposed on AMTs, 
and SD is the main source of the safety demand. Besides the MM’s and SD’s influences, 
the AMT’s commitment to performance and to safety is also shaped by influences from 
their peer AMTs. Such influences may be exerted explicitly by communication or may be 
transferred implicitly by observation.
To specify influence relations between agents, the French and Raven’s power model 
(Raven, 1992) was used. This model introduces the following bases of power:
 ■ reward power: its source is the ability to control legitimate reward and its strength 
increases with the magnitude of rewards;
 ■ coercive/punishment power: its strength depends on the magnitude of the negative 
valence of the threatened punishment multiplied by the perceived probability that 
the punishments can be avoided by conformity;
 ■ legitimate power of i over j stems from internalised values in j which dictate that i 
has a legitimate right to influence j and j has an obligation to accept this influence;
 ■ expert power is the ability to administer information, knowledge or expertise to 
another agent; its strength varies with the extent of the knowledge;
 ■ referent power of i over j has its basis in the identification of j with i, i.e., a feeling of 
oneness of j with i;
 ■ informational influence or persuasion is based on an information or logical argument 
that the influencing agent could present to the target to implement a change.
Different power bases may be correlated. For example, a source of legitimate power may 
be the value that one must adhere to certain types of expertise, thus enabling an agent’s 
expert power base if the agent holds this expertise. An agent’s ability to persuade may 
further increase his/her standing as an expert. Power bases should therefore not be 
thought of as independent variables, but conceptual tools to quantify the ethnographic 
textual descriptions and the sentiments conveyed by them. This necessarily involves 
some (inter-)subjectivity.
The strength of power-based influence of agent i on agent j is represented by 
parameter γij with the range [0, 1]. For each influence relation between the agents 
from the case study a range of values was identified as shown in Figure 8. The actual 
influence values used in the simulation discussed in Section 5 were drawn from the 
uniform distributions defined by these ranges. In the following these influence relations 
are discussed more in detail.
4
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Figure 8. The influence relations between the agent types in the three phases
According to the case description, in the first phase MM was pushing for production 
goals. The main power bases involved were strong coercive/punishment power, strong 
reward power and weak legitimate and expert power. MM had these power bases due 
to its formal position in the organisation. For example, MM had the ability to control 
promotion of AMTs and to decide whether or not AMTs with a short term contract would 
be hired again in the future. The case study indicates that the new AMTs were more 
influenced by managers than the old guard (0.8-1.0 vs. 0.0-0.2) during the first phase. 
The old guard used their knowledge of safety regulations to resist the MM’s pressure 
on production goals. Thus the old guard could structurally undermine both strong and 
weak power bases. This is reflected in high legitimate power between members of the 
old guard (0.8-0.9) that reduces the power of MM.
The ranges are determined by reasoning from within the specific situations that the 
agents can encounter. For example, we established a range of (0.8-1.0) power of MM 
over new AMTs for the following reasons. The influence level of 1.0 means that in some 
instances, new AMTs do not see how they could resist MM demands at all. New AMTs had 
weak legitimate power, as they are unaware of behavioural norms like how procedures 
should be executed, if those norms existed at all. At the same time, MM had very high 
coercive and reward power over newcomers. In the context of a fragmented culture, 
where there is no clear norm of ‘how to do things’, MM can play out any uncertainty 
about rules and always has the last word. MM may also hold some expert power towards 
newcomers, as the MM is himself a senior engineer and newcomers may not feel they 
can question this knowledge.
The lower level of 0.8 on the other hand reflects that in some situations, the 
legitimacy and expert power base of MM may be undermined by members of the old 
guard. A top-down management style may also create negative referent power. AMTs 
identify with one another and MM becomes the out-group, resulting in a desire not to 
behave in a manner seen characteristic of MM. That is, AMTs then resist behaviour such 
as respecting work packages and trying to meet performance demands. This together 
creates a lower level that we determined at 0.8, rather than, for example, 0.7, which 
would be at the threshold of a medium to strong power level. The reason for this is that 
the power of MM over new AMTs never reaches close to average. New AMTs generally 
feel at the mercy of MM during the first phase as clear norms are lacking and they have 
little individual or shared experience to resort to.
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According to the case description, the old guard acted as role models for the new AMTs, 
which is represented by high referent, expert and legitimate power towards new AMTs. 
In situations where MM is absent, the old guard could pressure new AMTs to do the 
complete opposite of their instructions, while the lack of norms allows them to come up 
arbitrarily with instructions that new AMTs should follow. This is reflected in the upper 
level of 1.0. The lack of an integrated culture may also undermine their own legitimacy; 
the old guard also does not control MMs reward and coercive power on new AMTS, 
which together is reflected in a lower limit of 0.8, and thus a range of (0.8-1.0). The role 
of SD during the first phase was only marginal. SD had very limited legitimate power 
to influence both new AMTs (0.1-0.2) and the old guard (0.0-0.1) by imposing safety 
values on them.
In the second phase the size of the old guard was decreasing, by the end of the 
phase all of them had left the organisation. MM was still the main driver behind the 
production goals. The MM’s influence was still based on the same power bases as in 
the first phase and additional referent power. In the second phase MM also included 
former technicians, who were perceived as role models by new AMTs. Besides the new 
referent power, the legitimate power of MM had increased due to the struggle of the 
organisation for survival. This created a context in which a discourse about meeting 
schedules became commonly accepted as the reality to reckon with. From the MM’s 
position, it became easier to argue why tight plans should be met and working overtime 
should be considered normal. Therefore, the MM’s influence strength on new AMTs 
had increased in comparison with the first phase as well (0.85-1.0 vs. 0.8-1.0). We take 
0.85 rather than 0.9 because the effect of legitimate power, while significant, is impacted 
negatively by the gradual development of new AMTs’ experience and knowledge of 
company rules and business arrangements. This allows new AMTs to develop their own 
informational and expert power base, and undermine coercive and legitimacy power 
bases. Yet because the company grows so quickly, we estimated these effects remain 
very small on average for the duration of the growth phase.
Even though the main focus during the second phase was on production goals, 
SD became more involved and present in the organisation. However, their behaviour 
was rather reactive - they responded to occurrences and supported production goals. 
Their legitimate power had increased a little. SD thus could thus always exert a trace of 
influence, translating in power level of 0.1. On occasions – such as after an incident or 
during a safety campaign – influence would be slightly higher, but still very weak, resulting 
in the range (0.1-0.3).
In the third phase a new proactive SD was formed. Management pressure on 
production goals was not dominant anymore and AMTs were able to work according to 
procedures and safety rules. The legitimate power of MM decreased and SD even had 
coercive and punishment power. For example, in this phase SD was able to initiate the 
suspension of the license of an AMT who did not work according to procedures. This new 
power of SD over the AMTs is reflected in the higher influence strength (0.5-0.8). In their 
turn, the AMTs had more freedom to work according to safety standards and had more 
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legitimate power against management pressure. Note that there is no mechanism that 
establishes a new ‘old guard’ as time passes by and new AMTs become more experienced. 
This is a theoretical possibility but there were no data to substantiate this process here.
To determine combined influences of groups of agents (such as the management 
or old guard) based on the individual influences of the group members, the Latane’s 
(1981) dynamic theory of social impact is used. According to this theory, the strength of 
influence γGi of group G of N agents on agent i is determined by:
γGi = Nᵝ [Ʃk=1..N (γki /Iki
2)/N],   (1)
where γki is the strength of influence of group member agent k on agent i; it is defined for 
the different phases of the case study as discussed above;
Iki ϵ [0, 1] is the immediacy of agents i and k , i.e., their closeness in space and time; we 
assume that Iki=1, i.e., the agents interact with each other without intermediate agents.
β is a constant used for compensation for the group size; from empirical studies
β = 0.3..0.5. In our study β = 0.4.
4.4.3 Modelling social contagion
Provided a demand for performance or safety by an influencing agent, an AMT agent 
decides to which extent and how fast to satisfy this demand by delivering its performance 
effort. The AMT i ’s performance effort pei for the MM’s performance demand pdMM is 
determined by the following social contagion equation (Deffuant et al., 2000):
dpei = αMM,iγMM,i(pdMM - pei )dt  (2)
Here γMM,i is the influence of MM on i, αMM,i is the rate of change parameter, which depends 
on the agent’s openness to change and the expressiveness of the influencing agent/group. 
Since MM has a high expressiveness in all phases, αMM,i is taken 0.8.
Similarly the AMT i’s safety effort sei for the SD’s safety demand sdSD is determined by
dsei = α SD,iγSD,i(sdSD -sei )dt   (3)
Here αSD,i is taken 0.4 for the first two phases, when SD was rather passive and 0.8 for 
the last phase with the proactive SD.
The influence of AMT agent j on the performance and safety efforts of its peer AMT 
agent i is defined by the following social contagion process:
dsei = Ʃj αjiγji(sej-sei )dt   (4)
dpei = Ʃjαjiγji(pej-pei )dt
Here αji is taken 0.7 in all the phases, reflecting intensive explicit and implicit interaction 
between the AMTs.
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If by applying the equations (2)-(4) a point (pe, se) is obtained that lies above the maximum 
safety effort function from Figure 7, the closest point on the function is chosen. In such 
a way mutual inhibition of safety and performance goals is captured.
Furthermore, two additional constraints are defined to reflect that the old guard had 
used safety as a shield against the productivity push of MM in the first phase and did not 
deliver performance effort above a certain threshold (pt):
 pe < pt     (5)
 se > maxsft(pt)pe2 / pt2
where pt is performance threshold setting maximal performance the old guard can reach 
and maxsft is the maximum safety effort function defined above (Figure 7). For our model 
we have chosen pt = 0.75 for new AMTs corresponding to a high performance demand 
and pt = 0.5 for the old guard, which reflects their opposition to a high performance 
demand. Essentially, the safety effort of the old guard is determined by fitting a quadratic 
function between [0, 0] and the point on the maxsft curve for the level of the performance 
threshold.
The frequencies of interaction of the agents are defined as follows. Interaction 
between AMTs occurs within a shift every 5 minutes and between shifts during shift 
changes. MM influences AMTs every 10 minutes in every phase, since MM function as 
supervisors of AMTs and are relatively close to them. The SD’s influence on AMTs occurs 
once a shift in the first phase, five times a shift in the second phase and 15 times a shift in 
the last phase. This represents the low, indirect participation of the safety department in 
daily operations at the initial phases towards a more active participation in the last phase.
4.5 SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section we discuss analysis of the simulation results. In particular we show how 
the model can be validated through an interpretation of the emergent patterns regarding 
commitment to safety. Validation is here seen as the interpretation of generated 
simulation data and matching the pattern to the ethnographic description. This validation 
criterion states that if the simulations create patterns that match the empirical case, then 
the model must be to some extent correct. With alternative settings, we can check if the 
results are intuitively sensible and construct hypotheses that can be tested with newly 
gathered data. We therefore performed simulations using the model from Section 4.4 
(discussed in Section 4.5.1) and several variants of this model (discussed in Section 4.5.2).
4.5.1 Simulation results of the proposed model
Based on the model presented in Section 4.4, 100 discrete simulation runs were 
performed with a static time step representing one minute of time in the real world. 
The simulation comprises three distinct phases for which most of the simulations 
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parameters differ in accordance with the case description. In addition, there are two 
transition phases between the main phases and those parameters that vary between the 
phases are gradually changed in transition phases. The length of all the phases separately 
as well as the overall length match the lengths of periods with distinct safety cultural 
characteristics as identified in the case study.
All agents were put in an agent pool from which they were being selected for shifts. 
There were three shifts with equal length during one day. The ratio between the size of 
a shift and number of agents was constant during the whole simulation. Only in the third 
phase every shift was split into two which worked separately and had no influence on 
each other. This simulated that some of the AMTs had worked on line maintenance and 
some on base maintenance. During the whole simulation the number of agents entering 
and leaving the company is maintained as reported in the case study.
The developed model was validated by comparing the simulation results with the 
patterns found in the case study (Atak & Kingma, 2010). The simulation results for one 
random simulation run are represented by graphs of AMTs’ performance and safety 
efforts (Figure 9) provided the MM’s performance and SD’s safety demands (Figures 5 
and 6). The simulation results aggregated over all 100 simulation runs are provided in 
Figure 10. Commitment can be interpreted as the difference of management demand and 
AMT performance, but not in all situations. For example, when management demand is 
very low, equally low AMT performance does not necessarily reflect high commitment. 
We chose not to include another complex parameter for commitment to safety, but 
rather interpret commitment straight from the performance and demand graphs.
The rows in the graphs in Figure 9 represent the state of a single agent’s safety or 
performance effort. Efforts range from zero (blue) to one (red). Black corresponds to 
the value of -0.1, which is an empty row, i.e., the agent is not employed. In the graphs for 
the first phase, at time point 0, there are 35 agents present, a work force that gradually 
grows until the 8-year time point in the third set of graphs, where it reaches 260. Old 
guard AMTs occupy row 15 through 35 in Figure 9. They are gradually leaving the 
company starting from the first phase to roughly the first year of the second phase. The 
row representing their efforts abruptly turns black when an old guard AMT leaves, while 
empty rows below are gradually being filled with new AMTs.
In the first phase, conflicting management demands, resistance strategies and power 
differences between agents give rise to fluctuating, unevenly distributed safety efforts 
(Figure 9). This pattern corresponds to the fragmentation perspective, highlighting 
ambiguity and inconsistent views amongst cultural members. Commitment to safety 
at this stage reflects the influence of the old guard’s ‘work-to-rule’ resistance against 
management performance demands, by extensive compliance with safety rules (reflected 
by very high safety efforts in Figure 9). New AMTs are highly influenced by the more 
experienced old guard and therefore are greatly drawn in by this behaviour. At the same 
time new AMTs experience a stronger pull from MM than the old guard does. They work 
harder than the old guard, compensating to some extent for the work they leave undone 
due to their resistance to MM (Figure 9).
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Figure 10. Performance and safety efforts in the three phases averaged over all agents in 100 
simulation runs. Standard deviation at each point is less than 0.03. 
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effort. Efforts range from zero (blue) to one (red). Black corresponds to the value of -0.1, which 
is an empty row, i.e., the agent is not employed. In the graphs for the first phase, at time point 
0, there are 35 agents present, a work force that gradually grows until the 8-year time point in 
the third set of graphs, where it reaches 260. Old guard AMTs occupy row 15 through 35 in 
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Figure 10. Performance and safety efforts in the three phases averaged over all agents in 100 simulation 
runs. Standard deviation at each point is less than 0.03
As the core of this resistance—the old guard—leaves the company, it enters a second 
phase. Commitment in the first phase a pears to hav  been of a superficial character. In 
the graph, old guard members leaving the company are represented as values that go to 
-1. As almost all members of the old guard have left, the safety effort graph shows how 
all the AMTs’ safety efforts drop to dangerously low levels (Figure 9).
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The transition between the first and second phase is initiated by changing power relations 
between MM and AMTs and increasing performance demands. The changes accompany 
the shifting mentalities and arrangements accommodating new, larger contracts (see 
section 4.4). Old guard AMTs continue to resist performance pressures, but new AMTs 
are less affected by them than by the increasing persuasiveness of MM. This reflects 
the observed exertion of power, where AMTs could not ignore the company’s economic 
challenges and MM legitimised its attempts to pressure the work force by reminding 
technicians of this fact (Atak & Kingma, 2010, p. 271). As more and more new AMTs were 
recruited and the old guard AMTs’ numbers decreased, the old guard AMTs was losing 
the struggle to resist. When only the last two members of the old guard remain in the 
company, safety efforts reach a turning point, drop and stabilise at a significantly lower 
level. Since the phasing out of the old guard is a relatively gradual process, the transition 
between phase one and two takes a relatively long period to complete.
The safety efforts observed in the second phase, fluctuating around 0.25, can be 
interpreted as AMTs regularly making shortcuts to speed up the work, also when the 
flight safety consequences of procedure shortcuts may not be known. Atak and Kingma 
(2010, p. 275) describe an event, where an incorrect aircraft part had been ordered 
and MM forces an AMT to install an old part, rather than wait for the correct new part. 
Another type of practice related to low values of safety could be acceptance of unhealthy 
working schedules, such as the reported overtime and double shifts that can lead to 
clouded judgment.
Consistently low safety efforts, significantly lower than demanded by the SD (0.8), 
can in the second phase be interpreted as revealing low commitments to safety. The 
uniform distribution of low levels of safety efforts indicates that practices such as those 
described above are seen as normal and legitimate throughout the organisation. The 
ethnographic data reveal that ‘a new discourse on safety which stressed a flexible and 
practical attitude’ took hold of the organisation at this time and was used to justify 
deviations from safety rules (Atak & Kingma, 2010, p. 272). AMTs’ relatively low power 
towards MM, and MM’s increasing persuasiveness to be flexible with safety standards, 
gives rise to an organisational culture integrated around production values. This can 
be observed in the performance efforts by AMTs responding in a uniform manner to 
fluctuations in managers’ performance demands.
In the transition towards the third phase, managerial demands and power relations 
are harmonised. Both safety and performance demands are lowered, and the SD gains 
power relative to MM, which loses some power (see section 4.4). The resultant power 
balance shifts in favour of the SD, signifying the shift towards a serious safety policy by 
a new CEO, in a more comfortable, mature market position. Safety levels quickly rise to 
acceptable levels, reflecting the observation that the influence of the new policy was felt 
‘from the very first day’ (Atak & Kingma, 2010, p. 272). Performance efforts remain at 
a higher level slightly longer, accounting for the work that had accumulated under the 
previous, higher performance demands and takes some time to complete.
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The new balance of power and work pressure allows AMTs’ safety efforts to stabilise, 
yielding an impression of strong, internalised commitments to safety. Safety and 
performance pressures no longer impose conflicting demands on AMTs, evident when 
one compares the demand values to the maximum efforts represented in Figure 9. Safety 
efforts are uniformly distributed amongst the 260 AMTs at a level of approximately 0.6, 
meaning more than-average concern with safety where standards are normally met and 
exceptions coordinated. Safety efforts hardly fluctuate, even when performance efforts 
do (approximately between 0.5-0.55). This stabilisation and uniform distribution signifies 
a professional subculture of AMTs where safety practices are shared and technicians are 
given leeway to exercise discretion over safety-critical decisions. Production pressures 
exerted by management still fluctuate, but hardly perturb the uniformly distributed 
safety efforts.
To summarise, under the social and organisational influences an emergent pattern 
of commitment unfolds in the three distinct phases of organisational development. 
Commitment is first superficial, owing to the old guard’s resistance in the context of a 
fragmented culture in the survival phase. The weakness of commitment shows up in the 
second phase, when the organisational culture integrates around production values. In 
the final, maturation phase, commitment takes on the stable character. Such commitment 
is expected of a more autonomous professional culture in a diversified cultural context 
where competing core goals coexist in relative harmony.
4.5.2 Results of ‘what-if’ simulations of model variants
To test the usability and scope of the model, we simulated three variants of the original 
model from Section 4.4. These variants are each realistic scenarios that could have an 
interesting impact on the patterns of commitment. The results of these simulations are 
considered in this section and compared to the simulation results of the original model.
Model variant 1- Weak opposition culture. In the first model variant, in contrast to the 
original model, old guard represents a loosely connected group, which does not oppose 
MM strongly. This variant is interesting because it helps illuminate the role of the old 
guard in the development of the culture. The following changes were made in the original 
model:
 ■ influence of the old guard on themselves is [0.1, 0.4] (was [0.8, 0.9]);
 ■ performance threshold (pt) of the old guard is 0.75 (was 0.5).
Using this model variant 10 simulation runs were executed. The performance and safety 
efforts averaged over all the agents and the simulation runs of model variant 1 were 
compared with the simulation outcomes of the original model (Figure 11) by using paired 
sample t-test with 5% significance level.
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Figure 11. Performance efforts (left) and safety efforts (right) in the three phases averaged over all 
agents in 10 simulation runs for the original model and model variant 1. Standard deviation at each 
point is less than 0.05
In phases 1 and 2 significant differences between the models were established both 
for the performance and safety demands. The null hypothesis of the paired t-test was 
supported for the phase 3.
The safety effort of the AMTs in phase 1 of the model variant 1 is significantly lower 
than in the original model. This can be explained by a low opposition of the old guard 
and a low degree of their mutual reinforcement. Furthermore, it can be observed that 
because of the loose relations in the shifts in model variant 1, the performance effort is 
not reinforced by the team members and remains relatively constant throughout each 
phase. In the original model the performance effort grows steadily in the first phase. In 
general, tight relations between agents and mutual reinforcement of their states may 
have positive, as well as negative amplification effects.
After the transition period the behaviour of AMTs stabilises in the second phase in both 
models. These results show that a resistant old guard may not only have a positive role to play 
in terms of safety, but also have a less detrimental effect on production than it might seem.
Model variant 2 – Conflict between safety and performance demands. In the second 
model variant, in contrast to the original model, SD has a high influence on the AMTs 
during the first and second phase. However, the performance and safety demands are 
both high and not harmonised, as in the third phase. This is theoretically interesting 
because it may help to corroborate the managerial insight that pressing on performance 
is not always helpful.
The following changes were made in the original model:
 ■ the influence of SD over both new AMTs and the old guard is [0.7, 0.9]
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Figure 12. Performance efforts (left) and safety efforts (right) in the three phases averaged over all 
agents in 10 simulation runs for the original model and model variant 2. Standard deviation at each 
point is less than 0.05
The paired t-test showed the models have significant differences w.r.t. the performance 
effort in the second phase and w.r.t. the safety effort in the first and the second phase. It 
means that the SD’s impact on the AMTs is statistically significant, however is not very 
high in terms of the magnitude (Figure 12). One can conclude that enforcing high safety 
and performance demands at the same time without their mutual adjustment does not 
actually help to improve safety.
Model variant 3 – Random composition of shifts. In the third model variant a random 
composition of the shifts was introduced by a random permutation of the agent pool 
every time when all the agents were used for the shift composition. This is an interesting 
variation because it is a strategy used by airline companies, for example, to prevent 
negative group dynamics in flight crews.
























Figure 13. Performance efforts (left) and safety efforts (right) in the three phases averaged over all 
agents in 10 simulation runs for the original model and model variant 3. Standard deviation at each 
point is less than 0.05
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The paired t-test showed that there were no significant differences between the models 
w.r.t. the performance effort. However, there were significant differences w.r.t. the safety 
effort in the first and the second phases. The safety effort was on average higher in model 
variant 3, meaning that shift rotation might have a positive effect on safety. However 
the magnitude of this effect in the simulation is not very high, because the shifts did not 
differ much from the beginning. The more differences the shifts have, the higher will be 
the effect. In the future more variations between the shifts will be explored.
4.6 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
This study presents an innovative approach that can be used to address current 
questions regarding safety culture that attempt to get beyond linear, static approaches 
and that take a complex, political view on culture more seriously. Our paper showcased an 
example from the aircraft maintenance domain addressing the research question how the 
commitment to safety of maintenance technicians emerges and develops under social and 
organisational influences. Commitment to safety is a key aspect of organisational safety 
culture, but current survey-based methods offer limited insight in underlying mechanisms 
of development of such cultural properties. We propose an interdisciplinary approach, 
combining organisational ethnography with formal agent modelling and simulation 
experiments. As a demonstration of this approach, we developed a formal model from 
the ethnographic case study by Atak and Kingma (2010). We used this model to simulate, 
bottom-up, with a generic set of mechanisms operating throughout the simulation, the 
observed emergent global pattern of commitment to safety of aircraft maintenance 
technicians, developing over a period of 9 years. Theories of social power and influence 
were used to derive a formal model and supplementary data were gathered through 
interviews and other studies on aviation maintenance operations.
4.6.1. Value and applicability of the approach
The merit of the approach is in offering insight in relations between social and 
organisational power mechanisms and emergent characteristics of safety culture, not in 
deriving precise numerical values. Formal modelling adds to ethnographic research that 
it forces researchers to make theoretical connections explicit between social relations 
and cultural dynamics. Ethnographic accounts will tend to remain more contextualised. 
The ethnographer often starts from a participatory insiders’ perspective. The agent-
based modeler, on the contrary, builds a model of a sociotechnical system from a complex 
systems perspective by identifying agents, their various local properties and interactions, 
taking diverse feedback mechanisms into account. By taking such a systemic approach 
to model development, the agent-based modeler is able to provide a feedback to the 
ethnographer to focus their data collection efforts, observations, and explorations on 
particular aspects of a sociotechnical system represented by parameters, processes, 
and mechanisms in the model. However, it is not necessary and even not desirable that 
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the activities of the ethnographer are fully steered by the modeler. By keeping a more 
open attitude to data collection, the ethnographer may discover important aspects not 
considered by the modeler, which however might be important to be reflected in the model. 
Based on an agent-based model, diverse forms of analysis could be performed, such as 
sensitivity analysis and bias and uncertainty analysis. Through such an analysis important 
parameters, assumptions, and uncertainties in the model can be identified, which would 
require refinement and further identification by ethnographic research. Thus, the 
systematic agent-based model development and ethnographic research should take place 
in interaction with each other, complementing each other in an integrated methodology.
In contrast to modelling social relations with network properties like homophily 
(Holzhauer, Krebs & Ernst, 2013), our model uses power influencing. This is suitable 
for safety culture studies because the bases of power that each agent experiences are 
anchored in rich qualitative context descriptions. With this approach to social relations, 
formalisation helps to explicate contextual processes that are important in shaping a 
‘strong safety culture’. We thus capture a more fragile and dynamic reality than standard 
quantitative safety culture research methods does (Guldenmund, 2000; 2007).
The context-sensitive modelling approach may also provide managerial insights. One 
example is our demonstration of how lowering and harmonising performance and safety 
demands can lead to a significant increase in AMTs’ safety efforts, with only a small 
reduction of performance efforts.
4.6.2. Limitations
Although the tendency may exist to view multi-agent models of safety cultural phenomena 
as predictive, we do not claim this: the current model is explanatory. Since cultural 
phenomena are context-specific, the transferability of any model depends on the extent to 
which the dynamics it captures are recognisable elsewhere. This requires attention to any 
specific context of application and likely many adaptations of the model. We draw attention 
to transferability as a limitation, but it may also be seen as a strength. Formal modelling is 
a powerful tool to make assumptions explicit and theorise back and forth between what is 
happening in a particular setting and what we know more generally about safety culture.
That said, the current model remains relatively high level, does not include many 
possible feed-back interactions, and hard-codes some influences that are in reality 
dynamic effects. One interesting possibility is the impact of critical incidents. When 
commitment to safety decreases overall, safety incidents may occur and this may give 
voice to maintenance personnel and safety department officials to prioritise safety. The 
current secondary data source was not detailed enough to find empirical evidence for such 
feedback loops, showing where the current model could benefit from further research.
4.6.3. Further research
The model presented here invites improvement and extension while also inspiring 
further theoretical development and ethnographic research. In order to agree with the 
contextualising tendency of ethnographic research, more detailed data may be gathered 
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on the precise ways in which safety and production demands are weighed. These data can 
lead to more adequate models and yield interesting theoretical insights. The translation 
from conceptual to formal models may also be automated as described by Fuentes-
Fernández, Hassan, Pavón, Galán and López-Paradez (2012).
The rewards of this approach are promising. There is a persistent—but often 
inappropriate—assumption in both theory and practice that safety behaviour can 
be regulated by mainly enforcing compliance with safety regulations (Dekker, 2014). 
Fundamental insights of how safety is created through culture are however still spread 
thin (Antonsen, 2009; Edwards et al., 2013; Woods, Dekker, Cook, Johannesen & 
Sarter, 2010). The current approach attempts to escape this deadlock and move 
towards more refined thinking about the human contribution to safety (Reason, 2008).
APPENDIX 4A. MODEL DOCKING
To assess the model’s expressiveness, suitability, and innovativeness, we relate it to 
another important modelling approach to power. Power relations between artificial 
agents have also been investigated in the area of multi-agent systems. Castelfranchi, 
Micelli and Cesta (1992) introduce different types of social dependence relations 
between agents, based on which social influence and power are defined. Power relations 
are viewed in terms of resource dependence: an agent gains power when it controls 
resources that another agent needs.
In Burton (2003) different types of model relations are discussed, also called model 
docking. Such a docking may be done at the distributional and relational levels. At the 
distributional level the models require to produce the same (numerical) outcomes, 
whereas at the relational level internal components and dynamics of the models are 
related. In the following it is described how the models can be related at both these levels. 
Note that although the social dependence relations introduced in Castelfranchi, Micelli 
and Cesta (1992) are qualitative, it is indicated in the same paper that the specification 
language may be extended by incorporating quantitative degrees of dependence 
between agents. To enable comparison of the models at the distributional level, a three-
valued scale for measuring the degree of social dependence and power of influence is 
introduced: ‘h’ corresponding to a high degree, ‘m’ – medium and ‘l’ - low.
First we demonstrate how the models can be related at the relational level.
We start by introducing acts and goals w.r.t. which social dependencies are defined. 
In Table A1 notations for the agents from the case study are provided which will be used 
for specifying social dependence relations. The goals of AMTs provided in Table A2 were 
identified in accordance with the self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 2002), which 
is generally accepted as a sound empirical theory of human motivation. According to this 
theory, humans have several types of needs, among which competence need is related 
to seeking to control the outcome and experience mastery, relatedness is the need to 
interact, be connected to, and experience caring for others, and autonomy is the need to 
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, which are derived from empirical 
data, i.e. the case study. Based on the case study description, in relation to the goals a set 
of acts is identified listed in Table A3.









g4 Personal/psychological safety & security-related goals
g5 achieve high performance
g6 achieve high compliance to safety regulations
g7 achieve high performance without compromising safety
g8 avoid compromising safety
Table A3. The acts of the agents from the case study w.r.t. which dependence relations are defined
a1 promote an AMT
a2 hire an AMT with a short term contract
a3 refrain from providing reprimands
a4 ensure safety regulations are being observed by an AMT
a5 approval of behaviour of an AMT
a6 allow for AMT professional discretion
In Table A4 social dependence relations are provided, which were identified for the first 
phase of the organisational development in the case study; c.f. the influence relations in 
Fig.4. Each social dependence relation (S-DEP x y a g d) reads as: x depends on y to degree 
d with respect to act a useful for realising x’s goal g. Note that the original S-DEP relation 
from Castelfranchi, Micelli and Cesta (1992) was extended with the fifth argument – the 
degree of dependence, as was discussed previously.
To define social dependence relations, the influence relations from the model 
introduced in this paper (Fig.4) were taken as the basis. For each influence relation 
the power bases explained in Section 4.2 were related to particular goals and acts of 
agents. For example, the influence relation of MM on new AMT in the first phase has a 
strong legitimate basis to control promotions of AMTs, to re-hire AMTs with a short term 
contract and to provide reprimands. Both promotions and re-hiring of AMTs contribute 
positively to the satisfaction of their competence-related goals, i.e., they can be seen 
4
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a form of professional recognition. Also refraining from providing reprimands by MM 
serves as a positive feedback contributing to the satisfaction of the AMTs’ competence-
related goals. Furthermore, re-hiring of AMTs, as well as refraining from providing of 
reprimands contribute positively to the AMTs’ personal safety & security-related goals. 
Since MM has a strong legitimate power basis on new AMTs, all these social dependence 
relations have a high degree (h) (Table A4, first column). Other social dependence 
relations in Tables A4 and A5 are defined in a similar manner.
Table A4. Social dependence relations of new AMTs in the first phase
on MM on SD on old guard on new AMTs
(S-DEP x1 x3 a1 g1 h)
(S-DEP x1 x3 a2 g1 h)
(S-DEP x1 x3 a2 g4 h)
(S-DEP x1 x3 a3 g1 h)
(S-DEP x1 x3 a3 g4 h)
(S-DEP x1 x4 a4 g1 l)
(S-DEP x1 x4 a4 g4 l)
(S-DEP x1 x2 a4 g2 h)
(S-DEP x1 x2 a5 g2 h)
(S-DEP x1 x2 a5 g1 h)
(S-DEP x1 x1 a5 g2 l)
Table A5. Social dependence relations of old guard in the first phase
on MM on SD on old guard on new AMTs
(S-DEP x2 x3 a3 g4 l) (S-DEP x2 x4 a4 g4 l) (S-DEP x2 x2 a4 g2 h)
(S-DEP x2 x2 a4 g3 h)
(S-DEP x2 x2 a4 g4 h)
(S-DEP x2 x1 a5 g2 l)
As stated in Castelfranchi, Micelli and Cesta (1992: 10), the power of influencing is 
derivable from dependence relations: “If x is dependent on y’s performing a certain act 
in view of p, y is quite likely to have the power of influencing x relative to some other 
goal of x’s.”. The new AMTs have a high dependence on MM and old guard (Table A4). In 
the case study MM uses this dependence to influence new AMTs to adopt the goal of 
achieving a high performance:
H
i=1,2,3 (INFL-POWER x3 x1 ai g5 h)
(INFL-POWER x y a g v) relation is read as x has the power of influencing y of degree v 
if x can do such an act a that makes y have g as a goal of her own. To express power of 
influencing relation over multiple acts H-relation is used in Castelfranchi, Micelli and 
Cesta (1992).
In the case study old guard use the new AMTs’ high dependence on them to influence 
the new AMTs to adopt the goal of achieving high compliance to safety regulations (i.e., 
opposing high performance demands):
H
i=4,5 (INFL-POWER x2 x1 ai g6 h)
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Since the social dependence relations of the new AMTs on SD and other new AMTs are 
of a low degree, they do not form a sufficient basis for power influencing.
As was discussed in Section 4.4.1 and illustrated in Fig. 11 goals g
5 and g6 may be in 
conflict with each other, especially when demands are high. Since both identified power 
of influencing relations have a high degree, new AMTs are pulled strongly by MM and 
old guard in the opposite directions. This results in a fragmented culture, which is in line 
with the outcomes of the model proposed in this paper.
The old guard has high mutual social dependencies, which unite this group even 
stronger in a self-reinforcing manner:
G
i=2,3,4 (INFL-POWER x2 x2 a4 gi h)
The distinct behaviour of old guard – high compliance to safety and opposition to high 
performance demand - can be also clearly seen in the results of the model proposed in 
this paper (Fig. 13).
The social dependence relations for the second phase are provided in Table A6. As 
management gains referent power over new AMTs in this phase, a new relation is added 
(S-DEP x
1 x3 a5 g2 h). Furthermore, the dependence of the new AMTs on the old guard 
diminishes in this phase, which is reflected in the degrees of the relations in the third 
column. Also the mutual dependencies between the members of old guard become 
weaker, which is reflected in the third column of Table A7.
Table A6. Social dependence relations of new AMTs in the second phase
on MM on SD on old guard on new AMTs
(S-DEP x1 x3 a1 g1 h)
(S-DEP x1 x3 a2 g1 h)
(S-DEP x1 x3 a2 g4 h)
(S-DEP x1 x3 a3 g1 h)
(S-DEP x1 x3 a3 g4 h)
(S-DEP x1 x3 a5 g2 h)
(S-DEP x1 x4 a4 g1 l)
(S-DEP x1 x4 a4 g4 l)
(S-DEP x1 x2 a4 g2 l/m)
(S-DEP x1 x2 a5 g2 l/m)
(S-DEP x1 x2 a5 g1 l/m)
(S-DEP x1 x1 a5 g2 l)
Table A7. Social dependence relations of old guard in the second phase
on MM on SD on old guard on new AMTs
(S-DEP x2 x3 a3 g4 l) (S-DEPx2 x4 a4 g4 l) (S-DEP x2 x2 a4 g2 l/m)
(S-DEP x2 x2 a4 g3 l/m)
(S-DEP x2 x2 a4 g4 l/m)
(S-DEP x2 x1 a5 g2 l)
Thus, the following power influencing relations can be inferred in phase 2:
Hi=1,3;5 (INFL-POWER x3 x1 ai g5 h)
(INFL-POWER x2 x3 a4 g6 l/m)
Gi=2,3,4 (INFL-POWER x2 x2 a4 gi l/m)
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MM clearly has the highest influencing power over new AMTs in this phase, and thus 
makes them to adopt goal g5. This is also in accordance with the results of the model 
proposed in this paper.
In the third phase the basis of legitimate power of MM becomes weaker and 
management pressure on production goals is not dominant anymore. This is reflected 
in the decreased degrees of dependencies in the first column of Table A8. Furthermore, 
SD becomes more proactive and gains a basis for coercive and punishment power. 
Thus, relation (S-DEP x
1 x4 a3 g4 m-h) is added in the second column of Table A8. Both 
MM and SD gain power by allowing AMTs to make more professional judgment calls. 
This contributes to satisfaction of their autonomy goals g
3 and heightens their motivation 
to take responsibility for the work, the demands for which are now within reasonable 
limits. For example, MM gives AMTs more influence in creating work packages and the 
SD acknowledges that not all procedure violations are unsafe, if there is sound and 
knowledgeable professional judgment. The strength is low-medium because this power 
derives only from legitimacy and persuasion power bases. Thus, the relations (S-DEP x
1 
x3 a6 g3 l-m) and (S-DEP x1 x4 a6 g3 l-m) are added.
Table A8. Social dependence relations of new AMTs in the third phase
on MM on SD on new AMTs
(S-DEP x1 x3 a1 g1 m-h)
(S-DEP x1 x3 a2 g1 m-h)
(S-DEP x1 x3 a2 g4 m-h)
(S-DEP x1 x3 a3 g1 m)
(S-DEP x1 x3 a3 g4 m)
(S-DEP x1 x3 a6 g3 l-m)
(S-DEP x1 x4 a4 g1 m-h)
(S-DEP x1 x4 a4 g4 m-h)
(S-DEP x1 x4 a3 g4 m-h)
(S-DEP x1 x4 a6 g3 l-m)
(S-DEP x1 x1 a5 g2 l)
Based on the social dependence relations from Table A8 the following power of 
influencing relations can be inferred:
Hi=1,3,6 (INFL-POWER x3 x1 ai g7 m-h)
Hi=3,4,6 (INFL-POWER x4 x1 ai g8 m-h)
New g7 and g8 goals reflect harmonisation of the performance and safety demands in 
the organisation in the third phase. Note that both power of influencing relations have 
m-h degree, which gives AMTs some freedom to perform operations in their own way.
The compared models can thus be formally related to each other, providing a test 
of our model’s expressiveness and appropriateness for the topic of study. In the other 
model, social dependence relations are defined at a more detailed level than the power 
relations in our model. Such a level of detail is not deemed to be necessary for the 
application considered in this paper, given the nature of the secondary data that we 
referred to. Furthermore, social dependence relations are formalised in the other model 
using a qualitative predicate logic-based language, which is more suited to specify agent 
states and is less applicable for describing dynamics of processes. In contrast, our model 
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is quantitative and continuous; it takes a dynamic view on the evolution of power relations 
in an organisation. To address the current limitations of safety cultural analyses and 
theorising, our approach appears more appropriate.
APPENDIX 4B. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS FOR THE FUNCTION 
MAXSFT
In this section, the sensitivity of the patterns of commitment produced by the model to 
the parameters of the function maxsft(pe)=1-1/(e-w1× pe + w2) are discussed.
For w1=15 and w2=10 and cpp close to 0.5 the function has the shape:
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Figure B1. Change of the maximum safety effort (vertical axis) depending on the performance 
effort (horizontal axis) with parameters w1=15 and w2=10. 
 
The corresponding patterns of performance and safety efforts of the AMTs for the three phases 
of organisational development are provided below. The agents that left the organisation are 
indicated by dark blue. 







Figure B1. Change of the maximum safety effort (vertical axis) depending on the performance effort 
(horizontal axis) with parameters w1=15 and w2=10
The corresponding patterns of performance and safety efforts of the AMTs for the 
three phases of organisational development are provided below. The agents that left 
the organisation are indicated by dark blue.
Figure B2. Visualisation of performance and safety efforts of the AMTs during the three phases with 
parameters w1=15 and w2=10
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The essential validation findings discussed in Section 4.5 are also reflected in Figure B2. 
In the first phase commitment to safety is superficial, when safety efforts are the result of 
resistance of the old guard to high performance demands. Notice the difference between 
the high, almost uniform old guard AMTs’ safety efforts (hues of red) and the new AMTs’ 
safety efforts fluctuating under the competing influences of the management and the 
old guard. In the second phase, when the source of resistance is removed, safety efforts 
plummet across the entire workforce. In the third case, commitment becomes a stable, 
professional trait and is hardly impacted by the day-to-day pressures.
For w1=35 and w2=30 and cpp close to 0.8 the function has the shape:
Figure B3. Change of the maximum safety effort (vertical axis) depending on the performance effort 
(horizontal axis) with parameters w1=35 and w2=30
The corresponding patterns of performance and safety efforts of the AMTs for the three 
phases of organisational development are provided below.
Figure B4. Visualisation of performance and safety efforts of the AMTs during the three phases with 
parameters w1=35 and w2=30
Also in this case the essential validation findings discussed in Section 4.5 can be observed 
in the emergent dynamics (Figure B4).
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APPENDIX 4C. MODEL ROBUSTNESS
The robustness of the model was evaluated by running 200 Monte Carlo simulations, in 
which all essential parameters of the model were drawn from the uniformly distributed 
intervals, representing possible variations of agent attitudes in the maintenance 
organisation being modelled. These intervals are defined as follows:
 ■ the initial safety efforts of the new AMTs: [0.5, 0.8] (medium-high values);
 ■ the initial safety efforts of the old guard: [0.7, 1] (high values);
 ■ the initial performance efforts of the new AMTs [0.5, 0.8] (medium-high values);
 ■ the initial performance efforts of the old guard [0.4, 0.7] (medium values);
 ■ the standard deviation of parameter α is 0.1 in all phases of the social contagion 
model described in Section 4.4.3;
 ■ the intervals of the influence relations between the agents were specified as in 
Figure 8.
The patterns of commitment to safety of the AMTs identified in Section 5 can be seen 
in every Monte Carlo simulation run (Figure C1). The standard deviation is the highest 
in the transition period from phase 1 to phase 2, which involves many organisational 
changes: orientation towards production goals, increase of the MM’s influence on the 
AMTs and marginalisation of the old guard. Thus, in general the patterns produced by 





Figure C1. Mean (in red) and standard deviation (in black) of performance effort (left) and 
























Figure C1. Mean (in red) and standard deviation (in black) of performance effort (left) and safety effort 
(right) calculated over all agents an  200 simul tion runs
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When to STAMP? A case study in 
aircraft ground handling services
ABSTRACT
In this paper we show that safety analysis using the STAMP causation model is limited in the 
extent to which it appreciates complex dynamics of safety. When the STAMP is applied as 
management tool, controls may be introduced too soon in the analysis since it is necessary 
to understand emergent behaviour first. Emergent behaviour can be studied through 
organisational ethnography in parallel development with an agent-based model, as illustrated in 
a case study of airport ground handling services. Based on ethnographic research and theories 
from psychology and social sciences, we developed an agent model that showed why repeated 
attempts at managerial control to improve employees’ safety compliance were not durable. The 
insights obtained through the case study shift management ideas about what control means 
towards creating smarter design and communication processes that involve the work force.




Nancy Leveson’s (2011) STAMP (Systems Theoretic Accident Model and Process) 
promises to offer an alternative view on safety from traditional rule-based behavioural 
approaches. It is framed as a ‘New View’ (Dekker, 2004), a ‘model 2’ (Hale & Borys, 2013), 
or even a whole ‘new paradigm’ to safety (Leveson, 2011). STAMP explicates a model of 
the organisation where safety is a control problem. Complex and emergent patterns in 
working processes are controlled by hierarchies of controlling units, e.g. management 
levels. These function by developing an adequate model of the process and algorithms 
to control the process. STAMP is ‘new’ or ‘model 2’ in the sense that it explains why 
safety should be a matter of continuous adjustment with thorough understanding of the 
complex interactions between various aspects of the work processes and technologies.
‘Old’ models such as the Swiss Cheese Model (SCM) simplify accidents as the 
outcome of chains of events that must be stopped by series of barriers (Reason, 1990). 
The barriers are like slices of Swiss cheese, containing holes through which some unsafe 
actions may inadvertently pass through. Therefore, this theory implies that organisations 
should find out what kind of failure modes and accident paths exist and install multiple 
barriers in its way, such as physical redundancy or behavioural barriers (e.g., Standard 
Operating Procedures). Methods that use this way of thinking can be subsumed under 
the label reliability engineering.
A growing number of researchers believes that at higher levels of safety and in more 
technologically complex contexts, safety is better represented in terms of complex 
dynamics, rather than SCM’s linear sequences of events (Amalberti, 2001; Hale & Borys, 
2013). If accidents are complex emergent phenomena, then the rationale for designing 
safety nets in terms of preventing dangerous linear sequences of events is flawed. It is 
not possible to predict all failure modes and accident paths because safety nets may 
interact, fail to work as intended and produce new, unknown dangers (Leveson, 2011).
Because linear reliability engineering models like the SCM have become part of 
the ‘working theories’ of safety management (Schön, 1983), also in contexts where 
this might not work, managers’ and regulators’ commitment to them may become 
‘bureaucratic’ (Dekker, 2014). Working theories are internalised ideas and experiences 
that professionals, such as managers, use to understand problems and act in them. In this 
case, as the current literature suggests, managers may sometimes be wrongly advised to 
think about safety management as a chain of events issue. While they do, this may lead 
to conflict between managers and workers because the latter then come to view safety 
as a senseless burden (Hale & Borys, 2013). The rules may not seem to be about safety 
but about covering responsibilities. The motives for introducing safety measures may 
be questioned and the designers of new and improved safety systems and procedures 
deeply distrusted.
The STAMP model embodies a fundamentally new approach to accidents and safety 
because it does acknowledge the complex interactions that contribute to accidents, and 
provides a way to analyse this complexity. STAMP could also have promising prospects 
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as a working theory of safety management (Leveson, 2011), as it may help deriving more 
sensible safety rules and procedures. Thus, STAMP may alleviate management-work 
floor conflicts about symbolic or bureaucratic safety rules.
In this paper, however, we argue that as a working theory for management, STAMP 
should not be seen as a whole new approach to safety. While STAMP is in many respects 
a significant improvement from older linear accident models, it has limitations as an 
organisational management theory. In some ways STAMP continues to encourage top-
down thinking about management, because it is not intended to represent the behaviour 
of people. It simply places control on behaviour without understanding its driving forces, 
and does not count for the complexities that workers face and the contributions that 
they (could) make to safety. Therefore, STAMP to some extent fails to capture the ‘new’ 
view where safety is approached positively, in the sense that workers’ input to safety are 
fully appreciated (Hollnagel, 2014).
We substantiate this point of view with a case study in an airline ground safety 
department that was struggling with poor management-work floor relations as it 
attempted to implement safety procedures and systems. STAMP was used to identify 
the weak spots in management control and communication, with the aim to formulate 
actionable changes in management and improve the situation. We found that STAMP 
created some insights but did not help providing an actionable analysis of the situation, 
because it did not help to understand how the sour relations had arisen. In the same 
organisation we also conducted research using organisational ethnography and agent 
modelling, both providing some promising insights and courses of action.
Therefore, in order to achieve a truly ‘new’ view, we recommend the use of 
complementary approaches to STAMP that attempt to capture the social dynamics and 
ingenuity that emerges bottom-up. We propose a process by which knowledge from 
relevant disciplines can be accessed and used in an empirical analysis of a particular 
organisation. There is a large, untapped body of work from socio-technical systems 
modelling, social psychology, sociology, anthropology and organisational sciences that 
could refine working theories of safety managers, as well as the field of safety science. 
This could help analysts and managers understand the emergent behaviour of systems, 
before they introduce control. In this paper we show how those two methodologies can 
be applied in tandem to overcome the limitations of the STAMP approach.
First, we introduce organisational ethnography as a way to derive an in-depth, and 
more power-sensitive account describing the origin and sustainment of certain patterns 
and behaviours. This is an open-ended process that begins with immersing oneself in 
various sub-cultures of the organisation, conducting in-depth observations, interviews 
and document analyses, before theorising what might be going on. In the final phases, 
from a holistic frame of mind, the researcher may develop interventions and discuss 
those with members of the different sub-cultures.
Second, we introduce agent based modelling and simulation as a method to zoom 
in on specific parameters that might be usefully controlled in terms of a control loop 
suggested by STAMP. This method integrates theories of behaviour early in the analysis 
5
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to create a model. This model is then instantiated in simulations, predicting emergent 
patterns that may be validated using alternative datasets of the same situations that 
were observed. The predictions can also be used to design interventions, and further 
validation or adaptation of the model may occur by monitoring the path and outcome 
of interventions.
Thus, the safety analysis and management methodology can explain how new ideas 
and frustrations emerge that are seeking to be heard, and how these inputs are diffused, 
integrated, or locked out of management decision making.
5.2 STAMP, ORGANISATIONAL ETHNOGRAPHY AND AGENT 
MODELLING
STAMP is an accident causation model that reduces safety to a control problem (Leveson, 
2011). The system consists of the processes that need to be controlled, controllers who 
have models representing the process and a control algorithm, sensors that provide 
data on states of processes, and actuators that exert control on the processes. One 
may stack controllers upon one another; the agent controlled by a higher hierarchy is 
essentially seen as a process that can be controlled by the same principles. The controlling 
unit determines the set-point at which level the controlled process should run. Leveson 
(2011) claims that in this way STAMP can be used to analyse accidents, design socio-
technical systems, and manage safety in organisations.
When applied to organisational management, Leveson introduced the Systems 
Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) to design good organisational controls or manage 
their functioning real-time. The STPA cycle contains 1) identifying the possible system 
states out of intended control constraints; 2) finding out how the control architecture 
could fail to control the system in these instances. In both these steps STAMP is used as 
tool to depict how system elements interact and what hazards could emerge. This may 
lead to a redesign of the controls, such as updating the control algorithm or closing a 
control loop by ensuring that the process provides information.
Organisational ethnography is the anthropological method applied to organisations, 
viewing any organisation as a group that develops a culture (Bate, 1997; Hatch, 1993). 
The main insight imported in organisational sciences from anthropology is that culture is 
highly complex (Martin, 2001) and that prediction is almost impossible, in part because 
culture management systems are not neutral devices since they aimed at controlling 
people. Management systems are political because they are built on assumptions that 
work out to grant some more power and privileges than others (Hardy & Clegg, 1996). 
Systems can also be politicising when people learn how the system works and use them 
to their advantage. In social science discourse this is referred as agency (Giddens, 1984), 
meaning people have the ability to reflect on what is happening to them, form goals, 
and make decisions to achieve those goals. They have various tools at their disposal, 
such as humour and ridicule, to distance themselves from management control while 
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also endorsing it (Kunda, 1992). This may render managerial control ambiguous. The 
solution generally proposed by organisational ethnographers is to immerse oneself in the 
organisation with as little preconception as possible, or at least making them as explicit 
as possible, and thoroughly observe what is really going on (Van Maanen, 2006). The 
ethnographer remains sensitive to the fact that various groups may have an interests to 
be represented in certain ways. All social skills of the ethnographer are used to establish 
rapport and engage with people, while keeping some intellectual distance (Ybema, Yanow, 
Wels & Kamsteeg, 2009).
Given this interest in understanding how agency works in safety management, it 
makes sense to apply Agent Modelling (AM). While Organisational Ethnography (OE) 
allows one to gather large amounts of qualitative data and inductively work towards the 
most appropriate framework for the dynamics observed in the given setting, AM can 
focus on a specific work process and make more quantitative predictions. In particular, in 
this research we modelled multi-agent systems. These systems consist of human and/or 
technological (in this case, only human) agents that have the capacity to form goals and 
make decisions, that influence one another, and that may participate in certain processes. 
Modelling complex agent systems is interesting because it allows one to understand how 
nonlinear patterns emerge from many local interactions. The method uses empirical data 
and relevant theories to create an agent model, which can be programmed in several 
different platforms (e.g., Matlab). Patterns of interest, such as varying level of compliance 
with safety procedures over time, are not hard-coded but emerge from the simulations. 
By matching the simulation data to empirical data, the model can be validated. Sensitivity 
analysis can be performed to explain why the patterns occur and make predictions.
The two methodologies are also complementary, as Passenier et al. (2016) showed. 
While ethnography allows for an open gaze and holistic understanding of dynamics in an 
organisation, formal modelling forces much more precise descriptions and explanatory 
frameworks that make the overall interpretation more sound. Both methodologies 
support a social constructionist view of organisations and social order, meaning that 
attention is paid to the messiness and intractability that people experience by resisting 
oversimplification of those experienced realities.
5.3 METHODOLOGY
We applied STAMP to a safety management problem where occupational safety 
emerged as the main issue of concern, a domain that Leveson (2011) also suggests 
could be usefully managed with STAMP. The case study was an airline ground service 
provider experiencing difficulties to improve safety compliance of its work force. 
Ground service work—concerned with (un)docking, (dis)embarking and (un)loading 
of aircraft—is traditionally dangerous work, and serious injuries and deaths have not 
been uncommon (Balk, Stroeve & Bossenbroek, 2011). In recent years, both damage to 
aircraft on the ground as well as harm to ground personnel have escalated, and safety 
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programs were setup to improve safety. In the organisation where we conducted our 
research, Line Oriented Safety Audits (LOSA) were introduced along with stricter rules 
and procedures, and attempts to change the safety culture. LOSA observations on the 
platform checked actual practices against written procedures and communicated what 
systematic deviations occurred, so that managers could enforce better compliance with 
these points (De Boer, Koncak, Habekotté & van Hilten, 2011).
This method of working with LOSA seemed perfectly in tune with viewing the 
employees as the controlled process, and the extensive hierarchy of managers as the 
control architecture consisting of many control loops. The process was complex, because 
when managers would start enforcing compliance on one point, compliance would relax 
on another. The organisation consists of several departments working on different 
locations and there are many interacting processes and coordination issues. Therefore, 
STAMP seemed suitable for analysing the problem. STAMP application in other cases in 
the same domain were proved successful (de Boer & de Jong, 2014).
STAMP research was initiated by a multidisciplinary team consisting of three students 
(Romy Heimering, Rob Haest, and Jisvy van Zoelen), each supervised by one of the 
three authors as experts in organizational ethnography (Passenier), agent modelling 
(Sharpanskykh), and STAMP (de Boer) (see Table 10). Since STAMP was envisioned as the 
best candidate for analysing the problem, this process was leading the entire team. The 
ethnographer and the agent modeller assisted with interviews and platform observations 
to gain a deeper understanding of the problems identified by LOSA, to describe the 
control process, and to identify why it failed.
In this case, however, STAMP did not provide an adequate framework to analyse 
how and where management control was failing. There were many control loops that 
could be seen as failing and therefore explain how this situation had come about. The 
managers themselves reported many employees worked at the company for over 20 
years, forming tight friendship ties and making it impossible for someone to interfere 
and change their behaviour. The conditions of the company, however, also did not allow 
refreshing the work force or shifting team composition more. Memos were ineffective: 
people did not read them and felt managers did not know what they were talking about. 
Safety reporting was low; it seemed that people were not appreciating its importance.
The solution, from the STAMP analysis, appeared to be that managers should be 
more present at the work floor. Yet, it was not clear what managers should do besides 
telling people to stick to rules, the latter being disregarded since the rules were devised 
by managers whose expertise was doubt. Through her interactions with personnel, 
the ethnography student found that employees described their managers attitude as 
distant and lacking interest in their concerns, including safety concerns. The data for 
LOSA however suggested no difference between managers whose commitment to 
improving safety was expressed through more visibility at the platform, and those whose 
commitment was less visible. An adequate understanding of the work processes and 
a full consideration of the motivations and skills by which ground service employees 
performed their work were missing. After this initial year of fieldwork, we had an 
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elaborate description of the control structure, but still insufficient understanding of 
how unwanted behaviours—of both managers and employees—arose. Lacking satisfying 
results, we continued for a second year with only ethnography and agent modelling.




Year 1 team:  ■ De Boer (supervisor)
 ■ Van Zoelen (student, Ba 
thesis)
 ■ Passenier 
(supervisor)
 ■ Heimering (student, 
Ma thesis)
 ■ Sharpanskykh 
(supervisor)





Student performs STPA 
by analysing LOSA reports 
and organisational charts, 
constructing a control 
architecture, and identifying 
control failures at Ground 
Services.
Student assists 
STAMP by analysing 
documents, and 
conducting interviews 
with personnel and 
platform observations.
Student assists 
STAMP mainly with 
the construction of 
the organisational 
control architecture and 
identify control failures.
Year 2 team:  ■ De Boer (supervisor)  ■ Passenier 
(supervisor)
 ■ Bakker (student, Ma 
thesis)
 ■ Sharpanskykh 
(supervisor)





Student formulates the 
the research quesion: 
How do managers 
and staff members 
of Ground Services 
make sense of safety? 






selects simulation case 
scenario, creates agent 
model, and runs and 
analyses simulations to 
find out how and why 
deviations emerge and 
what can be done to 
improve compliance.
To gain a better perspective on how hazards are controlled in real world ground service 
work settings, we changed the configuration of the project in the second year (Table 
10). The student dedicated to a STAMP analysis (van Zoelen) left without replacement, 
and we reformulated research questions for a new organisational ethnography student 
(Joyce Bakker) and the same agent modelling student as in the year before (Rob Haest). 
This relaxed the need for the team to focus on control and find reasons why control 
failed. Instead, while we could still use the control architecture and the identification of 
hazards of the first year, we could investigate the problem with a more open mind; that is, 
as not necessarily a control problem. The ethnographer addressed the broader question 
why people in different layers of the company made different sense of safety and safety 
rules. The agent modeller focused on how and why in certain cases deviations emerged 
from routine work processes, and finally what could be done to improve compliance. As 
5
Voorbereid document - David.indd   127 01-02-2021   15:15
128
Chapter 5
mentioned above, organisational ethnography allows for a more up-close look at what 
is happening. With agent modelling, one may create a model that explicitly incorporates 
complexity of the work processes and the way team members influence each other. In the 
new configuration, we thus conducted organisational ethnography and agent modelling 
simultaneously for another year.
The agent modelling sub-team (Sharpanskykh and Haest) selected a newly designed 
procedure for the aircraft turnaround process to instantiate the model, allowing precise 
predictions that could be validated by LOSA data. The newly appointed organisational 
ethnographer (Bakker) meanwhile observed management meetings in-depth as well as 
work performance at multiple platforms. The aim was to understand how the joint team’s 
insights could be translated to useful advice in view of the differentiation between work 
force and management. The results and suggestions presented at the end of the second 
year triggered discussions and were endorsed by members of management, suggesting 
that we had arrived at a proper analysis and actionable suggestions.
The resulting, iterative investigation process can be described in three consecutive 
steps. First, the agent modelling (AM) and organisational ethnography (OE) teams 
jointly discussed the situation of the organisation in question as presented by them by 
the management. They used the STAMP framework developed by the STAMP team to 
create an impression of the hazardous processes that exist and that are problematic, 
and the control architecture that allows the hazards to occur. In this stage, both teams 
tapped into their respective disciplinary knowledge and formulate ideas about what 
may be going on in the organisation that might fall out of the STAMP framework and for 
which management may have a blind spot. This lead to a set of qualitative, open-ended 
questions for fieldwork.
Second, members of the AM and OE teams conducted observations and interviews 
at the work field, and analysed organisational schematics, charts, safety data, written 
communications, and procedures. The team members observed how safety-critical work 
was done and how members interacted with each other. They talked with members of 
the work force, management, and administration, and collected war stories or anecdotes 
that were told to express difficult dilemmas and ways of resolving them. These data 
were recorded as field notes, interview recordings and transcripts. The fieldworkers 
communicated amongst them as means to develop an idea of what were the significant 
agents and processes, and revisited relevant literature to dig up interesting concepts 
and theories.
The OE used the data to develop a qualitative framework to characterise the 
dynamics of the overall culture, while the AM created a conceptual model of agents, 
their relations and influences, and local processes they were engaged in. Connecting 
to developments in the organisation, the AM selected a significant process or practice 
to create the precise, formal model. The process, such as the implementation of the 
new turnaround procedure, allowed for longitudinal data gathering. The data were 
qualitative and/or quantitative, taken from existing databases and/or by continuing to 
monitor developments. The AM and OE teams regularly met to discuss their respective 
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conceptual model and framework, so that they were able to integrate their knowledge 
and confirm they understood at some level what the other team was doing.
When the teams felt they had a sense of what is going on, they moved to step three, 
separated into two parallel tasks. The OE characterised the dilemmas experienced by 
members of the organisation by writing a thick description. This involved picking out 
telling anecdotes or physical details, interpreting what they signified for members of the 
organisation, and showing how those contributed to specific behavioural dynamics as well 
as a more global texture of the culture. The way in which what it means to work safely 
may differ in different sub-cultures of an organisation, is an example of a more global 
texture; a detailed example of this can be found in Atak and Kingma (2010). Focusing on 
more a detailed work process, the AM finished the formal model and instantiated it to 
run simulations that should reveal patterns matching the longitudinal data. By performing 
sensitivity analysis, tweaking specific parameters and running statistical analyses over 
the results, the AM team developed predictions about how emergent patterns came 
about. This method is described in more detail by Sharpanskykh and Haest (2015).
With the interpretations of the simulations and the qualitative description and 
framework, the team reverted to step 1. They got together with members of the 
organisation to revisit their ideas about how dangers came about and how they may 
be effectively controlled. This resulted in suggestions for interventions and design 
recommendations as well as leading to new questions for field work. Multiple iterations 
of this process may be necessary to arrive at a satisfying result.
5.4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The research applying OE and AM showed that control had to be re-thought as a matter 
of creating smarter and more bottom-up processes for procedure design and employee 
involvement, also suggesting some practical courses of action. This replaced the idea 
inspired by the initial STAMP analysis that a control loop had to be closed, interpreted 
as that management should be more visible and enforce top-down designed procedures 
and rules. While it is vital for members of the organisation to have a certain degree 
of control over their process, our research team effectively redefined the overarching 
organisational problem as one of management learning, rather than management control.
The OE results showed that employees who distrusted the design process of new 
procedures and the commitment of management to safety, had a point, even though 
managers were very active with safety. The problem was not that anyone was lazy 
or did not do their job properly, but rather that managers had a tendency to stick to 
their office and domain too much. Different units were given much leeway in how they 
wanted to carry out safety policies, and this together with their activity shifting emphasis 
from one domain to the other actually frustrated personnel and made management 
appear inconsistent. There was little communication between units, which could cause 
coordination problems. It turned out that employees did not file safety reports, because 
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when the issue they reported was not urgent, there was no response from the safety 
department. This made them believe that their reports were not being used, which 
was actually untrue; all reports were gathered, analysed, and discussed in regular Risk 
Assessment Meetings.
The result was that safety managers thought that employees did not care about 
the work and about safety, and that employees thought that managers did not really 
care. Employees felt that mangers held double standards with respect to their work and 
safety: if they complied with procedures, they could be reprimanded for being slow, and 
if they worked around procedures to be on time, they could be reprimanded for violating 
procedures. Most worryingly, some new procedures actually carried more danger than the 
old ways of working that were now seen as deviant and dangerous by management. It had 
been forbidden, for example, to use the baggage high loader as a way to move personnel 
up to the aircraft baggage compartments; instead, a ladder should be used. The narrow, 
high ladder however was much more dangerous than the high loader—if properly used.
It was then possible to understand why personnel disqualified management as a whole 
and distrusted and ignored procedural instructions. Given these issues, heightened by the 
limited interaction between mangers and work floor, it seemed plausible that polarisation 
could easily occur as a consequence of common group dynamics such as those described 
by social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The out-group—management—is reified 
and simplified and generally less trusted, while the reverse is true for the in-group. 
Similarly, management members appeared to have reified their image of the work force. 
There were some good attempts at promoting safety that could have mitigated these 
problems somewhat, but these were not used to their full potential. Safety delegates 
were appointed to promote safety, but they were not used to communicate across units. 
The development of new procedures often involved members of the work force to ensure 
the procedure incorporated their knowledge and experience, yet this was usually done 
with a particular group whose representativeness was questioned.
The AM research gave further insight into how and why control as exerted by 
using the LOSA data to enforce compliance on specific points, was ineffective, as well as 
how compliance could be improved. The analysis zoomed in on an adapted procedure 
for docking aircraft that arrived at the gate. Before aircraft are guided to the gate, the 
platform is checked for debris and obstacles. After the aircraft is parked in position, 
blocks are placed at the landing gears and pylons around the engine areas. Before the 
gate attaches to the plane, someone checks if it is clear and gives a thumbs-up to the 
operator of the moving gate. The aircraft is connected with the ground power unit and 
the door seals are inspected. In this sequence, the initial Foreign Object Damage/Debris 
(FOD) check showed up in LOSA records as relatively frequently being skipped, probably 
in order to save time. Management had attempted to change this by providing information 
and emphasising the FOD check for some time, which improved compliance; but when 
information ceased, compliance declined. The new procedure included an explicit role 
division connected to particular tasks, determined by the team leader during a short 
briefing just before commencing the entire process.
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The AM team developed a formal agent model that explained the old situation as well 
as tentatively predicted with some accuracy the changed situation. The model was 
created using several theories. Motivational models of human behaviour used were 
self-determination theory (Deci & Vansteenkiste, 2004) and Maslow’s (1943) hierarchy 
of needs, including a distinction between intuitive, habitual reasoning and conscious, 
rational reasoning (Kahneman, 2011). A learning model explained how new information 
is processed by way of social contagion, describing how new norms arise and spread in 
teams. Work demand and pressure were modelled as varying over time. Management 
control was modelled as the likelihood that team members would be reprimanded when 
intending to skip the FOD check. The change from the old to the new procedure was 
instantiated by adjusting the values for probabilities of reprimands by managers and 
team members and the speed of social contagion in direct (e.g. talking) or indirect (e.g. 
observing someone do something) communication. In the new procedure with explicit 
coordination (i.e. task divisions and roles), for example, the probability of reprimand from 
team members was estimated to be above zero, while it was set at zero in the old, implicit 
coordination procedure. Further detail on the model can be found in (Sharpanskykh & 
Haest, 2015).
The simulations of the implicit coordination scenario reproduced the pattern 
described above where temporary attention by management to the FOD check led to 
temporary increase in compliance. The explicit coordination case predicted that team 
members would develop a team norm to complete the FOD check before allowing the 
aircraft to park, and that reduced control from management would not quickly result 
in reduced compliance. These results were also observed in practice (Sharpanskykh & 
Haest, 2015). The sensitivity analysis furthermore revealed that management control 
was a relatively ineffective method to establish compliance. Addressing agents’ needs 
to understand why an action needs to be performed a certain way, came out as more 
influential. Responding to team member norms also became an important factor. Because 
members have shifted in this scenario to a more conscious, rational way of reasoning, 
these norms then become ingrained and compliance remains high, also after management 
relaxes control.
One manager, upon being presented these findings, expressed being humbled 
and realising that he felt he might have over-estimated his influence over the process, 
understanding the relatively low influence of direct management control. On the other 
hand, once the ethnographic findings and recommendations were presented, several 
managers and team leaders who had in some way been involved in the research project 
were also enthused by realising what influence they might have. The ethnography team 
members suggested that the organisation form safety teams consisting of members of 
every level of the organisation, especially the very lowest rank, and create a thoroughly 
bottom-up procedural design process. This resonated so strongly with the sentiments of 
those present at the presentation meeting that they instantly began brainstorming about 
ways to make it happen. They identified some potential obstacles—how does one select 
people outside the circle of ‘usual suspects’ of people involved in safety initiatives—and 
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came up with solutions—asking leaders close to the work floor to select them. They 
expressed commitment to essentially turn around the design process of new procedures 
in such a way that management would primarily take expertise from the work floor for 
the details of the procedure, and then check against regulation, instead of deriving 
procedures from new regulations.
5.5 CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
Replacing former working theories such as the Swiss Cheese Model, STAMP is meant to 
capture and control better the complex dynamics of safety. Despite the potential of the 
overall systems theoretic approach, where safety is taken as an emergent phenomenon of 
complex socio-technical systems, there are some problematic simplifications in the STAMP 
methodology. We argue that when STAMP is applied as a management tool, control is 
introduced too soon in the analysis cycle, and that it is necessary to understand emergent 
behaviour first. Thus, to arrive at a more bottom-up idea of safety rules, which is propagated 
by safety 2 thinking (Hale & Borys, 2013), safety compliance issues are approached 
as an overarching management learning problem rather than management control.
To complement STAMP, emergent behaviour can be studied through organisational 
ethnography in parallel with the development of an agent-based model. Organisational 
ethnography is a processual (i.e. describing patterns over time), qualitative analysis of 
work practices and social relations at multiple levels of an organisation. Agent models 
represent people and technology, as required, that perform actions, make decisions with 
some degree of autonomy, and exert influence on each other. By properly integrating 
relevant theories of human behaviour as well as data on local practices and relations, the 
model simulations should reproduce the emergent patterns described by the processual 
qualitative analysis. The model can be further validated with separate datasets of the 
old situation, or of new developments unfolding as interventions take place. Sensitivity 
analysis of key parameters allows analysts and managers to pin-point and test the most 
efficient measures of control.
In deriving an agent model from an ethnographic account, information and nuance is 
lost and one should not see the agent system as a definitive description; yet it offers courses 
of action when STAMP is applied at this point. Sensitivity analysis of key parameters in 
the agent model that specify relevant agent interactions and influences, allow analysts 
and managers to pin-point the most efficient measures of control. Control loops are 
thus more contingently and smartly situated in emergent behaviours of the system.
The application of OE and AM provided a trigger for managers to learn and shift 
perspective, get unstuck from their soured labour relations, and engage with the safety 
motivations of their personnel. Thus, we suggest that STAMP is complemented with OE 
and AM in order to achieve a complete ‘new view’ in safety analysis and management. 
The particular findings in this case, such as the need for explaining the reasons behind 
instructions, expressing worker autonomy in the way procedures are designed, and 
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involving workers in the design process, are likely to be more generally applicable factors 
in establishing a ‘new view’ towards safety analysis and management. In this view, (safety) 
management is a two-way process where analysts and managers are curious enough 
to understand the human contribution made on the work floor, before they introduce 
control. Exercising control then becomes a matter of establishing a communicative 
rationality and aligning organisational interests such that work gets done in a way that 
is acceptable to all those involved.
Challenges that our approach throw up include the access to organisations and the 
resources and time needed to complete the analysis. Ethnographic research requires 
access to sites where activities of interest occur. Since at the outset it is often not yet 
clear what will turn out to be interesting, this requires a strong vote of confidence and 
flexibility from organisational officials, especially given the sensitive nature of safety-
related questions. Ethnography can be very time-intensive, which may press the 
resources available to an investigative team. Ethnographers need time to become part 
of a group and get passed the sometimes subtle facades that organisational members 
tend to put up in any context (Goffman, 1959), and especially in relation to safety (Atak & 
Kingma, 2010). The creation of a detailed agent model, integrating several types of data 
and theory, can also be a lengthy process. Further potential challenges exist in forming an 
interdisciplinary research team and establishing a collaboration that bridges the different 
knowledge and scientific norms of the two disciplines.
The suggestion in this paper is to form teams consisting of at least one expert trained 
in agent modelling and one expert trained in organisational ethnography, if both are also 
proficient in safety analysis and management theories such as STAMP. If not, an additional 
member can be added with expertise on this domain; the agent modelling expert is likely 
to be from an engineering or computer science domain, and the ethnographer from social 
sciences. In our project we worked with fieldworkers and supervisors of each domain. 
We have addressed the challenges of interdisciplinary research, but a complementary 
approach such as advocated here requires a genuine interest and some knowledge 
overlap across fields. The project may usefully adopt the systems theoretic ideas about 
viewing safety as a control problem, as STAMP does, yet not be naïve about how the 
actual control architecture functions, given the complexity of human interaction.
APPENDIX 5A. ABBREVIATIONS
AM  Agent Modelling
FOD  Foreign Object Damage/Debris
LOSA  Line Oriented Safety Audits
OE  Organisational Ethnography
SCM  Swiss Cheese Model
STAMP   Systems Theoretic Accident Model and Process
STPA  Systems Theoretic Process Analysis
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In this dissertation I problematise the theoretical black-boxing of safety cultures. As 
a result of a well-established line of technical and human factors studies of accidents 
and incidents, industries know much about the ‘input’ of safety cultures. That is, the 
regulatory processes, often based on lessons from accidents and thinking in terms of 
prevention (Reason, 1990; Leveson, 2011), that guide and constrain the practices and 
processes in safety-critical industries (Rasmussen, 1997). However, it is much harder to 
grasp the mechanisms by which these regulations are transformed into outputs, which 
include commonly seen errors and violations as well as an overall very safe and rule 
compliant performance (Oliver, Calvard & Potočnik, 2019). I argue that we lack insight 
in what happens inside the black box of the safety culture – the throughput so to speak. 
Earlier studies of expert practices have been characterised as methodically prepared 
and executed improvisations (Bigley & Roberts, 2001; Orr, 1996), which is difficult to 
reconcile with their strict conformity with ‘safe standards’ like rules and instructions 
or standard operating procedures (Hudson, 2001; Parker, Laurie & Hudson, 2006). As 
a result, seemingly contradicting their own ideology of transparency (Reason, 1998), 
what actually happens in safety cultures remains unclear. In view of these interesting 
paradoxes, my dissertation investigates what role deviations from standards play in 
committed safety cultures.
Reading this black box in the context of the Dutch commercial aviation industry, 
my main finding is that deviations from standards reflect widespread ingenuity and 
dexterity of operational experts dealing with ‘unruly’ (Wynne, 1988) sociotechnical 
systems. Despite ultra-high reliability of its many components, complex sociotechnical 
systems like the air transport system are nevertheless fraught with often subtle, but 
critical, contradictions and anomalies. These contradictions are observable in technical 
artefacts, such as when nominally functioning automatic systems perform incoherent 
actions, and can be traced to the assumptions programmed into their software. They 
are also observable in the interpretive flexibility of the meticulously designed standard 
operating procedures in aviation (Wright, Pocock & Fields, 1998). Presuming that such 
contradictions are to some extent inherent in complex sociotechnical systems (Hollnagel, 
Woods & Leveson, 2006; Perrow, 2011; Wynne, 1988), I found certain social and 
organisational processes responsible for dealing with contradictions when problems 
come to the surface. The overall response can be characterised as a complex process 
of innovative deviance (Merton, 1949) that is driven by operational experts and relies on 
‘accomplices’ amongst the authorities tasked with management, oversight, prosecution, 
and governance.
I continue to first summarise my findings below. Then I discuss implications for safety 
science as well as risk debates in organisation and management. After noting practical 
implications, I conclude with a reflection on limitations and directions for further 
research.
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6.1 OVERVIEW OF THE FINDINGS
In the introduction (chapter 1) I grounded the theoretical black-boxing problem in 
the Dutch research context where debate arose over the lessons to be learned from 
an actual black box – of the Turkish Airlines Boeing 737NG, which crashed near 
Amsterdam Schiphol airport in 2009. The Dutch Safety Board (2010) claims that the 
crash resulted from a particular combination of factors, including fatal deviations from 
standard operating procedures on the part of Schiphol’s air traffic controller as well as 
the deceased flight crew. I argued that the Board construed an authoritative narrative 
(Brown, 2004) by implicating the authoritative concepts of normal accidents, failed high 
reliability organising, and compromised safety barriers in the reconstruction narrative. 
I found however that the Dutch Safety Board’s (2010) reconstruction was partially 
contradicted by Dekker’s (2009) advisory report, which claims the pilots could not have 
prevented the crash brought about by a complex software interaction of the 737NG in an 
already tightly coupled aviation system. The fact that Dekker’s report was not published 
at the time became all the more salient ten years later, when two aircraft of the 737NG’s 
success, the 737MAX, crashed due to an even worse software problem.
My analysis of the accident narratives in the two reports served as a research agenda 
to study safe practices and processes, rather than accidents, because the accident 
narratives point to a lacuna in our understanding of how work is actually done in and 
around safety cultures. I found that Dekker’s (2009) report on the one hand helped 
deconstruct the Dutch Safety Board’s crash reconstruction narrative, which implicated 
the pilots, but on the other hand helped reify the assumption, in the case of Schiphol’s air 
traffic controller, that deviations from standards were dangerous. In view of the air traffic 
control organisation’s unwillingness to admit failure, this seemed to imply a problematic 
safety commitment. In contrast, I argued that the report provides insufficient evidence 
of this being the case. If one accepts that interpretive flexibility of procedures are normal, 
necessary and thus routine part of highly skilled, professional practice, then there is 
not enough data to support the view that something particularly problematic was going 
on in this case. Indeed, there was limited authoritative knowledge of organisational 
mechanisms to fall back on and distinguish deeper organisational problems. While there 
are theories explaining why routine deviations are problematic (Snook, 2000; Vaughan, 
1997; 1999), there were no authoritative competing theories to explain when and why 
routine deviations might be safe. Therefore, I continued to investigate deviant safety 
practices and processes outside the political sensitivities of air crash investigations.
The contextualising study in chapter 2 indicates that there is a social risk in deviating 
for aviation professionals. On the one hand, despite the intention to act in line with the 
spirit of the procedure (DeSanctis & Poole, 1994) and even with ample legal anchor and 
precedent, deviating from the letter of the procedure can be construed as deviance by 
authorities within or outside the organisation. On the other hand, authorities who act 
as ‘accomplices’ appear to negotiate contrasting risk perceptions from their own legal 
perspective, the public, and the professional safety culture where innovative deviance 
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sometimes surfaces. Although policies can change as public and political moods change, 
at the time of my research in the Netherlands the judicial authorities were inspired 
and supported to act in this manner by the European policy of just culture (Kortleven 
et al., 2017). Ideally, just cultures resist criminalisation and enable organisations to 
follow their own investigative process in case of an irregularity (Dekker & Breakey, 
2016). However, even though authorities were embracing the policy, there were still 
significant tensions throughout the industry. According to the public prosecutor, the air 
traffic control organisation appeared particularly traumatised by earlier experiences 
of ‘unjust’ criminalisation. If there is any truth in this observation, such trauma could 
perhaps help explain why they strongly defended their traffic controller’s actions in the 
Turkish Airlines case as well as why they closed the doors to me after my initial contact, 
where I mentioned this crash.
I was also able to observe how the social tensions, implied when innovative 
deviance modifies or stretches such a negotiated order, surface in flight crews’ work 
in the cockpit. According to the vignettes in chapter 2, these tensions become visible in 
conflict, political sensitivities, deviations from SOPs, and frustrations about glitches in 
planning and communication. In contrast with functional observation methods like LOSA, 
which focus only on hazards in such observations, I argue that my observations reveal 
glimpses of how work normally gets done in aviation HROs. As such I argue that my social 
perspective and approach contributes to aviation safety field with richer observations 
and deeper understanding. Rather than reducing the observations to hazards that need 
to be controlled, I suggest that they show important, even necessary forms of learning, 
negotiation, and reflective practice. At the same time, I acknowledge that HROs are 
not immune to Normal Accidents. HROs operate inherently vulnerable and hazardous 
systems that continually evolve and produce hazards in new and unexpected ways, which 
need to be further studied.
The study of airline pilots’ reflective cockpit work practices in chapter 3 follows 
the research agenda set by my reading of the Turkish Airlines crash reconstructions 
by uncovering expert-drivers of the emergence and normalisation of organisational 
deviance. I note that while Vaughan (1997) in her seminal study of NASA applied 
Merton’s (1949) theory of deviance to focus on the negative consequences, where 
deviance expresses a lack of safety commitment, I focus on the positive consequences, 
where deviance expresses safety commitment. I find that in procedural grey areas, 
routine deviations from procedures arise within a normal process of developing 
expertise through action and transmitting expertise by collectively reflecting on the 
grey areas. My findings suggest that expertise development means developing intuition 
(Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 2005) and using deviations from standards to communicate about 
different intuitions within a setting that incorporates varying operational expertise. The 
two-person cockpit crew of large airline jets after all includes a captain, who can be 
characterised as a professional or even an expert, and a co-pilot, who is sometimes only 
a novice, and at a later stage usually becomes a competent learner on her or his way to 
captaincy.
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In this well-contained, but rich research context, I find that new deviations may emerge as 
quick reflexive responses to anomalies as well as deliberate, reflective actions. A process 
model derived from fieldwork observations and interviews suggests that deviations may 
trigger reflection-in-action, which reflects an ability to think even under the acute time 
pressure of a risky operational situation (Yanow & Tsoukas, 2009), as well as reflection-
on-action, which takes place afterwards. Overall, reflective practices therefore shape the 
bottom-up process of innovative deviance where certain procedure deviations become 
routine while others do not. The model suggests that through reflection-on-action pilots 
may engage in a wider, often spontaneous and informal processes of problematising 
observed deviance through which risks of deviant practices are reassessed. Finally, the 
process may lead to some forms of innovative deviance becoming normalised through formal 
codification in official procedures. Often this is not possible for individual organisations 
and innovative deviance remains a way by which professional pilots’ communities 
of practice (Orr, 1996) deal with contradictions and weaknesses in aircraft design.
There is an argument that ‘opening’ a theoretical black box, such as safety cultures, and 
describing the social and organisational mechanisms by which such cultures reproduce 
themselves, can turn into an empty exercise if one ignores the moral problems implied 
in these mechanisms (Winner, 1993). I use the less absolute metaphor of ‘reading’ black 
boxes, which also allows me to participate in the more normative or ideological aspects of 
aviation safety cultures. In chapters 4 and 5 I engaged with the engineering disciplines, 
who are responsible for designing safety-critical technologies and organisations, to 
translate insights on innovative deviance in aviation safety cultures.
The multi-agent model in chapter 4 translates the idea that safety commitment in 
organisational cultures, where deviance is found, is not static and does not always follow 
predictable paths. Thus, the safety commitment espoused by higher management, and 
promoted by a company’s safety department, may contrast with actual practices owing to 
the particular dilemmas that an organisation experiences. We found a set of typical safety 
cultural dilemmas in Atak and Kingma’s (2010) case study of an aircraft maintenance 
company. That is, how to uphold safe standards under the commercial pressures arising 
from a quick growth phase while coping with strained internal relations under new 
management and changing priorities.
Focusing on these dilemmas, and reflecting the limitations of using a secondary data 
source, we made many simplifications in the modelling process. The model features 
aircraft maintenance technician agents, which stands for a more diverse group of 
specialisations that exist in reality. These interact with the super-agents of maintenance 
management and the safety department, which represent a complex management 
structure as two agents with opposing interests: management demands productivity 
while the safety department demands safety. A function coded in the technician agents 
determines how these agents respond to varying demands from these agents and other 
functions determine how they influence each other as they participate in a rudimentary 
representation of work processes. We distinguish junior technicians from the old guard, 
who are the majority in the first phase of the company’s life and who regularly protest 
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against the new maintenance’s demand for productivity by committing to a ‘working 
to rule’ safety-maximising strategy. Junior technicians in contrast are phased in during 
the second phase and do not resist management unless they are influenced by others. 
We hard-coded how over the timespan of nine years, management’s and the safety 
department’s demands vary in three distinct phases, each responding to the particular 
dilemmas described by the original narrative, also including how old guard technicians 
are gradually replaced fully with new technicians.
Even with such a simple model of power relations and work process, which 
nevertheless demanded a great deal of the expertise and collaboration skills within 
our research team, we found that the emergent patterns in the simulations matched 
Atak and Kingma’s (2010) ethnographic narrative on key points. The graphs visualising 
productivity and safety performance for example show how during the growth phase, 
productivity soars while safety performance plummets, which coincides with Atak and 
Kingma’s assertion that the company experienced several close calls. In the third phase 
the simulation graph shows that the technician agents reach a more mature safety culture 
where productivity and safety are in harmony. The methodology also allows for virtual 
experiments, by which alternative developments of the agent system could be explored, 
allowing us to get a sense of how the agent system works.
In chapter 5 this work, applied to a Ground Services safety culture development 
project, contributes to the debate about “old” or “safety 1” versus “new” or “safety 2” 
approaches (Dekker, 2004; Hollnagel, 2014). To analyse why personnel routine deviations 
from safety procedures continued to plague the organisation, STAMP was introduced. 
STAMP was promoted as a “safety 2” accident model that encourages a fuller analysis 
of complex human, technical, and organisational factors than the conventional, linear 
‘safety 1’ methods like bowtie methods (De Ruijter & Guldenmund, 2016) and the SCM. 
According to Leveson (2011), STAMP can also be used pro-actively for safety management 
by undertaking a Systems Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA). The team consisting of 
supervisors and students with expertise in the complementary fields of organisational 
ethnography, STAMP, and agent modelling, decided to use STPA to guide the project.
Our experience in the first year of this project suggests that STAMP/STPA still 
embodies top-down control thinking and inspires conventional safety 1 wisdom. Guided 
by the STPA process, the research team was turning up results, but this did not trigger an 
integration of emerging insights of what was really going on in the organisation. Because 
STAMP frames safety as a control problem, but offers no concept or theory for how 
people engage in work processes or form social relations, the team could not establish 
why personnel deviance emerged in the first place. Safety culture development was 
approached as a matter of managers having the culture and bringing it to the work floor, 
enabled by a sort of dashboard with controls provided by the STPA process. In reality, 
the problem resided within the entire organisation, including management.
The subsequent research year our team applied ethnography and agent modelling 
in a similar manner as described in chapter 2, using the hazards identified by STAMP 
but relaxing the need to explain them as a control problem. Thus we provide some 
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pointers for how to analyse bottom-up processes that safety 2 approaches talk about. 
The students asked open questions such as how different organisational members 
make sense of safety, enabling the team to eschew deep-seated assumptions about 
organisational deviance. First, the results showed that routine deviations were in many 
cases examples of innovative deviance, triggered by practical constraints not taken into 
account by existing procedures. Indeed personnel made sense of safety from the context 
of their operational reality, which often did not match with managers’ assumptions, and 
which presumably caused distrust between both groups. These results challenged 
managers dominant assumptions about deviance and invited them to learn, rather 
than to gain more means of control. Second, the agent model and simulation analysis 
helped relocate control in a way that was humbling to some managers. The simulations 
demonstrated logically that management’s influence to force compliance was very limited 
as compared to how they imagined it. Taken together, the results led mangers to conclude 
that procedure redesign processes, triggered by frequent aviation safety regulation 
updates, should be done with representation from the work floor. Although we were 
not around to observe the subsequent process, as reorganisations limited further access, 
we considered the results as usable, insightful, and promising for further development 
and applications to practice.
6.2 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
The studies described in chapters 2 through 5, aimed at reading the theoretical black 
boxes of safety cultures in the context of the Dutch commercial aviation industry, find 
a social and organisational response that can be characterised as innovative deviance. 
Innovative deviance was conceived by sociologist Robert Merton (1949) to represent 
social and organisational responses that act in line with certain values of a culture, but 
deviate from the norms, such as laws, rules, and procedures, in order to achieve their 
goals. This enables analyses of how in societies certain practices that transgress the 
law are criminalised by the society, but at the same time represent innovations that 
sometimes endure and can also become decriminalised. In my studies, the application is 
more subtle, in that there are no clear transgressions of the law, but rather professionals 
exercising discretion in ‘grey areas’. These actions can get criminalised, as the just culture 
literature notes (Dekker, 2011b; Dekker & Brakey, 2016), but may also represent useful 
practical innovations such as workarounds and shortcuts needed to keep an operational 
process going. Innovative deviance acknowledges that social norms, which are codified 
in safe standards, are in part upheld by those who take the risk of deviating from these 
standards in the interest of a particular constellation of shared values, of which safety 
is only one. This perspective also highlights how different the process might be in 
different contexts, as decision makers in some societies are known to respond more 
authoritatively, while others respond more consensually, such as in the Netherlands 
(Hofstede, 1993; Merritt, 2000).
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My point of departure, the black boxing of safety culture, resonates with Oliver et al.’s 
(2017; 2019) recently published analysis of the Air France AF447 loss of control crash, 
which happened in the same year as the Turkish Airlines crash. When I read Oliver et al.’s 
insightful accident study in the course of analysing my findings of innovative deviance, 
I found that there are clear parallels between the crashes as well as the lessons that 
can be drawn. In case of AF447, flying at night over a pitch-black ocean at high altitude, 
incorrect sensor signals caused an Airbus 330’s ‘alpha protection’ system to get switched 
off, while causing confusion about the state of the aircraft. This led to rapid loss of 
control as the aircraft stalled without the crew being able to understand that this was 
the case. Oliver et al. (2017) suggest that AF447’s loss of control demonstrates how 
designing more predictability in systems, which demand less cognitive engagement and 
consequently erode users’ skills, may weaken organisations’ abilities to recognise and 
deal with unforeseen events.
Oliver et al.’s analysis resonates with my critical reading of the Turkish Airlines crash 
investigation reports, which suggests that the language of control and commitment 
used in aviation safety cultures often black-boxes the very processes and practices that 
deal with ambiguities and complexities in the high-tech operation. This adds to existing 
explanations why gathering large amounts of safety data, and promoting transparency 
about the contents of these databases, does not necessarily lead to safety improvements 
(Amalberti, 2001). Furthermore, in relation to the high reliability organisations literature, 
which has come to propagate a normative ideal-type of culture (Rijpma, 2003), my 
studies thus provide necessary nuance. That is, the theoretical frameworks by which 
diverse, large sets of data are interpreted in high reliability organisations, may in 
important respects lack the sensitivity to operations usually attributed to high reliability 
organisations (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007).
The black box debate connects to a wider debate on the limitations of industrial 
automation (Barley & Kunda, 1992; Dreyfus & Hubert, 1992; Farjoun & Starbuck, 2007). 
Industries are globally grappling with the promises as well as pitfalls of increasingly 
intelligent software (Faraj et al., 2018). Oliver et al.’s (2017) theorising points out that 
there is a serious danger in the design thinking that relies on compliance with standardised 
processes designed for maximum predictability. My studies complement this view as 
they reveal a rich and socially complex organisational ‘underlife’ that is often ignored 
or rejected by management control systems because these routine deviations from 
standards can be interpreted within the regulatory context as organisational deviance 
and as such a lack of safety commitment. In reality, my studies suggest, organisational 
deviance often represents ingenious practical innovations that are widely shared 
and enhance dexterity in various forms of technical and operational work. By design, 
therefore, managers are bound to ignore these efforts on the work floor, even when that 
floor is suspended at 40,000 feet and subjected to extensive monitoring and control.
My studies revealing ingenuity and dexterity of innovative deviance place the Turkish 
Airlines accident in a risk management context that is lost with the black boxing of safety 
culture. Innovative deviance suggests that operational practices deviate from the ideal, 
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formally prescribed process, which is usually seen as a loss of control in the literature, 
described for example by the metaphor of practical ‘drift’ (Dekker, 2011a; Snook, 2000). 
In contrast, I draw attention to the observation that organisations rely on innovative 
deviance to keep operations under control. My studies suggest that uncovering the 
underlying social relations can help identify whether deviance represents a normal, 
bottom-up control process, or an erosion of control. The modelling study suggest that 
under too much strain, such as seen when production pressures are high, costs are 
cut, and work relations sour, the actual safety margins, which are upheld by innovative 
deviance, erode in more complex ways than imagined.
The positive lesson that can be drawn from my studies owes to the move away from 
accident models to provide alternative theories for how control and commitment is 
expressed in often implicit, intuitive ways. Accident models, which provide the theoretical 
backbone of the majority of risk and safety frameworks, help making sense of complex 
data in reference to limits, which in reality however are ambiguous, opaque, and difficult 
to observe (Oliver et al., 2017). In contrast, I focus on the role of deviations, which refers 
to actions that are empirically observable and represent anchor points of intuitive 
expertise (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 2005) as well as reflective practice (Schön, 1983). So 
doing I contribute to a processual view on intuitive expertise (Akinci & Sadler-Smith, 
2019; Hodgkinson & Sadler-Smith, 2018) where intuition is regarded as an important 
signal that deserves to be taken seriously in communication between experts of different 
or varying expertise.
With the learning processes of innovative deviance I also add to discussions 
about expertise as these processes explicate what it means to rely on experience as 
well as formal knowledge and thus defer to expertise (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). I do 
so by providing a competing theory of organisational deviance as learning about risks 
encountered in practice, which competes with the view that organisational deviance 
necessarily implies a dangerous lack of control over operational practices (Snook, 
2000; Vaughan, 1997). Through this learning process, which is not a sufficient, but 
probably a necessary part of safe practices, the inherent under-specification of technical 
instructions, as reflected in rules and procedures (Suchman, 1987), are in a constant 
process of becoming resolved and reassessed. Sometimes these practical solutions are 
codified into formal organisational standards. Awareness of these learning processes 
should be helpful in pinpointing when safety cultures get disturbed, such as when 
organisations lack diverse practical experiences that trigger shared learning, or when 
authorities polarise or delegitimise professional discussions about deviant practices.
The studies in this dissertation thus contribute to a growing body of ‘safety 2’ research 
(Hollnagel, 2014). Safety 2 acknowledges that safety rules are in important ways informed 
by bottom-up rather than top-down processes (Hale & Borys, 2013) and therefore 
suggests empirically investigating ‘work as done’ and asks how safe conditions are 
created (e.g. Adriaensen et al., 2019; Jahn, 2019; Rankin, Lundberg, Woltjer, Rollenhagen, 
& Hollnagel, 2014; Woltjer, Pinska-Chauvin, Laursen & Josefsson, 2015). Such research 
reduces our reliance on the often false assumptions of functional blueprints, or ‘work as 
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imagined’ (Dekker, 2006), to understand how and why organisations stay safe. Safety 2 
research is often conducted by researchers from cognitive engineering and psychology 
disciplines, as seen for example in the resilience engineering school (Hollnagel et al., 
2006). I show that social scientific approaches to the study of high-tech, safety-critical 
work and organisation has relevant contributions to make to this literature. First, existing 
empirical studies of work as done tend to focus on cognition (e.g. Bergström, Dahlström, 
Henriqson & Dekker, 2010; Carim, Saurin, Havinga, Rae, Dekker & Henriqson). Less is 
written about the layered social and organisational processes that arise from technical 
work practices (Haavik, Kongsvik, Bye, Dalseth Røyrvik & Almklov, 2017). Second, I show 
how investigating these processes does not require the use of accident models. Safety 2 
analysis frameworks that do, such as STAMP (Leveson, 2011) or FRAM (Hollnagel, 2012) 
have a tendency to result in the conclusion that sociotechnical systems are “complex”. 
This, as chapter 5 showed, is not always helpful. In contrast, the practice approaches 
detailed in chapters 2 and 3 show theorising from empirically observable deviations 
from procedures or particular contextual solutions in procedural grey areas can further 
our insights. In modelling terms, as chapter 4 lays out, the research focus shifts from 
functional structures to agents doing work, interacting, and influencing each other. 
As chapter 5 shows, the novel methodology and theory developed in this dissertation 
complements current thinking in safety sciences by demonstrating a tendency to 
inadvertently perpetuate illusions of control.
With regard to the normative debates on Normal Accident Theory (NAT) and High 
Reliability Theory (HRT), the process of innovative deviance furthermore suggests that 
despite their acknowledged shortcomings (Rijpma, 2003), as authoritative theories, NAT 
and HRT could be focus points for useful learning. Learning would require acknowledging 
the fragility of real-life HRO processes and practices, as well as the differentiation and 
fragmentation of safety culture within real HROs (e.g. Atak & Kingma, 2010). HROs I 
argue are therefore not immune from the pattern of accidents described by NAT. To 
appreciate such fragility means resisting deductive reasoning from normative accident 
models like Reason’s (1990) human error taxonomy and the Swiss Cheese Model (Reason 
et al., 1989), or the more normative renderings of HRO studies (e.g. Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2007). Even under societal pressure to find ‘the’ cause, or the person(s) to blame (Dekker, 
2004), it should instead perhaps be recognised that a major role of incident and accident 
investigations is to note contrasting, inconclusive evidence. In light of the horror that 
accidents are, this could mean developing new or strengthening existing social rituals 
and institutional structures to restore relations between the various inflicted parties 
(Dekker & Brakey, 2016), while allowing for more open-ended investigation narratives, 
which raise questions that cannot yet be answered.
How can investigation narratives create an authoritative text without solidifying 
a narrative on ‘the’ causes, underpinned by authoritative concepts and theories? Can 
societies accept investigation narratives that explicate the interpretive flexibility of black 
box data? Solutions, however imperfect, will depend much on institutional and cultural 
context. Failure needs to be acknowledged without ignoring interesting evidence that 
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might eschew established theories about sociotechnical systems. As I illustrate here, 
accident investigations may serve as useful guides for a sociotechnical research and 
development agenda. Thus, we may learn about more complex, emergent mechanisms 
that can be observed in, for example, commercial airline operations.
6.3 PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
Safety-critical organisations need to comply with safety regulations, which create 
considerable constraints and encourage a preoccupation with procedures and 
compliance. For organisations new to risk and safety management the exercise may be 
enlightening as well as frustrating. The rationalisation of risky organisational processes 
enables learning, reflection and control. Rationalisation however can also have 
drawbacks, such as becoming insensitive to intuitive expertise, which comes into play 
in safety assessments, but which can be difficult to explain. Becoming aware of, and 
developing a legitimate talking point with regard to the background of varying practices 
can help foster sensitivity to operations. This approach provides an advantage over 
relying purely on formal descriptions of technical and organisational safety barriers, 
which have a limited basis in reality. Therefore it is all the more important, when (re)
designing technical systems, operating procedures, and training methods, to include the 
targeted practical experts in these processes.
Airline companies for example are usually very good at designing and training 
standard operating procedures, which is why they are considered as high reliability 
organisations (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). The drawback of such a focus however can 
be that every informal instruction, such as a simple trick or rule of thumb to adapt a 
procedure to different contexts, ultimately becomes part of an increasingly elaborate 
standard operating procedure (Pélegrin, 2013). For example Rankin et al.’s (2016) study 
of cockpit surprise ultimately aims to find the ideal generic failure handling process 
sequence, which can then be turned into a procedure. In contrast, my studies suggest that 
there is a large variety within work practices that cannot be proceduralised. Knowing how 
to deviate therefore qualifies as an important aspect of the overall resilience potential 
that organisations have and use.
To learn how to deviate sensibly, pilots not only employ their formal training in 
communicative and team coordination and broader awareness of various (socio-)
psychological and physiological processes as taught by Crew Resource Management. 
Pilots also informally experiment with techniques and experience feedback of their 
actions in the operation. If such experiential learning is crucial for expertise development, 
it deserves a broad platform as well as expert guidance. Furthermore, companies train 
and certify pilots in flight simulators for certain procedures and scenarios. In addition, 
pilots could also benefit from simulator training with more complex scenarios, which are 
not (or ambiguously) covered by procedures:
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 ■ Asking training candidates to reflect on their recent experiences and think about 
what situations or techniques they want to train and discuss, besides subjecting 
them to formally required training and checks;
 ■ Developing simulation training and reflective evaluation of unexpected, complex 
operational situations, ranging from mundane to extraordinary, such as situations 
with contradicting warning signals or failures that due to time pressure cannot be 
resolved through the standard QRH process;
 ■ If necessary, train the trainers to help candidates ‘author’ their own training 
session, verbalise judgments based on experience, and reflect on their performance 
afterwards.
Leading a company in such a direction takes trust, relational work, and courage from 
the offices responsible. There are three key points to take into account in this process. 
First, key officials need to open up to innovative deviance. While innovative deviance is 
probably globally present, the Dutch response is consensus-driven and the interaction 
with authorities may more easily turn into a kind of negotiation. Fostering a just culture 
by opening up to a sort of negotiation with authorities, often conducted under the radar, 
makes sense in the Dutch society and culture but may very well fall short in other cultural 
and institutional contexts. This is not necessarily a bad thing. Therefore it may well be 
necessary to develop a context-sensitive language to address innovative deviance, taking 
stock of the advantages and social rituals available there. The most essential part may 
be to avoid falling into cultural comparisons, especially to imply any cultural superiority, 
because there is no such thing and because it is very unhelpful to get stuck in us-versus-
them comparisons.
Second, assuming that innovative deviance is in fact a global phenomenon, with 
context-specific expressions that invite various organisational responses, the challenge 
for safety management is to foster an open attitude and genuine curiosity for deviant 
practices. The use of auditing tools like LOSA may be helpful as a starting point for more 
in-depth research into safe practices, rather than to draw conclusions about safety. A 
difficulty with safety auditing observed in the Netherlands is that checking or auditing 
compliance is seen as a judgment, which creates distance between management and work 
floor that distorts the relations and inhibits mutual learning. Thus, safety management 
risks promoting an ideology that has little to do with what people actually do. Including 
researchers with a professional training in qualitative social scientific methods, such as 
organisational ethnography, is helpful to foster an open mind, study actual practices from 
the point of view of the person who performs them, and recognise more complex social 
and organisational processes. Not everyone is equally suited to be an ethnographer: it 
is important to look for a combination of social skills and an analytical mindset besides 
formal methodological and theoretical training.
Third, the translation of qualitative observations to a systematic organisational 
assessment demands a well thought-out interdisciplinary approach. It is not surprising 
that to reap the benefits of more intelligent software capabilities, organisations also 
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need to learn how these systems actually work in practice. Technologies invariably 
interact with people who are also confronted with various technical limitations, despite 
the promising potential. It is possible to draw on resilience engineering methods, such as 
STAMP (Leveson, 2011) or FRAM (Hollnagel, 2012), which are dedicated to address this 
development, and select candidates who are trained in these methods. However, because 
they rely on functionalist models based on accident thinking, these methods also have 
their shortcomings. It is hard to make the analytical step from the functional modelling 
of resilience potential (see Adriaensen et al., 2019, for an example of a DC-9 cockpit 
routine) to the often informal and ambivalent social and organisational relations between 
people from which safe – and in some cases deviating – practices emerge. Therefore 
it can be hard to translate the results into practice. An alternative is to start out with 
(ethnographic) interviews and observations of operational experts, who will often already 
have an advanced understanding of the technical problems that functional modelling can 
identify. Involving operational experts in functional modelling can also help bring these 
problems to the surface. Subsequently, researchers in the field of multi-agent systems 
modelling can help to corroborate ideas generated by ethnography and thus generate 
deeper insights. It is important that modelling specialists have the ability and willingness 
to level with and listen to members of the other disciplines involved. Only then can they 
develop insights on how to influence processes as carried out by larger more complexly 
interrelated populations of human and technical agents.
6.4 LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
6.4.1 Innovative deviance beyond the Dutch airline context
It seems likely that innovative deviance is a global phenomenon, because the paradox 
between compliance with standards, which dominates the view of high-tech safety 
critical work, and improvisations actually required to operate complex technology, 
is globally present. However innovative deviance may well be expressed differently 
and evoke different responses in other contexts than the Dutch commercial aviation 
industry studied here. Even in other sectors within the same national context, as a 
Dutch study comparing healthcare revealed (Kortleven et al., 2017), accomplices 
amongst the authorities may be absent or very differently organised. Presumably a 
lack of accomplices or just culture amongst authorities also means less effective safety 
processes in organisations, but these effects are difficult to prove and might be based 
on cultural assumptions that should be studied. It is said for example that Asian cultures 
like the Chinese inhibit dissent (Liao, 2015), which would imply that it is difficult to talk 
openly about deviance, thus limiting the learning and coping with technical anomalies 
and complexities through deviance. On the other hand I found that dissenting also 
remains a tense affair in the Dutch context, requiring specific safety cultural practices to 
accomplish. In other types of technical operations, perhaps other dilemmas will dominate, 
as well as other institutional responses.
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Studying deviations from standards in other safety-critical contexts, such as nuclear 
power plants, will likely reveal differently deviant practices and these may be black-boxed 
by different safety theories and ideologies. In my studies, aviation’s safety ideology 
provided an opening to talk about deviations from standards, since pilots’ discretionary 
space has long been formally recognised within a distributed model of authority in air 
transport organisations (Stoop & Kahan, 2005). Such an opening may not always be 
present in other professions and industries, such as chemical processing, oil and gas, and 
nuclear power, where operators may also be further removed from the core process by 
more advanced automation. In contrast, in relation to safety-critical professions that 
have managed to hold on to their traditional authority and autonomy, such as surgeons, 
debates about deviations may be more public but also more polarised. Here, I would 
expect that deviations from standards can effectively become part of a regulator’s 
arsenal to discipline powerful professional groups in order to make them accept new 
(safety) management systems.
Furthermore, based on my studies I expect that innovative deviance is equally 
important as a driver of emergent safety cultural processes in aircraft maintenance as 
in the cockpit. While my cockpit work studies do not include quantitative datasets to 
corroborate these results, many airline companies will have access to these data when 
they conducted a LOSA project. It would be interesting to use such data to learn about 
the extent and depth to which innovative deviance takes place in airline cockpits around 
the world. Further empirical studies of work processes and practices are also necessary 
to see if and how innovative deviance features in aircraft maintenance and other types of 
work that, despite their critical nature, are performed more ‘backstage’ than flying. The 
multi-agent system simulations suggest that the simple social mechanism of mimicking or 
influencing other team members’ behaviours, which then spread through team rotations, 
can explain a great deal of how safe practices emerge and erode. By including interactions 
with technological agents, future agent models can explain how interactions generate and 
spread deviant practices. If access is provided to safety databases, such as safety incidents 
and reporting, perhaps agent models could even test the assumptions about the effects of 
different forms of deviance and compliance. That is, further studies might elaborate and 
test conditions under which safe practices erode (Snook, 2000; Vaughan, 1997; 1999), 
versus conditions under which innovative deviance puts safety values into practice.
6.4.2 Resilient routines
Further studies of deviant work practices and organisational responses should enrich our 
knowledge of reflective practices in risk managed organisations. An important question is 
whether and how deviant practices foster resilience, which is about bouncing back from 
disturbances, or at least degrading gracefully (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). As HRO theorists 
(Weick et al., 2008) and safety scholars (Hollnagel et al. 2006) suggest, resilience is crucial 
to deal with unforeseen events where organisations transgress beyond design limits. If 
innovative deviance enables an organisation to deal with such transgressions, large and 
small, then innovative deviance is an important source of an organisation’s resilience 
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potential. Perhaps this potential can get weakened over time as regulatory processes 
black-box and constrain the space for reflection that drives innovative deviance. In other 
areas than aviation, such as nuclear power, where catastrophic failures have a potentially 
worse, long term impact, it seems especially urgent and interesting to investigate whether 
and how resilience is maintained through deviance. Could it be, for example, that by 
learning how and when to deviate or strike a balance in routinely encountered procedural 
grey areas, professional experts learn a more generic, experiential skill that they can also 
resort to in highly unusual, out-of-limits situations? Or is extensive training with more 
generic risk and failure heuristics (e.g. Rankin, Woltjer & Field, 2016) in combination with 
more specific crisis scenarios or emergency procedures the only way to prepare for these 
situations? Similar questions might be asked for sociotechnical systems with other types 
of risk than safety, such as security of critical infrastructures.
Studies into extreme contexts like cockpits might provide useful insights in resilient 
routines beyond the safety-critical domain for organisations operating in other risk 
contexts, such as finance or accounting (Hällgren, Rouleau & De Rond, 2018). The cockpit 
is an interesting extreme context because of the tight safety margins and the extensive 
automation and standardisation. Thus, the cockpit could also serve as an extreme case 
for the question if standardisation and automation leads to deskilling and thus eliminates 
resilience potential in organisations.
A superficial reading of this context would suggest that almost all the work done 
conforms to organisational routines, because pre-existing designs and key assumptions 
underpinning the trained routines almost always hold (Suarez & Montes, 2019). This 
would imply only very modest, perhaps negligible engagements in improvisational 
activity, such as ‘interpretations’ or ‘embellishments’ (Weick, 1998) of the operational 
routines as they are designed. It would also imply that organisations’ resilience potential 
remains invisible in the vast majority of cockpit work situations, because there are so 
few significant disturbances to the routine to bounce back from. Drawing lessons from 
superficial readings of the cockpit context to other organisations then logically emphasise 
conformity with formalised routines rather than raising the question how to improvise 
wisely in more ambiguous situations.
According to this point of view, operating airlines appears to be a more dreary 
affair than how I portrayed their processes here. Indeed, various aspects of the flight 
operation, which I have mostly omitted in my current studies, might be relatively 
uneventful compared to the action I described. There could be a certain selection bias 
as for reasons of practicability I focused on short-haul flights, where I expected that I 
could observe deviations from standards in a more condensed way than if I had chosen 
for long haul flights.
Based on what I have observed, however, I suspect that a detailed study zooming in 
on longer trajectories of team action (Christianson, 2019) will reveal plenty of resilience 
in the form of improvising within the grey areas of design assumptions. Loukopoulos, 
Dismukes and Barshi’s (2003) study for example highlighted that while there are many 
intersecting tasks or subroutines, which pilots are expected to perform simultaneously, 
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such multitasking is arguably a myth. In practice, routines have to be cut in parts, put on 
hold, cut short, picked up again, adapted, stretched, shortened, etc. That is, in order to 
perform many intersecting tasks, pilots probably improvise to match events with the time 
and sequencing presumed by the procedures (Crossan, Cunha, Vera & Cunha, 2005) and 
rely on quick heuristics to take shortcuts (Tuccio, 2011) rather than performing routines 
precisely as designed.
6.4.3 Groovy organising
My studies were predicated on the assumption, based on the insights of the HRO 
literature (e.g. Weick & Roberts, 1993) and Orr’s (1996) influential study of field 
technicians, that the operation of safety-critical processes can be characterised as a 
continuous, methodical improvisation. This lens was useful in determining the research 
focus on deviations from standards, which are implied by improvisational processes, 
and the results suggest that improvisation does indeed play an important role in the 
operation of complex jets. However to date there are no studies that take this perspective 
on high-tech, safety-critical operations to their full potential and describe in detail how, 
when, to what extent, and to what effect professionals like airline pilots, air traffic 
controllers, and maintenance technicians actually improvise. Perhaps it is difficult to do 
so because it is hard to obtain the rich data necessary for answering these questions 
and because theorising from these data also implies an investment in disciplined 
imagination (Cornelissen, 2006; Weick, 1989). Presumably, as was the other premise 
of my dissertation, it is hard to ‘unsee’ the design blueprints of organisational routines, 
when organisations invest so heavily in routinising.
Building on the organisational improvisation literature, the metaphor of jazz 
improvisation (Barett, 1998; Weick, 1998) might inspire further studies. One of the 
returning themes in the organisational improvisation literature is that there are many 
ways to define organisational improvisation (Hadida, Tarvainen & Rose, 2015). In HRO 
contexts like airline cockpits it may seem more obvious to define improvisation as an 
episodic type of phenomenon by which teams respond to crisis situations (Bigley & 
Roberts, 2001; Rerup, 2001; Trotter, Salmon & Lenne, 2014; 2015). It is, however, also 
possible to identify more continuous, and more mundane, improvisational phenomena. 
Hadida et al. (2015) define team-level, low-degree organisational improvising as 
‘synchronising’, analogously to how a jazz orchestra’s rhythm section creates a groovy 
performance. Such synchronising phenomena are more likely to be continuous aspect 
of human teamwork as well as for individuals working with technical systems, which with 
today’s digital capabilities could also easily be defined as actively synchronising agents.
To apply this analogy to a flight crew, imagine for example as a baseline a classical 
orchestra performance, analogously to how teams in other organisations perform a very 
strict ritual, such as a military parade, in an almost completely determined environment. 
This might be the image of perfect, ritualistic compliance (Merton, 1949), which conforms 
to what the safety scholars call ‘work as imagined’ (Dekker, 2006) because it leaves 
out most of the variation seen in real-life operations. Then, by contrast, imagine a jazz 
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performance, analogously to how a team performs a standardised process in a more 
hectic and indeterminate environment, such as a crew performing a flight to Amsterdam 
Schiphol airport.
This analogy then might highlight how teams of highly skilled technical and operational 
experts are connecting and interacting with each other and with external audiences 
through their instruments. They rely on an array of well-rehearsed standards, sometimes 
creating new moves on the spot but more often resorting almost automatically to their 
personal repertoires of ‘licks’ and ‘crips’ (Barett, 1998, p. 606). Improvising teams may 
also be seen to joke and talk during the performance, communicate nonverbally to cue 
an alternation of roles or leads, express emotions and surprise, and coordinate their 
performance in ways that, despite the application of shared vocabulary and standards, 
is largely tacitly understood.
By elaborating these processes, future research could develop insights in the 
perceived contradiction between improvisation and compliance with standards, on which 
I cited the Dutch Safety Board in the introduction of this thesis. This perception appears 
to be based in deep-seated cultural beliefs about the risks and fragility of improvisation 
versus the safety of standards. In contrast, the improvisational lens could help elaborate 
empirically as well as theoretically how improvisations and standards go together. As 
American musician Wynton Marsalis points out, despite the improvisational nature of 
the jazz genre, its ‘harmonic progression […] is standardised. […] The standardised grid 
underlines everything from our voting ballad to the sky scrapers to the distance between 
lines in our roads. […] Our understanding of that grid determines how successful we will 
be at what we want; so, too, with the chord progressions of a song’ (Wynton at Harvard, 
2017, 0:07-2:26 minutes).
Gauging from my own observations, the musical analogy could lead to interesting 
insights in reflective practices and resilience. The idea that flight crews synchronise as 
though they are seeking a groovy rhythm might for example allow researchers to discover 
how flight crews manage to slow down and speed up their decision making process under 
time pressure. My study in chapter 3 presented a model of alternating and overlapping 
fast reflexive and slow reflective action. Synchronising, by way of slowing down and 
speeding up teamwork processes in a dynamic flight routine, could elaborate this 
process. It may be necessary to slow down the teamwork process in order to engage in 
the slower reasoning process (Hodgkinson & Sadler-Smith, 2018). Experimental cockpit 
cognition research has indeed shown for example that reframing, or adjusting one’s 
understanding of a situation in response to a surprise, takes time to complete (Rankin et 
al., 2016). There are CRM tools to slow down and reflect on risks for a moment, such as 
Threat and Error Management (TEM) (Helmreich et al., 2017, May), but this appears to 
presume a more linear and predictable flight process than what I observed in practice 
(cf. Dekker & Lundstrom, 2006). In reality, while crews rethink the situation, the music 
keeps playing. Therefore it could be worthwhile to study whether and how TEM or other 
management tools actually feature in improvisations by which teams slow down, reassess, 
and reorganise in-flight.
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More fundamentally, this research may go on to discover ‘a tacit, taken-for-granted 
quality in all organising that we fail to see because we are distracted by more conspicuous 
artefacts such as structure, control, authority, planning, charters, and standard operating 
procedures’ (Weick, 1999, p. 533). Consider for example how flight crews’ commitment 
to land seems to emerge in an evolving situation, rather than through a strictly analytical 
process such as checking the stable approach criteria, as Dekker’s (2009) Turkish Airlines 
crash analysis pointed out. My own observations of a formally unstable approach in the 
simulator in chapter 3, as well as a real-life decision to commit to the destination airport 
in chapter 2, also describe such emerging commitment. Perhaps studying how teams and 
organisations commit to certain courses of action is more effectively done by looking 
through an improvisational lens (Weick, 1998), than the traditionally used lenses of 
decision making (e.g. Kahneman & Klein, 2009; Klein, 2015).
6.4.4 Foresight and future technologies
Ongoing technological advances may also be changing reflective practices in ways that 
will need to be covered by future research. Current airline jet automation for example 
represents semi-autonomous rather than fully autonomous technology and is a far cry 
from the ‘intelligent’ technology of the currently developing Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
paradigm. Current AI however may represent a new paradigm of automation which 
according to some scholars will have a massive impact on organisations and professionals 
(Faraj et al., 2018). By way of machine learning, AI software systems can potentially 
reach better judgments over certain areas of expertise that were traditionally the 
exclusive jurisdiction of professionals, such as interpreting scans in radiology (Hosny, 
Parmar, Quackenbush, Schwartz & Aerts, 2018). Research then is needed on social and 
organisational responses to these technical innovations, which may put greater demands 
on the human learning, intelligence, and creativity implied by innovative deviance. As 
technology operators are resituated in the further automated control process, they 
will likely need to develop new intuitions and heuristics to interact with new systems 
(cf. Hutchins, 1995a), which will include software that behaves in ways that cannot be 
understood with traditional means (Faraj et al., 2018).
A relevant line of future research is to study how organisations undergoing AI 
automation manage to retain or transform critical skills and knowledge. There are 
widespread fears that AI will lead to massive job losses and deskilling (Faraj et al., 2018). 
Indeed, the aviation case suggests that when organisations aim to eliminate violations 
and limit operational variability in search of protection by automatic systems, they may 
actually drive dangerous deskilling (Oliver et al., 2017). Researchers therefore suggest 
designing flexible routines, which only partially constrain teams while deliberately 
leaving other aspects of the performative routine open to professional discretion (Grote, 
Weichbrodt, Günter, Zala-Mezö & Künzle, 2009). My findings on innovative deviance 
on the other hand suggest that design constraints, anchored in ‘safe standards’, also 
trigger, feed, and incorporate reflection, creativity, and expertise development. Further 
studies on how and why formal standards develop in response to AI systems might thus 
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reveal how organisations and professions retain or perhaps transform skills, while under 
industry pressures to further standardise and automate processes.
Further research in the fields of regulation, routines, and artificial intelligence would 
benefit from radical interdisciplinarity, such as the close collaboration between textually 
oriented qualitative ethnographers and mathematically oriented agent modellers in my 
studies attempted. The value is not necessarily in developing predictive models, which 
may be impossible and even unwanted in view of human agency and the complexity 
of culture. In my experience, the value in modelling might be primarily the exercise of 
formal modelling itself and the way this forces participants in the process to explicate 
assumptions, test the internal logic of their theoretical arguments, and spread the insights 
gained as they continue work within their discipline. If all participants are open to learning, 
this could generate insightful readings in major sociotechnical questions of our time. The 
processes described here could for example inform debates about how to trust AI to make 
critical legal, surgical, and military decisions; how to reorganise semi- or fully autonomous 
traffic; and whether to rely on nuclear power and the safety cultures that would need to 
keep nuclear processes and waste safe, while we already begin to experience the impact 
of fossil fuel use on the climate, possibly to the detriment of societal and political stability.
Without necessarily providing any clear-cut predictions, by understanding the depth 
to which technical systems rely on deviant organising, I argued earlier that we can still 
make critical technological choices with some foresight. To illustrate the limitations to 
prediction, I write these concluding remarks at a time when the world, and with it the 
global aviation industry, is severely impacted by the corona virus crisis. This may have 
deeply changed the context and thus the object of my research. Does the economic 
hardship that presumably follows, as well as sudden changes and restrictions to 
operational aviation routines, trigger the creation of various shortcuts, workarounds, 
and other deviations from safe standards? If so, will these help create safe practices or 
signify an erosion of aviation’s safety institutions, or worse, dangerous leaks in the global 
efforts to contain the virus?
Beyond this immediate crisis as experienced in aviation, however, perhaps a 
more general lesson is to continue to recognise the contradictions in technical and 
organisational designs, and expect these to surface in the experience of human operators. 
With increasing reliance on digital systems, capable of autonomous decision making, 
there is growing need to distinguish the human contribution that is needed to keep these 
systems aloft. My studies suggest that the human contribution can be formulated around 
reflective practices, which regularly deviate from standards and signify a diverse basis 
of socially constructed expertise, ingrained in, but not limited to, typical human traits 
such as habit and intuition. It seems likely that with more powerful decision making 
automation, the human role will centre even more on managing exceptions to rules, which 
are beyond the decision making abilities of robots and semi-autonomous systems like 
autopilots. If this is true, and societal conditions allow it, then capitalising on innovative 
deviance could become a vital aspect of managing and regulating even the most control-
oriented organisations in the future.
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SUMMARY
This dissertation encompasses a set of studies that address persistent yet problematic 
assumptions about the way complex and hazardous technologies are operated by 
the members of aviation safety cultures. Aviation safety culture is often described as 
humble in terms of its acceptance of human errors and technical failures, underscored 
by the many redundancies, meticulous planning, and adherence to standard operating 
procedures. However, because of the extensive standardisation and conformity 
presumed necessary to stay in control, it is hard to grasp how deviations from standards 
belong to such a culture. Deviations from standards however are implied in the more 
varied, fragile, and messy processes by which operational experts like pilots, flight 
attendants, air traffic controllers, maintenance technicians, and ground personnel are 
known to apply procedures and planning in practice. As I demonstrate in the introduction, 
essential knowledge about these deviating processes is easily ‘black-boxed’ in formal-
legal narratives and theoretical debates. The central research question of my dissertation 
therefore is: What role do deviations from standards play in committed safety cultures?
Reading this theoretical black box in the context of the Dutch commercial aviation 
industry, my main finding is that deviations from standards reflect widespread ingenuity 
and dexterity of operational experts dealing with contradictions in complex sociotechnical 
systems. My studies find certain social and organisational processes responsible for 
dealing with contradictions when problems come to the surface. The overall response 
can be characterised as innovative deviance, driven by operational experts and relying on 
‘accomplices’ amongst the authorities tasked with management, oversight, prosecution, 
and governance.
The contextualising study in chapter 2 indicates that there is a social risk in deviating 
for aviation professionals, which creates some tensions. On the one hand, despite the 
intention to act in line with the spirit of the procedure and even with ample legal anchor 
and precedent, deviating from the letter of the procedure can be construed as deviance 
by authorities within or outside the organisation. On the other hand, authorities who act 
as ‘accomplices’ appear to negotiate contrasting risk perceptions from their own legal 
perspective, the public, and the professional safety culture where innovative deviance 
sometimes surfaces. I observed how the resulting tensions surface in flight crews’ work 
in the cockpit in the form of humour, emotions, and stress normally seen during the 
interactions of a routine working day.
The study of airline pilots’ cockpit work practices in chapter 3 uncovers expert-
drivers of the emergence and normalisation of organisational deviance, or routine 
nonconformity with procedures. I note that while seminal accident studies of NASA 
focuses on the negative consequences of deviance, I focus on positive consequences. 
I find that in procedural grey areas, routine deviations from procedures arise within 
a normal process of developing and transmitting expertise. Expertise development 
means developing intuition and using deviations from standards as opportunities to 
communicate about different intuitions between professionals with varying experience.
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There is an argument that ‘opening’ a theoretical black box can turn into an empty 
exercise if one ignores the moral and practical problems associated with them. In 
chapters 4 and 5 I therefore engage with the engineering disciplines, who are responsible 
for designing safety-critical technologies and organisations. Their safety culture models 
are often a-political, while qualitative studies show that safety cultures develop through 
power and (office-) politics. By formalising these insights in a multi-agent model, chapter 
4 translates the idea that safety commitment in organisational cultures does not always 
follow predictable paths. Instead, by modelling a maintenance company’s power relations 
and work process, and conducting simulations with this model, we demonstrate how 
commitment to safety emerges in non-linear ways from (mostly routine) work and social 
interactions. In chapter 5 I report how this methodology offered a useful alternative for 
safety management to existing theories in the case of a ground services organisation. 
The methodology may allow companies to achieve a fuller social understanding of safety 
commitment and help to apply control in more effective ways.
These findings contribute to our understanding of safety cultures and also have wider 
implications. Innovative deviance is a concept developed by sociologist Robert Merton 
to analyse how certain practices that transgress the law are criminalised by societies, but 
at the same time represent innovations that enable people to realise cultural values. In 
my studies, the application is more subtle, in that there are no clear transgressions of the 
law, but rather professionals exercising discretion in ‘grey areas’. These actions can get 
criminalised, but may also represent useful practical innovations such as workarounds 
and shortcuts needed to keep an operational process going. In other societal contexts 
and domains, innovative deviance may proceed differently than in the Netherlands. 
Further research should explore the social and organisational responses elsewhere, 
since it seems likely that innovative deviance is a phenomenon that is globally present.
Practical implications of these findings include becoming aware of varying, deviating 
practices in order to foster sensitivity to operations. When (re)designing technical 
systems, operating procedures, and training methods, organisations should recognise 
the practical reasons for deviating and include practical experts to foster constructive 
learning. Leading a company in such a direction takes trust, relational work, and courage 
from the offices responsible. However, these efforts may be well spent. It seems likely 
that in the future, with more powerful decision making automation, the human role 
will centre even more on managing exceptions to rules. Complex exceptions after all 
are beyond the decision making abilities of robots and semi-autonomous systems like 
autopilots. If this is true, and societal conditions allow it, then capitalising on innovative 
deviance could become a vital aspect of managing and regulating even the most control-
oriented organisations in the future.
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